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Abstract 
Successful pursuit of multiple goals (e.g., health, career, family goals) is critical to personal 
well-being and social prosperity. However, despite significant research on how people 
manage single goals or even dynamics among two goals, people’s understanding of the 
relations among all of their goals (i.e., goal structure) has not been extensively researched. To 
address this gap, this dissertation builds on the rich traditions in social science that study 
differences in people’s lay theories about the nature of things and how they work. 
Synthesizing diverse scientific theories of goal structures (e.g., control theory, spreading 
activation theory), I proposed a novel framework to study lay theories of goal structure, or 
goal models (i.e., individuals’ beliefs about the organizing principles of the relations among 
goals): hierarchical, network, and sequential. To study goal models, I borrowed mind-
mapping techniques and developed methods to assess and manipulate individuals’ goal 
models. Results of the validation study (Study 1) provided initial evidence that there is 
diversity in how people represent their goals, and that this diversity is well-captured by the 
goal model framework. Since these goal models highlight different organizing principles, I 
argue that they can confer benefits or involve costs, depending on the situation. Subsequent 
studies (Studies 2 to 7) tested the corresponding implications of goal models across self-
regulatory situations (e.g., managing chronic goal conflict, goal progress) and presented 
evidence for the predictive validity of each model. This research contributes to the extant 
literature (on goals, self-regulation, lay theories, etc.) by providing a theoretical framework 
and scientific methods to systematically understand the nature and impact of the way 
individuals structure their goals. The findings on divergent implications of goal models offer 
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practical insights into the dynamics of regulating multiple goals, helping to promote effective 
self-regulation. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 A consistent refrain of modern life is the lament for the many and varied demands that we 
must balance. Regardless of whether one’s ambitions are broad or narrow, whether one’s 
resources are vast or limited, whether triumphs or defeats call more frequently, to live is to 
juggle multiple goals. To fulfil one’s goals—the internal representations of desired end-states 
(Austin & Vancouver, 1996)—is important not only because it leads to the direct attainment of 
desired outcomes, but also because it has far-reaching effects on life satisfaction, self-esteem, 
and health (e.g., Emmons, 1986, 1996; Emmons & King, 1988; Gray, Ozer, & Rosenthal, 2017; 
McGregor & Little, 1998; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). Not surprisingly, psychology has a long 
tradition of studying goals that can be traced back to the earliest days of the discipline; it remains 
one of the most studied topics in psychology (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; James, 1890). 
 Research has focused on identifying the content of goals (e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1988; 
Elliot & Thrash, 2001; Higgins, 1997; Higgins et al., 1987), describing the process of a goal 
pursuit (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1982; Gollwitzer, 1990; Latham & Locke, 1991; Lord & Levy, 
1994; Powers, 1973), unpacking the dimensions of goals that influence judgments and behaviors 
(e.g., Cesario, Corker, & Jelinek, 2013; Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
and examining how to make goal pursuit more effective (e.g., Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 
1994; Kluger & DeNisi, 1998; Locke & Latham, 1990). Despite the extensive goal literature, 
historically most of the work in this area has been geared towards understanding the 
psychological impacts of and on single goals (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). It is only in the past 
two decades that the direct study of multiple goals has drawn increasing attention in the social 
sciences and become an influential topic within self-regulation and motivation research (Ballard, 
Yeo, Loft, Vancouver, & Neal, 2016; Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010; Kruglanski et al., 
 2 
2002; Louro, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2007; N. E. Miller, 1944; Vancouver, Weinhardt, & 
Schmidt, 2010).   
The core assumption within the study of multiple goals is that even a single goal cannot 
be understood in isolation from an individual’s other goals. People have diverse, multiple goals 
that co-exist and influence each other in a system (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Lord & Levy, 1994). 
People are active agents who construct relations among their goals (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 
1998; Huang, Zhang, & Broniarczyk, 2012). Consequently, successful pursuit of a given goal not 
only depends on direct actions towards that goal, but also on how people manage the relations 
(both positive and negative) among their host of goals (Emmons & King, 1988). Thus, in order 
to understand why people succeed or fail at self-regulation, it is critical to consider goals within 
the systems or structures they inhabit. Yet to date, most research on self-regulation has focused 
on addressing the impact of goal content (e.g., promotion/prevention goals, intrinsic/extrinsic 
goals; Higgins, 1997; Ryan & Deci, 2000) and the relations between two goals (e.g., goal 
conflict; N. E. Miller, 1944). Relatively little research has examined the impact of goal structure 
as a whole (Tomasik, Knecht, & Freund, 2017). I propose that people’s subjective theories about 
the relations among their goals may have important influences on self-regulation.  
 To begin addressing these questions, my dissertation integrates research on goal relations 
and structure, lay theories, and self-regulation to propose a novel framework for examining 
individuals’ lay theories of goal structure, or goal models. Based on theoretical and empirical 
work on goal structure, I propose a novel framework with three major organizing principles that 
might underlie individuals’ goal models: hierarchical, network, and sequential. This line of 
research by no means aims to address how goals are actually represented in the brain. However, 
prior work on other types of lay theories—laypeople’s assumptions about the nature of things 
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and how they work—reveals that they are powerful in influencing human behaviors, regardless 
of whether people’s lay theories are scientifically accurate (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995b; Hong, 
Chao, & No, 2009). I introduce the idea that the unique organizing principles of each goal model 
lead to both benefits and costs depending on the types of outcomes examined, the affordances of 
a given situation, and the sensitivities of the individual. Knowing these contingencies adds to our 
understanding of why people succeed (and fail) at key self-regulatory challenges and pushes the 
boundary of the self-regulation literature to consider the impact of goal structure. Moreover, as 
lay theories are malleable (Dweck et al., 1995b), this knowledge also provides actionable 
insights into guiding people to devise a suitable goal model in response to their specific multiple-
goal challenges, contributing to the promotion of more effective self-regulation. 
 I first provide a brief review of prior work on goal structure and the significance of 
adopting a lay theory approach. By integrating these two previously unrelated literatures, I then 
introduce the goal model framework and discuss in detail the potential characteristics of each lay 
theory (i.e., hierarchical, network, and sequential). Drawing on self-regulation research, I offer 
propositions for how each goal model may affect self-regulatory experience and outcomes 
differently across multiple contexts. Seven empirical studies are then presented. As no extant 
empirical work that I know of examines individuals’ lay theories of goal structure, I developed 
novel methods to assess (Study 1) and to manipulate goal models (Study 3). I also tested the 
proposed hypotheses of each of the three goal models in relation to different self-regulatory 
challenges (Studies 2 to 7). Last, I will discuss the implications of this framework and future 
directions. 
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Goal Structure 
 The study of goal structure involves the study of the interrelations among goals (Austin & 
Vancouver, 1996; Unsworth, Yeo, & Beck, 2014): To what extent do an individual’s goals work 
with, against, and beside one another? To understand the potential organizing principles that 
unite diverse goals, it is useful to first consider the simpler case of potential relations among two 
goals and then consider how questions of a more comprehensive goal structure builds on, 
complements, and diverges from that simple system.  
 At the most general level, there are three primary possibilities for the ways in which an 
individual’s goals may interact: they may have no direct influence on each other (i.e., neither 
harm or help), they may directly facilitate each other (e.g., running with friends promoting both 
social and fitness goals), or they may directly conflict with each other (e.g., relaxing on a beach 
to pursue leisure goals versus working overtime to advance one’s career; Gray et al., 2017). Not 
surprisingly, goal facilitation and goal conflict have received the most attention (Boudreaux & 
Ozer, 2013; Emmons & King, 1988; Kelly, Mansell, & Wood, 2015; Kleiman & Hassin, 2013; 
Presseau, Tait, Johnston, Francis, & Sniehotta, 2013; Riediger & Freund, 2004). Goal facilitation 
happens when the pursuit of one goal increases the likelihood of the success of pursuing the 
other (e.g., “get good grades, manage my time better”; Gray et al., 2017). Goal conflict happens 
when the pursuit of one goal hinders or excludes the pursuit of the other (Gray et al., 2017). Goal 
facilitation and goal conflict have been primarily examined with respect to two goals. These 
goals tend to be situation-specific (e.g., work and family, academic and social) and examined in 
relative isolation from other possibly related goals (Kelly et al., 2015; c.f. Turner-McGrievy, 
Wright, Migneault, Quintiliani, & Friedman, 2014).  
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Research on goal structure examines the interrelations among goals, each represented as a 
unit. People can hold vastly diverse goals which can be as abstract as values and identities 
(Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) or as concrete as motives, projects, tasks, 
and actions (Gollwitzer, 1990; Malaviya, Brendl, & Miguel, 2014; McGregor & Little, 1998; 
Schmuck & Sheldon, 2001; Unsworth et al., 2014). Moreover, goal structure research builds on 
the study of dual goal relations that goals can be mutually influential (e.g., work-family, 
academic-social). Goals and dyadic goal relations are integral units to a goal structure (Kelly et 
al., 2015; Tomasik et al., 2017). However, the focal concern of a goal structure goes beyond the 
study of goals as single or dyadic units.  
Compared to the focus on single goals, goal structures consider multiple goals—both 
adjacent and non-adjacent—simultaneously. In contrast to the focus on direct relations between 
two focal goals (e.g., work-family), a goal structure takes into account both type of relations 
(e.g., direct and indirect relations, facilitation and inhibition relations, presence and absence of 
relations) and configurations of goals relations (e.g., number of goals a goal is connected to; 
Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 2002). If goals are diverse building blocks and 
goal relations represent how well they fit with one another, goal structure is the architecture into 
which goals can form.  
As a whole, a goal structure’s impact on self-regulation has the potential to be more than 
just the sum of its parts (i.e., goals and relations). Within a goal structure, goals vary in their 
positions and interrelations. However, these variations do not necessarily reflect the actual layout 
of goals in the brain (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). Even though goal structure is principle-driven, 
its functioning is not entirely rigid. A modern view of goal structure is to see it as a dynamic 
system (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Scholer, 2014). This means that goal interrelations are governed 
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by systematic principles, but these interrelations can change (e.g., when interacting with 
individual and situational characteristics).  
Prior work on theorizing about goal structure offers three major organizing principles for 
conceptualizing how goals operate in a system. First, many classic theories proposed that goals 
operate vertically with hierarchical relations. Goals vary in importance (and level of abstraction) 
and form structures that resemble a hierarchy (Carver & Scheier, 1982b; Lord & Levy, 1994), 
pyramid (Maslow, 1943), or ladder (Trope & Liberman, 2010; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). 
Second, other theories have viewed goals as interconnected on a more equal playing field, as a 
web or associative network (A. M. Collins & Loftus, 1975; Hebb, 1955; Kruglanski et al., 2002; 
J. Y. Shah & Kruglanski, 2000), tripartite groups (Deci & Ryan, 2000; McClelland, 1987), or 
branching tree (Sattath & Tversky, 1977; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). Third, 
other perspectives emphasize goal pursuit over time, where goals are steps or phases (Gollwitzer, 
1990; Orehek & Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, 2013) that are salient at different points of a timeline 
(Heckhausen et al., 2010). These three classes of theories present distinct sets of organizing 
principles of goal structures. I will come back to discuss these differentiations and potential 
implications in more detail in the section of the proposed goal model framework. 
Limited Work on Subjective Theories 
 Despite theoretical work on how to conceptualize goal structure, the body of empirical 
research on goal structure is limited. No research that I am aware of has systematically tested 
whether individuals differ in their endorsement of these organizing principles and its influence 
on how they view relations among their goals. Work that has more narrowly examined 
components of goal structure, however, suggests that studying lay beliefs about goal structure is 
a promising direction as they may exert critical influences on self-regulation and well-being. 
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 For instance, seminal studies conducted by Emmons and King (1988) showed that the 
valence of relations in a goal structure can affect one’s psychological well-being. They asked 
participants to freely list personal goals and then rate, for each pair of goals, the extent to which 
they viewed the pursuit of one goal as hindering or facilitating the pursuit of another. The higher 
the level of conflict among goals, the more individuals reported negative affect and 
psychosomatic symptoms. Subsequent studies using similar methods also reported similar results 
(Lauterbach & Newman, 1999; Sheldon & Emmons, 1995; Slade & Sheehan, 1979; Tomasik et 
al., 2017; see the meta-analysis in Gray et al., 2017).  
 Research in goal system theory also examines how specific configurations of a goal with 
its adjacent goals can affect goal activation and motivation. For example, J. Y. Shah, Friedman, 
and Kruglanski (2002) showed that a goal’s level of activation was influenced by the activation 
of its neighboring goals. Specifically, an increasing commitment to a focal goal deactivated its 
connected non-committed goals and their associated means. This effect is presumably 
subconscious and beneficial for goal striving. In addition, the motivation to pursue a given means 
or sub-goal is also affected by the number of goals to which the means is connected. In a series 
of experiments, Zhang, Fishbach, and Kruglanski (2007) revealed that people perceived a given 
means to have lower instrumentality with respect to each goal when it served multiple goals 
versus a single goal. As a result, in situations when only one focal goal was activated and people 
needed to choose a means to pursue the goal, people were less motivated to pursue the means 
that served multiple goals (vs. another means that only serve specifically the focal goal).  
A Lay Theory Approach 
 Social science has rich traditions in the study of differences in people’s subjective beliefs 
about the nature of things and how they work, which are broadly called lay theories (Dweck, 
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1996; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Furnham, 1988; Zedelius, Müller, & Schooler, 2017).1 The term 
lay theories comes from the idea that people resemble lay scientists who collect information from 
experience and derive explanations for the way they believe the world works (Gelman, 2004; 
Heider, 1958; Hirschfeld, 2001; G. A. Kelly, 1955). These lay theories are defined as knowledge 
structures or assumptions that people hold to make sense of the environment (Chao & Kung, 
2015; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995a; Hong et al., 2009; Plaks, 2017). Most lay theories are 
context-specific: a person can have a collection of diverse lay theories, each unique to a 
particular situation or domain (e.g., lay theories of personality, empathy, intelligence, 
relationships, and race; Chao & Kung, 2015; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Kung, Eibach, & 
Grossmann, 2016; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998; Tullett & Plaks, 2016). Like personality, 
although there are reliable individual differences in lay theories, it is possible that a person’s lay 
theories change across both time and situations (Dweck et al., 1995b; Plaks, 2017). Evidence 
suggests that lay theories can be modified momentarily or changed reliably when trained over 
time (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Kung et al., 2018; Leith et al., 2014; Yeager et al., 2016). As 
many people, unlike scientists, do not formally test theories they hold, people’s lay theories may 
not be scientifically correct, and many people may not even be able to clearly articulate the 
theories without prompting (Dweck et al., 1995a; Furnham, 1988). However, even though lay 
theories may not be true in reality, they are influential in guiding people’s attitudes and behaviors 
and thus are important to understand (Zedelius et al., 2017). 
 Substantial evidence shows that lay theories have critical impact on psychological 
outcomes (see Dweck, 1995a; Plaks, 2017; Prentice & Miller, 2007; Zedelius et al., 2017). The 
                                                          
1 Similar ideas are commonly referred to as implicit theories and implicit beliefs, and types of lay theories vary, e.g., 
inheritability, immutability, entitativity, and psychological essentialism (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Chao & Kung, 
2015; Gelman, Coley, & Gottfried, 1994; Hamilton, Sherman, & Rodgers, 2004; Hong et al., 2009; Medin & 
Ortony, 1989; Plaks, 2017; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt et al., 2004).  
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classic study of lay theories focuses on people’s assumptions about whether certain attributes 
(e.g., intelligence, race) are fixed or malleable characteristics (Plaks, 2017; Zedelius et al., 2017). 
For instance, people have different lay theories of intelligence—the extent to which people 
believe intelligence is fixed versus malleable—and this variation is particularly relevant in 
achievement settings, predicting academic outcomes such as grades and academic motivation 
(e.g., Rattan, Good, & Dweck, 2012; Robins & Pals, 2002; Yeager et al., 2016). People also vary 
in their lay theories of race (or culture), which refers to beliefs about whether race is a malleable 
social construction or a fixed attribute that differentiates people into meaningful social categories 
(Chao & Kung, 2015; Hong et al., 2009; No et al., 2008). Lay theories of race are especially 
influential in cross-cultural settings, affecting intergroup outcomes such as stereotyping (Chao, 
Hong, & Chiu, 2013; Plaks, Malahy, Sedlins, & Shoda, 2012), prejudice (Jayaratne et al., 2006; 
Williams & Eberhardt, 2008), intergroup anxiety (Chao, Chen, Roisman, & Hong, 2007), and 
intergroup trust and cooperation (Kung et al., 2018).  
The perspective of distinguishing fixedness versus malleability beliefs is not the only 
framework in which people’s lay theories can differ (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Gelman, 2003; 
Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004). For example, in the domain of race, people also vary in the 
degree to which they believe racial groups share the same genetic dispositions (Plaks et al., 
2012). Another example is in the domain of wisdom: lay people differ in their theories about 
what constitute as wisdom. People vary in the extent they believe a wise person to be practical, 
philosophical, and/or benevolent (Weststrate, Ferrari, & Ardelt, 2016); they also differ in 
viewing wisdom to be a matter of knowledge, cognitive ability, or emotional regulation 
(Grossmann & Kung, 2018). In short, the content of people’s lay theories is flexible, and thus fits 
into diverse meaningful frameworks, usually depending on the domain. 
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From Scientific Theories to Lay Theories: A Goal Model Framework 
Integrating the goal structure literature with a lay theory perspective, I argue that people 
may adopt different lay theories of structure to understand their goals (i.e., organizing principles 
among multiple goals)—I call these goal models. Just like other lay theories, individuals’ goal 
models may not reflect how their goals are truly organized. Yet again, regardless of how goal 
structure truly operates, lay theories are powerful guides for one’s subjective understanding of 
experiences and bases for actions (Furnham, 1988; Hirschfeld, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973). Therefore, lay people’s goal models may have nontrivial influences on people’s goal 
regulation. I used scientific theories of goal structures in the literature as the foundation for 
exploring variation in people’s lay theories about goal structure. Based on this literature, I 
proposed three major organizing principles that might underlie individuals’ goal models: 
hierarchical, network, and sequential. The summary of the framework is presented in Table 1.  
 When introducing this framework, I will describe each model’s key organizing principles 
and signature characteristics in turn. Although it is possible that these principles may overlap and 
lay people can use multiple principles at the same time (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Lord & Levy, 
1994), these queries remain to be tested. In theory, the three types of goal models represent 
organizing principles that are distinct from each other. Because these principles can be 
distinctive, it is critical to understand what specific influence each principle could exert on goal 
regulation. Drawing on self-regulation research, I propose how goal models may provide new 
insights into why and how people tend to succeed and fail at certain self-regulatory challenges. I 
will also describe the specific hypotheses that will be tested in my empirical studies, as examples 
of the implications of this new framework. 
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Table 1  
A Goal Model Framework 
    
Sample model 
(Circles represent 
goals) 
Hierarchical Network Sequential 
Organizing principle Degree of Importance Degree of Association Time 
Supporting  
theories 
e.g., Action Identification 
Theory (Vallacher & Wegner, 
1989), Control Theory 
(Carver & Scheier, 1982b; 
Powers, 1973), Construal 
Level Theory (Liberman & 
Trope, 2008), Goal Systems 
Theory (Kruglanski et al., 
2002) 
e.g., Accessibility Theory 
(Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 
1985), Spreading Activation 
Theory (A. M. Collins & 
Loftus, 1975) 
e.g., Action Phase Model 
(Gollwitzer, 1990), 
Motivational Theory of 
Lifespan Development 
(Heckhausen et al., 2010) 
Signature 
characteristics 
Goals subsumed to important 
higher-order values and 
identities (e.g., I go to the 
gym and sleep early because I 
am a healthy person); lower-
order goals serve higher-order 
goals. 
Multiple and dynamic goal 
relations; more likely to 
reveal negative relations (e.g., 
to sleep early, I might not be 
able to go to the gym; though 
both promote good health). 
Arranged by order of steps; 
highlight timing of goal-striving 
(e.g., I sleep early now, so that I 
can go to the gym tomorrow, 
and will get healthier); clear 
path to pursue a goal. 
Proposed goal 
regulation 
implications 
Rigidity, self-relevance  Awareness of dynamic 
(conflicting) goal relations  
Sensitivity to progress 
Hypotheses Exacerbate negativity in goal 
striving among entity (vs. 
incremental) theorists (Studies 
6 & 7) 
Intensify chronic goal conflict 
experience (e.g., work-family 
conflict; Study 2) 
Induce (integrative) creative 
thinking (Study 3) 
Amplify the (positive and 
negative) effects of goal 
progress on goal motivation 
(Study 4) 
Increase positivity in the goal-
striving experience for people 
in locomotion (vs. assessment) 
mode (Study 5) 
Key model index 
(Study 1) 
Goal centralization Goal interconnectedness Goal disconnectivity 
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Three Emerging Goal Models: Differentiations and Implications 
Hierarchical Models  
 As discussed earlier, many scientific theories of goal structure posit that goals operate 
vertically on a hierarchy (e.g., pyramid, ladder; Carver & Scheier, 1982b; Lord & Levy, 1994; 
Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). This class of approaches is called the hierarchical model. 
Hierarchical models organize goals of varying content (e.g., value, motive, actions) on different 
levels/ranks and have been the most influential in the study of goal structure (Austin & 
Vancouver, 1996). Although different hierarchical theories vary in the number of levels that they 
focus on and the terms used to describe each level (Bettman et al., 1998; Unsworth et al., 2014), 
they share several assumptions.  
 Degree of importance. The core assumption of a hierarchical model is the organizing 
principle that goals vary in their degree of importance. Within a hierarchy, goals fall into 
different ranks. Hierarchical theories posit that goals at the top of the hierarchy are the most 
important, abstract, and enduring, whereas goals at the bottom of the hierarchy are the least 
important, and the most concrete and transient (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1982; Elliot, 2006; 
Kruglanski et al., 2002; Liberman & Trope, 2008; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Higher-order 
goals tend to be the person’s identities and values (e.g., being healthy); lower order goals tend to 
be more concrete actions (e.g., going to the gym). Moreover, the levels of the hierarchy are 
interdependent such that one (or more than one) lower-order goal are means in place to serve the 
higher-order end-goal (Kruglanski et al., 2002). For instance, to be a healthy person, an 
individual goes to the gym regularly. Goals “know their place” within a hierarchical structure 
and priorities (higher-order goals) are clear.  
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 Proposed implications and hypothesis. The use of a hierarchical model may affect 
people’s perceptions of the structural relations among goals. One implication that I propose is 
rigidity in the view of goal relations. Although there is flexibility in hierarchical models (given 
that a higher-order goal can often be served by different lower-order goals), the structure itself is 
relatively rigid. Higher-order goals (e.g., values) tend to be more stable, staying in their position 
(Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). For instance, the abstract goal “health” does not easily shift 
downwards to a lower-order position. Lower-order goals have ‘no way out’ but to serve the 
higher-order goal. This phenomenon is like people in a social hierarchy. Just as a social 
hierarchy solidifies differences between people of varying statuses and imposes a sense of order 
(e.g., Magee & Galinsky, 2008), the use of a hierarchical model may solidify differences 
between ranks of goals and may elevate the sense of rigidity in goal relations.  
 Further, another implication of a hierarchical model I propose is its emphasis on the self 
in goal regulation. As discussed earlier, within a hierarchy, higher-order goals tend to be abstract 
personal identities and values (e.g., being healthy), and lower-order goals tend to be concrete 
actions (e.g., going to the gym). By subsuming lower-order goals to higher-order goals 
(Schwartz, 1994), the hierarchical structure makes the personal meaning behind goal pursuit 
apparent: the higher order goal (i.e., being healthy) explains why people engage in the lower goal 
(i.e., going to the gym). While this vertical connection draws personal meaning to an action, it is 
also drawing more attention to the self (Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Johnson, 
Chang, & Yang, 2010; Oyserman, 2007). This makes the self relevant in both the success and 
failure of the attainment of the lower-order goal, which could have potential consequences for 
goal-regulation. 
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 Rigidity and self-relevance in a hierarchical goal model may have both upsides and 
downsides to goal regulation. On the one hand, hierarchical models may provide a clear picture 
of the relative importance of goals, making goal prioritization efficient (Ballard, Yeo, Loft, et al., 
2016; Ballard, Yeo, Neal, & Farrell, 2016). Moreover, hierarchical models may also highlight 
personal meaning behind goal striving, increasing the sense of purpose or clarity of self-concept 
that can result in many positive psychological outcomes (J. D. Campbell et al., 1996; Steger, 
Kashdan, Sullivan, & Lorentz, 2008). On the other hand, the stability and self-relevance of 
(higher order) identities and values can trickle down the hierarchy, instilling even transient 
(lower-order) goal challenges with personal meaning and permanence that make goals seem 
inescapable in a hierarchical model (e.g., I go to the gym to be a healthy person). These 
properties can be bad news for people who are fatalistic about their sense of self. 
 The self-regulation literature suggests that individuals differ in the extent to which they 
view the person to be fixed (entity theories) or malleable (incremental theories) on a continuum, 
called implicit person theory (Dweck, 1995a). Holding the belief that personal character traits 
cannot be changed, entity theorists have the need to prove themselves and tend to exhibit 
helplessness when facing failure or challenge (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1995b). In 
contrast, incremental theorists, who see personal character traits as malleable, experience 
challenges and failures as learning opportunities and focus on achieving mastery (Robins & Pals, 
2002). In many cases, because entity theorists are more likely to see goal-striving as a fatalistic 
and self-threatening process, they report significantly more negative goal-striving experiences, 
such as lower self-esteem, lower satisfaction, and lower goal motivation (e.g., Blackwell, 
Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). While most research 
that aims to help entity theorists focuses on changing their person theory altogether (Blackwell et 
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al., 2007; Yeager, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2013), little research has examined factors that can 
moderate the effect of the entity theory on goal motivations and outcomes (Kung et al., 2018).  
 Drawing on properties of hierarchical models, I argue that people’s lay theory of goal 
structure may offer a new perspective to understand when the effects of entity (vs. incremental) 
theory are exacerbated and diminished. Specifically, a hierarchical model could be harmful to 
those who have strong entity (vs. incremental) beliefs about personal character traits. Its relative 
rigidity may enhance entity theorists’ fatalistic assumption about goal pursuit, exacerbating their 
helpless reactions. Moreover, adding the characteristic that a hierarchical model tends to 
subsume goals to stable self-relevant traits and values, using a hierarchical model may also 
intensify entity theorists’ proneness to self-threat in goal pursuit. Put together, I hypothesize that 
having a hierarchical goal model may exacerbate entity (vs. incremental) theorists’ negative 
goal-striving experience (e.g., lower satisfaction and motivation). The current research will test 
the hypothesis as an illustration of the implication of the use of a hierarchical model (Studies 6 
and 7). If the hypothesis is supported, the results will highlight the importance of understanding 
people’s goal models as well as offering a new angle into understanding the effects of entity (vs. 
incremental) person theory in self-regulation. 
Network Models  
 A different type of lay theory instead conceptualizes the model as a web or network. In 
early goal theories, goals are viewed as vectors with direction and magnitude in a life space that 
can form a network-like map (Lewin, 1943, 1951). Classic cognitive theories in the mental 
representation of concepts similarly proposed that mental representations, like goals, are 
connected like a web or neural-network (A. M. Collins & Loftus, 1975; Higgins et al., 1985). 
These ideas influenced modern theories of goals, presenting goals as an interconnected model 
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(e.g., needs theory; McClelland, 1987), also called an associative network (J. Y. Shah & 
Kruglanski, 2000).  
 Degree of association. The central idea of network models is the principle that goals are 
related by association. Associations are versatile: most of them are either faciliatory or inhibitory 
(Gray et al., 2017; Presseau et al., 2013). By association, the activation of a given goal can make 
it more or less likely that a connected goal is also activated (A. M. Collins & Loftus, 1975; 
Forster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007). In a network model, the more relevant goals have more 
or stronger associations, and thus may be clustered together (A. M. Collins & Loftus, 1975). Yet, 
a network model should be less rigid than a hierarchical model. Goals in a network model are on 
a relatively equal playing field. Connecting goals by association, network models have fewer 
restrictions on both how and why goals are connected (A. M. Collins & Loftus, 1975). Goals can 
be connected in a network simply by semantic or domain relevance. For instance, ‘going to the 
gym’ and ‘sleeping early’ can be associated because they are both related to the domain of 
health. In short, as connection by association is less restricted, network models should generate a 
more interconnected structure. 
Proposed implications and hypotheses. The use of a network model may influence 
perceptions of goal relations. First, network models may offer a more flexible view of goal 
relations. The association principle is more likely to highlight multiple relations among goals, 
drawing people’s attention to how goals are related to one another with many possible direct and 
indirect pathways (e.g., going to the gym activates the health goal, and the health goal activates 
the goal to go to sleep early). Moreover, the association principle of network models can 
potentially reveal more dynamic relations among goals. Network models make salient the 
possibility that relations among two goals can be positive or negative. By drawing attention to 
 17 
multiple relations, a network model may increase people’s awareness of conflict among goals. 
For example, conflict can happen between “going to the gym at night” and “to go to sleep early”, 
even though both facilitate the goal of “being a healthy person.” By highlighting the dynamic 
(conflicting) relations among goals, network models may have implications for how people react 
to a conflict situation. 
Managing goal conflict is an immense and inevitable challenge for most people. Goals 
often conflict with one another, presenting trade-off scenarios where achieving one goal 
frequently means sacrificing some other goal. While goal conflict is inevitable, people can vary 
in the extent to which they are aware of it (Frederick, Novemsky, Wang, Dhar, & Nowlis, 2009; 
Savary, Kleiman, Hassin, & Dhar, 2015). Most conflict research to date conceptualized this 
awareness as a result of individuals’ abilities/personalities (e.g., Sharma & Bottom, 2013) and of 
situational characteristics (e.g., Jehn, 1997; A. K. Shah, Shafir, & Mullainathan, 2015). I argue 
that individuals’ lay theory of goal structure also matters. The lay theory of goal structure may 
present a new way to understand why differences in conflict awareness and experience can 
occur. Specifically, I propose that the use of a network model may increase people’s conflict 
awareness, which may be a double-edged sword in conflict situations, depending on whether the 
goal conflict can be easily resolved.  
By nature, some goals are more likely to be in persistent conflict than others, such as 
work and family goals, academic and social goals (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Major, Klein, & 
Ehrhart, 2002). The tension between chronic goals is difficult to resolve, and a reminder of the 
conflict can cause added distress that hinders people from successfully resolving the conflict 
(e.g., Major et al., 2002). In this context, network models are potentially problematic. I propose 
that, despite its overall flexibility in the structure, by increasing the awareness of conflict in goal 
 18 
structure, network models may exacerbate distress and undermine the ability to resolve chronic 
goal conflict. If so, the goal model framework would be critical for the understanding of conflict 
management. This is because the use of network (versus other) goal models may explain why 
people often have varying experience in similar goal conflict, and report varying levels of 
satisfaction and resolution (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; Netemeyer, Boles, & McMurrian, 
1996).  
As an illustration of this proposition, I tested the association between the use of a network 
model and workers’ experience in managing work-family conflict (Study 2). If the hypothesis is 
supported, people who adopt a network model to understand their goals will also report 
experiencing a higher intensity of the work-family conflict. The results will add knowledge of 
the role of goal models in understanding people’s conflict management experience and 
outcomes.  
 Whereas conflict between chronic goals can be tenacious, other conflict situations tend to 
be relatively transient, such as making consumer choices (e.g., eat pizza vs. sushi, watch a 
comedy vs. documentary; Laran & Janiszewski, 2009). In these situations, the awareness of goal 
conflict may not always be harmful. In fact, because the awareness of conflict can be the 
precursor for a person’s ability to integrate seemingly conflicting goals or ideas, conflict 
awareness may facilitate the attainment of synergistic outcomes (Frederick et al., 2009).  
 A common example of these conflict situations is those that call for creativity. Creativity 
is a key predictor of individual and organizational success (Anderson, Potočnik, & Zhou, 2014). 
Cognitive research on creativity suggests that creativity can be hard to come by because 
individuals are typically biased to ignore interconnections between ideas. For instance, workers 
falsely place more emphasis on their initial ideas and fail to converge them with subsequent 
 19 
insights for a more creative product (e.g., Berg, 2014). Moreover, people tend to have 
exaggerated perceptions of how different opposing ideas are (Thompson, 1990), lacking the 
motivation to integrate seemingly unrelated ideas and missing out on creative solutions. By 
increasing people’s awareness of the dynamic relations between conflicting ideas, I hypothesize 
that network models may increase integrative thinking and hence creative performance.  
 In one of the studies presented later (Study 3), I manipulated goal models and tested 
whether the use of a network model has a spill-over effect of creativity on tasks unrelated to the 
domain of the goals. If network models induce creative thinking, the findings will not only 
provide evidence for the importance of the goal model framework but also shed light on the 
understanding and promotion of creativity.  
Sequential Models 
 Finally, the third model (sequential model) highlights an organizing principle that is 
silent in the previous two—time. Not surprisingly, time is another organizing principle 
emphasized in many theories of self-regulation. Classic phase models of self-regulation 
distinguish between deliberation (deciding what goal to pursue) and implementation (the act of 
goal pursuit itself; see Gollwitzer, 1990). Strategies for pursuing dual goals can be concurrent or 
sequential (i.e., one at a time; Laran, 2010; Orehek & Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, 2013). Life-span 
development models organize people’s life goals on a timeline (Heckhausen et al., 2010). These 
models examine how goal regulation unfolds over time; one’s current location in the process 
affects relevant concerns, attention, and emotion.  
 Time. The central idea of a sequential structure is the principle of time. Goals in 
sequential models are arranged in chronological order or on a timeline, from one phase to 
another. Because time is linear, sequential models tend to shape like a chain(s). Goals in a 
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sequence are interdependent in that the completion of one goal leads to the initiation of another 
goal. In other words, the pursuit of a goal depends on the completion of a prior goal or step. For 
example, “to sleep early” can be viewed as a step prior to “going to the gym”, and “going to the 
gym” can be viewed as a step prior to “attaining good health.” In this example, not sleeping early 
enough (i.e., not fulfilling the prerequisite goal) implies an inability to attain the subsequent goal 
(e.g., insufficient energy to go to the gym). Therefore, concerns about the progress or timing of 
these chains are particularly salient in sequential models. 
 Proposed implication and hypotheses. By making salient the passage of time, I propose 
that a sequential model may increase people’s sensitivity to goal progress. Goal progress is 
defined by how well and how quickly people are closing the gap between the current state and 
the desired end-state (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Johnson, Howe, & Chang, 2012). Goal progress 
information has critical implications for self-regulation. A person’s progress to a goal provides 
informational feedback about whether the person should continue to invest in (and withdraw 
from) the goal (Carver & Scheier, 1982b; Earley, Northcraft, Lee, & Lituchy, 1990). It predicts 
critical self-regulatory outcomes such as affect, motivation, and success in goal-pursuit (Carver 
& Scheier, 1982; Johnson et al., 2012; Lord & Levy, 1994; Schmidt & DeShon, 2007).  
 Goal progress has been studied extensively and shows divergent effects on affect and 
motivation depending on the situation (see Fitzsimons, Friesen, Orehek, & Kruglanski, 2009). In 
single-goal settings where people are focused primarily on only one goal (among other present 
goals), high goal progress is usually motivating. To explain: as long as progress is not high 
enough to cause coasting (Carver, 2003), high progress induces positive affect and signals that 
further effort into the goal is warranted; on the contrary, low goal progress induces negative 
affect and signals that further effort into the goal might be futile (Ilies & Judge, 2005; Orehek, 
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Bessarabova, Chen, & Kruglanski, 2011). Despite some research that has examined how 
situations and framing effects can alter people’s sensitivity to goal progress in single-goal 
settings (e.g., Huang, Jin, & Zhang, 2017; Koo & Fishbach, 2008), relatively little is known 
about mindsets that can change people’s reaction to progress information. I propose that, by 
highlighting the role of time, the sequential model may serve as a critical mindset that predicts 
sensitivity to progress and have critical implications in progress-related self-regulatory contexts. 
 The use of a sequential model may have both upsides and downsides in single-goal 
settings depending on how much progress a person has made. By increasing sensitivity to 
progress, sequential models may amplify the (positive and negative) affective responses of goal 
progress and influence goal motivation. When goal progress is high, a sequential model can be 
beneficial as sensitivity to progress may increase proactivity toward pursuing the goal. In 
contrast, when goal progress is low, a sequential model can be harmful as sensitivity to progress 
may reduce proactivity toward pursuing the goal. The present research will test this hypothesis 
(Study 4). Considering the nuance that extreme high progress can reduce effort as it reaches a 
certain threshold that causes people to coast (Carver, 2003), the study will only examine the 
effect of less extreme high progress. If it is true that sequential models moderate reactions to 
progress information, the results will contribute to the progress literature by uncovering a new 
antecedent of sensitivity to progress. 
 Further, beyond state-level differences in progress, another perspective to look at 
progress is the degree to which an individual is sensitive to progress and movement in general 
among other critical features of self-regulation. Regulatory mode theory posits that these 
tendencies can be categorized as two distinct motivational functions: making critical evaluation 
and comparisons (assessment mode) versus generating action and change (locomotion mode; 
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Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003). Being in a locomotion (vs. assessment) mode increases 
preference for change and state-to-state movement (Scholer, Eitam, Stadler, & Higgins, 2017), 
encourages people to make progress (at the expense of making the right choice; Mannetti et al., 
2009), and enhances attraction toward straightforward means that lead to a single end-goal 
(Orehek, Mauro, Kruglanski, & van der Bles, 2012). Given that people with different regulatory 
modes focus on different information in self-regulation, it is critical to consider how ways to 
increase (or sustain) their motivation and satisfaction may also differ (Orehek et al., 2012). 
However, the extant literature is limited in offering what these strategies can be.  
 To this end, I propose that the way individuals understand their goal relations matter. 
Specifically, because sequential models highlight the passage of time, they are more likely to fit 
a locomotion (vs. assessment) mode in the pursuit of goals. Regulatory fit is a positive state that 
happens when people’s regulatory orientation (e.g., locomotion, assessment) matches with their 
manner of goal pursuit and sustain the regulatory orientation (Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Higgins, 
2000, 2005). When there is fit, people tend to “feel right” about it and become more engaged in 
the goal pursuit, typically resulting in a more positive goal-striving experience (Higgins, 2005). 
Goal models could be a factor that influences people’s manner of goal pursuit, and therefore 
affect their fit experience. Sequential models organize goals in a linear fashion and present goals 
as consecutive steps from the beginning to the end. This structure may create a sense of 
movement from one goal stage to another (compared to the other two models). Locomotors are 
sensitive to movement and change in self-regulation (Higgins et al., 2003), and the use of a 
sequential model may help sustain their orientation in the pursuit of goals. Some indirect 
evidence supports this claim, arguing that people with a locomotion mode find value in a one-
and-only path to pursue a goal (vs. having alternative paths; Orehek et al., 2012), which 
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resembles the signature property of a linear construction in a sequential model. In short, 
sequential models seem to fit those who have a locomotion (vs. assessment) mode and may lead 
to more positivity in their self-regulation experience. This fit hypothesis will also be tested in the 
current work (Study 6), not only as an illustration of the implications of sequential models, but 
also to provide new insights into promoting better goal-striving experience in ways that fit a 
person’s regulatory mode. 
Summary of the Goal Model Framework 
 In sum, synthesizing diverse scientific theories of goal structures (e.g., control theory, 
spreading activation theory), three major organizing principles emerge. Hierarchical Models 
highlight goals in terms of their relative importance, subsuming lower-order goals as actions in 
service to personal identity or values; Network Models highlights relations among goals as 
associations in a web or neural-network, revealing multiple and dynamic relations among goals; 
Sequential Models arrange goals on a chronological or logical timeline, making salient the 
concern of progress or timing. Because of their popularity in the literature, these principles may 
also reflect the varying lay theories of goal structure people have in understanding the relations 
among their goals. The potential implications of goal models for self-regulation are diverse and 
critical and the current research will test some of these implications. Results will enrich the 
literature by illuminating whether and how goal models have distinct impacts on self-regulation 
experience and outcomes. 
 I will present a series of studies conducted to examine the goal model framework and its 
implications for self-regulation. This empirical research serves three aims. First, it examines the 
validity of the goal model framework to generate new knowledge for the understanding of lay 
theories and goal structure. Second, it develops the methods that allow for the assessment and 
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manipulation of goal models to facilitate the scientific study of lay theories of goal structure. 
Third, it tests some of the proposed implications of the goal models to add new insights into 
factors influencing our success (and failure) in self-regulation effectiveness.  
Overview of Studies 
 Since no prior work has examined lay theories of goal models, Study 1 developed a novel 
assessment method and tested various forms of construct validity (e.g., content validity, 
divergent validity). Subsequently, Studies 2-7 explored specific implications of goal models (i.e., 
predictive validity). I conducted three pairs of studies, each testing hypothesized effect(s) related 
to the tradeoffs of each goal model. Specifically, the studies investigated whether network 
models are related to more salient chronic goal conflict (Study 2), yet also increase integrative 
creativity (Study 3); whether sequential models amplify the motivational response to goal 
progress (Study 4), and whether this depends on individual differences in regulatory mode 
(Study 5); and whether hierarchical models lead people who believe strongly that the self is fixed 
(vs. incremental) to be less satisfied (Study 6) and motivated (Study 7) in goal striving.  
 Study and sample details are summarized in Table 2. The studies were conducted 
between 2014 to 2017. In studies conducted more recently (Studies 2, 3 and 5), I performed 
power analyses before data collection to determine the target sample size. Estimates of a priori 
power analyses and sensitivity power analyses (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) are 
reported in detail in Table 2. Moreover, no data analysis was conducted before data collection for 
a given study was complete and all exclusion criteria in the study are reported. All self-created 
measures, namely the goal model methods, are presented verbatim in the appendices. Together, 
these studies provide a systematic examination of the goal model framework and its implications 
across many self-regulation contexts.
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Table 2 
A Summary of Study Details and Basic Sample Demographics 
    Study 1   Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5 Study 6 Study 7 
Sample    
      
N 141 
(Sample A) 
100 
(Sample B) 
94  
(Sample C) 
245 191 139 217 94a 200 
Year 2014 2015 2014 2017 2017 2016 2017 2014 2016 
Country Canada Hong 
Kong 
Canada Australia,  
Canada,  
USA, UK  
Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada 
Source Psych  
participant 
pool 
Business 
participant 
pool 
Waterloo 
campus 
Prolific 
Academic 
Psych  
participant 
pool 
Psych  
participant 
pool 
Psych  
participant 
pool 
Waterloo 
campus 
Psych  
participant 
pool 
Sample size and power 
considerationsb 
No a prior power analysis. The 
sample size was determined by a rule-
of-thumb of about 50 per group (i.e., 
150 in total) and the availability of 
participants in a semester. The target 
sample size was doubled given the 
uncertainty of the actual size of the 
effect. 
The 
minimum 
sample size 
was 250 
for .95 
statistical 
power to 
detect a 
medium-
sized effect. I 
aimed to 
recruit 300. 
The 
minimum 
sample size 
was 159 
for .80 
statistical 
power to 
detect a 
medium-
sized effect. I 
aimed to 
recruit 200. 
No a priori 
power 
analysis. The 
sample size 
was a result 
of the 
availability 
of 
participants 
in a semester. 
The 
minimum 
sample size 
was 159 
for .80 
statistical 
power to 
detect a 
medium-
sized effect. I 
aimed to 
recruit 200. 
No a prior 
power 
analysis. The 
sample size 
was a result 
of the 
availability 
of 
participants 
in two 
months. 
No a prior 
power 
analysis. The 
sample size 
was a result 
of the 
availability 
of 
participants 
in a 
semester. 
Sensitivity: The 
smallest detectable 
effect size c 
A small-to-medium effect (ηp2 = .03) A small-to-
medium 
effect (ηp2 
= .03) 
A small-to-
medium 
effect (ηp2 
= .05) 
A medium 
effect (ηp2 
= .07) 
A small-to-
medium 
effect (ηp2 
= .05) 
A medium-
to-large 
effect (ηp2 
= .08) 
A small-to-
medium 
effect (ηp2 
= .04) 
Design 
         
Target goal model of 
study 
All Network Network Sequential Sequential Hierarchical Hierarchical 
Goal model method Assessment Assessment Manipulation  Manipulation  Assessment Assessment Manipulation  
Focal outcome(s) Validity measures Work-family  
conflict 
Integrative &  
divergent 
creativity 
 
Academic  
motivation 
Self-esteem  
& life 
satisfaction 
Self-esteem  
& life 
satisfaction 
Academic  
motivation  
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Relevant 
table(s)/figure(s) 
Tables 2-6, Figures 1-2 Table 7,  
Figure 3 
Tables 8-9, 
Figures 4-6 
Tables 10-11, 
Figure 7 
Table 12, 
Figure 8-9  
Table 13, 
Figure 10-11 
Table 14, 
Figure 12 
Basic demographics 
         
Age median 19 19 21 37 19 19 21 21 19 
% Female 80 53 58 47 72 74 78 58 82 
Race 
         
% White 53 6 35 87 35 39 35 35 39 
% Black 1 0 1 3 4 1 5 1 1 
% Asian 37 94 60 7 48 46 49 60 49 
% Middle Eastern 6 0 0 0 2 3 3 0 3 
% Hispanic 3 0 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 
% Other 0 0 2 0 10 10 7 2 7 
          
Note.   aSame sample as Study 1 Sample C. bAll power analyses used the standard .05 alpha error probability and the medium effect-size value of ηp2 = .06.  
cSensitivity analysis reports the smallest significant effect size the given sample size can detect (Faul et al., 2009). All sensitivity analyses used the 
standard .80 power and .05 alpha error probability (two-tailed).
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Study 1: Validity of the Goal Model Framework and Its Assessment 
 Study 1 was conducted to validate a new method to assess goal models. I borrowed 
techniques from concept-mapping (e.g., to develop a goal model assessment task. In the task, 
participants freely created a concept map of their goals to represent their goal model. Afterward, 
participants were presented the prototype(s) and description of the three proposed models. They 
rated how similar their model was to each proposed goal model and identified the goal model 
that had the closest fit with the drawing of their goal model. For clarity, I will refer to 
participants’ goal model drawing as their ‘goal map,’ whereas I will refer to the three proposed 
goal models as goal models. 
 Using this self-report categorization method has its advantages. Since participants vary in 
their visualization skills, their drawn models might not make all goal-structure relevant 
information accessible. Hence, participants should have a deeper insight into their goal map and 
a more accurate assessment of their own model. This self-identification method is not uncommon 
in social sciences and is often preferred especially when the assessment of a construct requires 
deep and personal insights (e.g., adult attachment scale; N. L. Collins & Read, 1990). The 
validity of this method was put to the test. 
 I conducted several analyses to test the validity of the goal model assessment method. 
They included tests of discriminant validity, content validity, convergent validity, and objectivity 
or intersubjective agreement. Results of these validity tests not only generate evidence for the 
utility of the goal model assessment method, but also for goal models as a theoretical framework 
if the ways individuals spontaneously organized their goals indeed fit onto the proposed three 
goal models. The specific aim of each analysis is explained as follows. 
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 Discriminant validity concerns the measurement’s ability to differentiate concepts that 
are independent (D. T. Campbell & Fiske, 1959). In the current research, it would be informative 
to know whether participants’ responses can empirically separate the three goals models. 
Discriminant validity would be high if participants view their goal model to be uniquely similar 
to one of the three proposed goal models; discriminant validity would be low if participants view 
their goal model to be equally (dis)similar to all goal models. To test discriminant validity, I 
included items measuring participants’ perception of the similarity between their goal map and 
the prototype of the proposed models. 
 Content validity concerns whether the three types of goal model covered most, if not all, 
variations in how participants represented their goal structures (Haynes, Richard, & Kubany, 
1995). If content validity is high, participants should rate their goal model to be highly similar to 
(at least) one of the goal model prototypes, and if content validity is low, participants should rate 
their goal model not to be similar to any of the goal model prototypes. Participants’ self-report 
perception of the similarity between their goal map and the prototype of the proposed models 
allows the test of content validity. 
 Convergent validity refers to the degree to which the focal measurement is associated 
with other operationalizations that are theoretically similar (D. T. Campbell & Fiske, 1959). 
Given the novelty of the goal model framework, not surprisingly there were no similar measures 
in the literature that were developed to directly identify structural differences of goal models. 
However, building on graph theory and the sociological study of structural differences of a social 
network, I developed indices based on social network indices (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, & 
Labianca, 2009) that could operationalize properties of specific structures of goals and used them 
to test convergent validity of goal models. 
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 Last, to empirically address the validity of the self-report nature of the assessment 
method, I examined the extent to which participants’ self-report ratings aligned with third 
parties’ ratings (e.g., Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004), which can broadly be called objectivity. 
Typically, objectivity suffers in self-report measures of socially desirable characteristics, such as 
perspective taking and wise reasoning (Brienza, Kung, Santos, Bobocel, & Grossmann, 2017). 
Though there was no apparent reason to expect any of the three proposed goal models to be 
particularly socially desirable (c.f. Duckworth, 2016), whether people can report their goal 
models rather objectively is an empirical question. To test this question, I recruited coders to 
independently assess participants’ goal models. If objectivity is high, the coders’ ratings and the 
participants’ own rating of their goal models will be highly consistent.  
Method 
 Power, participants, and design. As a proof-of-concept study, statistical power and 
generalizability are especially critical. To this end, several steps were taken in the study design to 
increase sample size and sample diversity. To increase the cultural and academic diversity of the 
study sample, I recruited participants through three sources. The first sub-sample (Sample A; n = 
144) was recruited through the University of Waterloo Psychology Participant Pool, where 
participants completed the study for one course credit. The second sub-sample consisted of 
business undergraduates (Sample B; n = 103) recruited through the Hong Kong University of 
Science and Technology Management Studies Participant Pool. This sample has mostly Hong 
Kong Chinese, and they participated in the study for one course credit. The last sub-sample was 
recruited at booths set up at the University of Waterloo libraries and student centers (Sample C; n 
= 100), and participants received a snack bar and entered into a draw for 50-dollar cash prizes as 
the remuneration of their participation (see Table 2 for details of sample demographics). The 
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three sub-samples are collapsed for the main analyses, totaling 347 participants. Among them, 12 
did not complete the study or had missing data, resulting in a final sample of 335 for analysis.  
 In the study, participants completed two separate paper-and-pencil survey booklets. One 
booklet comprised the goal model assessment task, in which participants drew a model to 
represent the relations among their goals. The other booklet contained a battery of individual 
differences measures, including exploratory individual differences measures2 and demographic 
questions. To avoid order effects, participants completed one booklet at a time, and the order of 
the booklets and the order of scales inside the personality booklet were counterbalanced. Survey 
order did not affect the patterns of results. 
 Goal model assessment. In this task, participants first thought about their goals in life, 
and were given a black color pen to visualize their goals:  
 
“In the space below, please think about your goals in life, and create a diagram or concept 
map to organize and present your goals visually. Please label all elements of your 
map/diagram/figure.”  
  
 After drawing their goal map, they were presented three goal model prototypes with 
descriptions, as shown in Figure 1. They were asked to read all the descriptions and then identify 
how similar each of the models were to the participants’ goal map.  
                                                          
2 In the current and following studies, I included various types of personality (e.g., Big Five) and thinking style 
measures. Details are presented in full in Appendix J (and online as well for the preregistered studies). Because 
these measures were not the main focus of the study and did not affect the main finding presented, results of these 
measures are not reported in text for parsimony. 
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Figure 1. Goal Model Prototypes and Their Descriptions in Goal Model Assessment. 
  
 Similarity rating toward goal model prototypes. To assess the similarity of participants’ 
goal map to each type of goal model, participants responded to the question, “How much do you 
think each of the examples is similar to your own view of goals?” For each model prototype, 
they rated similarity on a scale from 1 (Not at all similar) to 7 (Extremely similar). The order 
was fixed for all participants: they first rated hierarchical, then network, and last sequential. The 
variation in these similarity ratings was used to examine whether laypeople could differentiate 
the three models and to test how much the conceptualization of the models overlap with each 
other (i.e., discriminant validity).  
 Self-categorization of goal models. Afterward, participants self-identified their goal 
model by ranking the three models from “1 – the closest fit” to the “3 – the least close fit.” 
Participants’ choice of the most closely fitting model was used as the categorization of 
participants’ goal model (see Appendix A for full instructions).  
 Indication of goal relations. To measure participants’ goal relations, participants were 
instructed to use different color pens to make indications on their goal map. Critically, they were 
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told not to add or erase any goals already on the goal map, and only make indications of the goal 
relations. Specifically, they used a blue and red pen to indicate the valence of any existing 
relations among their goals. They were told to use a “+” sign to indicate cases where the pursuit 
of a given goal facilitates/helps the pursuit of the associated goal; to use a “-” sign to indicate 
cases where the pursuit of a given goal hinders/excludes the pursuit of the associated goal.  
 Transforming goal maps into numerical matrices. To analyze goal relations 
quantitatively, I borrowed graph theory methods and transformed information on the goal maps 
into numerical matrices (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). I trained 8 coders to do the transformation 
in Excel. In brief, the coders used goal names as the header column and header row of a matrix, 
and then recorded the relations in the cell between each pair of the goals (see full instructions in 
Appendix B). To minimize error, I randomly assigned each goal map to two coders and 
compared their matrices (inter-rater reliability: rs > .94).3 Discrepancies were resolved through 
discussion and the final revised matrices were used in the analysis. These matrices were used to 
calculate goal model indices that represent variations in proposed goal structural properties and 
test convergent validity (see details in the result section). 
 Goal importance. To explore whether there were robust differences in single goal 
properties across goal models, I included an item measuring goal importance in the survey. Goal 
importance captures many vital goal content properties, such as goal commitment (Talevich, 
Read, & Walsh, 2014) and abstractness (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). For each of the goals on 
the goal map, participants answered the question of ‘How important is each goal to you at this 
point in your life?” from 1 (Not at all important) to 11 (Very important).  
                                                          
3 I calculated a basic network density score (i.e., number of relations divided by the maximum possible number of 
relations) for each coder’s matrix (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). The degree of deviation from a perfect positive 
correlation (i.e., 1.00) represents the level of inconsistency in coding. 
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 Task Experience. Last, to understand participants’ subjective experience in the goal 
model assessment task, at the end of the survey I included several Likert-scale items. They 
measured the extent to which participants felt the task was simple (from 1 = Not at all to 5 = 
Very simple), felt the task was strange (from 1 = Not at all to 5 = Extremely), and how well they 
felt their goal map represented how they see their goals (from 1 = Not at all to 5 = Extremely 
representative).  
Results and Discussion 
 Descriptive analyses. In the total sample, thirty-eight (11%) participants categorized 
their goal map as a hierarchical model, one hundred and thirty-five had a network model (40%), 
and one hundred and sixty-six had a sequential model (49%). Sample diagrams from participants 
are presented in Appendix C.  
 This overall distribution of goal models was consistent across national samples: the 
distribution did not differ across the Canadian (Samples A & C) and Hong Kong samples 
(Sample B), χ2 (2) = .34, p = .845. Moreover, there was no significant difference in the 
distribution across gender, χ2 (2) = 3.00, p = .223, age, χ2 (2) = 3.46, p = .177, race, χ2 (12) = 
11.57, p = .481, and program major, χ2 (14) = 17.74, p = .219. Interestingly, there was a trend 
that older participants tended to have a hierarchical model, B = .08, SE = .05, Wald(1) = 2.52, 
Exp(B) = 1.08, p = .113, perhaps due to their great integration of goals and clarity of self-concept 
(J. D. Campbell et al., 1996). This is a pattern that would need to be re-examined in a sample of a 
wider age range.  
 Participants thought the goal model assessment task was moderately simple (M = 3.36, 
SD = 1.12), not particularly strange (M = 2.42, SD = 1.09), and their goal map adequately 
represented their goals (M = 3.35, SD = .97). These ratings did not differ as a function of 
 34 
participants self-categorized goal models, ps > .264. These descriptives suggest that, from the 
participants’ perspective, the task seemed to be viable and useful for assessing their goal models. 
 Discriminant validity (among the goal models). To test discriminant validity, I 
examined ratings of similarity toward the goal model prototypes (within-subjects: hierarchical, 
network, sequential) as a function of participants’ self-categorized goal model (between-subjects: 
hierarchical, network, sequential). Because of the mixed design, I conducted a mixed-model 
ANOVA. Results showed a significant interaction, F(4, 666) = 123.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .43, 
suggesting that the pattern of similarity ratings differed as a function of participants’ self-
categorized goal model.  
 To unpack the result, I created three dummy variables and each contrasted one goal 
model with the other two (e.g., Hierarchical Model: hierarchical = 1, network = 0, sequential = 
0). For each dependent variable, I conducted three separate t-tests, using one goal model dummy 
variable at a time. This analytic strategy allows the test of a target goal model effect, in 
comparison to the two other models. These contrasts were used because they were conceptually 
straightforward and they matched closely with my predictions (i.e., testing how the use of one 
model differed from the other two).4 Results of the t-tests are reported in Table 3.  
 
  
                                                          
4 Alternatively, one could use multiple dummy-coding or effects-coding in multiple regression to look at how a goal 
model differ from one other specific goal model or from the grand mean, respectively. The use of these alternative 
analytical strategies yielded similar patterns of results and the same interpretations of the findings.  
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Table 3 
Independent t-tests: A Goal Model (vs. Other Two) Predicting Similarity toward Each Goal 
Model Prototype (Study 1) 
DV Predictor M SD B SE    t    p 95%CI ηp2 
 
Hierarchical 
Prototype 
1. Hierarchical 5.97 1.08 2.65 *** .27 9.79 <.001 [2.12, 3.18] .22 
2. Network 3.95 1.58 -.92 *** .19 -4.80 <.001 [-1.30, -.55] .07 
3. Sequential 4.00 1.68 -.18  .19 -.92 .358 [-.56, .20] <.01 
 
Network 
Prototype 
1. Hierarchical 3.07 1.51 -.73 * .31 -2.34 .020 [-1.35, -.12] .02 
2. Network 5.96 1.20 2.25 *** .16 13.86 <.001 [1.93, 2.57] .37 
3. Sequential 3.60 1.82 -1.87 *** .17 -10.88 <.001 [-2.20, -1.53] .26 
 
Sequential 
Prototype 
1. Hierarchical 3.53 1.69 -1.06 ** .34 -3.11 .002 [-1.74, -.39] .03 
2. Network 3.62 1.62 -2.23 *** .19 -11.84 <.001 [-2.60, -1.86] .30 
3. Sequential 6.23 1.31 2.56 *** .17 15.18 <.001 [2.23, 2.90] .41 
Note. N = 335: 38 hierarchical (11%), 135 network (40%), and 166 sequential (49%). For each dependent 
variable, three separate t-tests were conducted, each testing the contrast of one goal model: Hierarchical 
contrast (hierarchical vs. network and sequential); Network contrast (network vs. hierarchical and 
sequential); Sequential (sequential vs. hierarchical and network). Individual tests are numbered 
separately. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
 As evident in Figure 2, participants who adopted a hierarchical model viewed their goal 
map to be highly similar to the hierarchical model prototype, and less similar to the network or 
sequential model prototypes. Likewise, participants who adopted a network model viewed their 
goal map to be highly similar to the network model prototype, and less similar to the hierarchical 
or sequential model prototypes. Last, participants who adopted a sequential model viewed their 
goal map to be highly similar to the sequential model prototype, less similar to the network 
model prototype, and equally similar to the hierarchical prototype (compared to the average 
across those who used a hierarchical or network model). These results provided evidence for the 
discriminant validity of all three goal models.    
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Figure 2. The Similarity Rating (toward each Goal Model Prototype; scale from 1 = Not at all 
similar to 7 = Extremely similar) as a Function of Goal Models (Study 1).  
  
 Content validity. Content validity concerns the coverage of a construct. To show content 
validity, participants’ goal model should be highly similar to at least one of the goal model 
prototypes. Therefore, it is informative to analyze the pattern of participants’ highest similarity 
rating—the highest similarity score a participant gave to any of the three goal models. For 
instance, if a participant rated a 7 (out of 7) for the similarity between his or her goal map to the 
hierarchical model, a 5 for the network model, and a 3 for the sequential model, the participant’s 
highest similarity score would be 7 (i.e., Extremely similar)—content validity is high. In contrast, 
if a participant rated a 1 between his or her goal map to the hierarchical model, a 1 for the 
network model, and a 1 for the sequential model, the participant’s highest similarity score would 
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be 1 (i.e., Not at all similar). This would mean that none of the proposed goal models fit the way 
the participant viewed his or her own goal model—content validity is low. 
 Statistics of participants’ highest similarity scores showed a median of 7 (the highest 
point of the scale) and a mean of 6.34 (SD = .82). A one-sample t-test showed that the mean 
value significantly differed from the mid-point (i.e., 4.00) of the scale, t = 52.18, p < .001, 
95%CI[2.25, 2.42]. Results suggested that the three goal models captured many variations of 
participants’ goal models, demonstrating high content validity of the goal model framework. 
 Convergent validity. I developed indices based on social network indices to test 
convergent validity of goal models. Social network indices are useful descriptive measures of the 
variation in social structures (Borgatti et al., 2009). In social network analyses, people serve as 
nodes and the relations between people serve as ties. The basic property of a social structure is its 
size, measured by the number of nodes in the structure. Further, people form positive and 
negative relations with people. Therefore, another property that is of interest would be the 
average number of positive and negative ties per goal in the structure; some called similar 
concepts the ‘ambiance’ of the social network (Chua, 2013; Emmons & King, 1988).  
 Social structures also differ regarding how cohesive they are. Some structures are 
centralized to a single or few people (who usually control the resources, e.g., leaders), like a 
hierarchical organization. The degree to which a structure resembles a hierarchy is measured by 
an index called centralization (Freeman, 1978; i.e., the degree to which the structure revolves 
around a small number of nodes). Some social networks are less centralized and have many 
nodes that have a lot of connections. This represents a high-density network, which can be 
measured with the h-index (i.e., the maximum number of nodes that have at least the same 
number of ties; Hirsch, 2005). Last, some social networks may form a chain of connections 
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where one person connects to another, and there is little overlap in relations. As this social 
structure can be easily broken when few of the relations are dissolved, the degree to which a 
structure resembles a chain is captured by an index called connectivity (i.e., the minimum 
number of nodes, or ties, that must be removed to leave a disconnected network; White & 
Harary, 2001).  
 Goal model indices. Measurements of the structural variations in social networks are 
applicable in the study of properties of goal structures. This is because the basic graph theory 
assumptions of the existence of nodes and ties apply to goals as well. In a multiple-goal space, 
goals serve as nodes and the relations between goals serve as ties. Translating indices of social 
structures into goal structures, I created a set of goal model indices that measure the properties of 
goal structures (see Table 4).  
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Table 4 
Goal Model Indices: The Conceptualization and Operationalization (Convergent Validity) 
Note. 𝐶𝐷(𝑛
∗) = the highest number of ties of any node in the structure (i.e., highest degree centrality); 
𝐶𝐷(𝑖) = the number of ties of a node; N = number of nodes in the structure. Ties were undirected. 
 
 The number of goals within a goal model serves as the measure of the size of a goal 
space. The average number of facilitative and inhibitory ties per goal signifies the ambiance 
within which a goal operates, and hence can be a measure of goal facilitative and conflict 
ambiance. Theoretically, because a network model stimulates the thinking of multiple and 
dynamic goal relations, it should reveal more relations. Particularly, it should reveal more 
negative relations, relative to the other goal models, a hypothesis that will be tested.  
 Moreover, borrowing social network cohesion measures, goal centralization is the degree 
to which a goal model revolves around a single or few nodes (Freeman, 1978), which can be an 
alternative operationalization of a hierarchical goal model; the h-index that measures density of a 
Goal Model Index 
Original 
Network Index 
Calculation Key Reference(s) 
Goal space Network size Number of nodes in the structure  
 
Borgatti, Everett, 
& Johnson, 2013 
Goal facilitative 
ambiance 
Social facilitative 
ambiance 
Average number of facilitative 
(positive) ties per node  
 
Chua, 2013; 
Emmons & King, 
1988 
Goal conflict 
ambiance 
Social conflict 
ambiance 
Average number of inhibitory 
(negative) ties per node 
 
Chua, 2013; 
Emmons & King, 
1988 
Goal centralization Centralization (of 
degree) 
Degree to which a network 
revolves around a single or few 
nodes 
=  (∑[ 𝐶𝐷(𝑛
∗) − 𝐶𝐷(i)] )/(𝑁 − 1)(𝑁 − 2)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
Freeman, 1978 
Goal 
interconnectedness 
H-index The maximum number of nodes 
that each has at least the same 
number of ties 
 
Hirsch, 2005 
Goal 
disconnectivity 
Disconnectivity One minus the proportion of 
nodes that must be removed to 
disconnect the remaining structure 
 
Borgatti, Everett, 
& Freeman, 2002; 
White & Harary, 
2001 
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structure can represent the level of ‘goal interconnectedness’ (Austin & Vancouver, 1996), 
which can be an alternative operationalization of a network model. Last, disconnectivity captures 
the degree to which a structure can be easily broken apart. Because structures resembling a chain 
require the removal of few nodes or ties to break the remaining structure apart, the 
disconnectivity score can be an operationalization of a sequential model.  
 Based on the numerical matrix created from the participant’s goal map, I calculated the 
indices using Excel and the social network analytic software UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). I 
used the valenced matrix in the calculation of goal facilitative ambiance and conflict ambiance, 
and the unvalanced matrix (i.e., treating positive and negative relations equally, as “1”) in the 
calculation of other indices. Both were undirected. Using the goal model indices, I examined the 
convergent validity of the goal model assessment method. If convergent validity is high, 
participants’ self-categorized goal model should predict its alternative operationalization 
calculated in goal model indices (e.g., adopting a network model is associated with a higher 
score of goal conflict ambiance). Descriptives and intercorrelations of these indices are reported 
in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Descriptives and Intercorrelations of Goal Model Indices  
Index M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Goal Space 7.54 3.46       
2. Goal Importance 8.75 1.34 -.08      
3. Facilitative ambience .96 .85 -.24*** .07     
4. Conflict ambience .09 .16 -.11* .04     
5. Centralization .36 .28 -.08 .03 -.13* -.13*   
6. Interconnectedness 2.18 1.17 .21*** -.06 .36*** .01 -.13*  
7. Disconnectivity .38 .33 .04 -.01 -.08 .23*** -.22*** -.50*** 
Note. N = 335. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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 To test convergent validity, I conducted t-tests to examine the differences in the goal 
model indices as a function of goal models. Table 6 summarizes the full results.  
Table 6 
Independent t-tests: Goal Models Predicting Goal Model Indices (Study 1) 
DV Predictor M SD B  SE    t       p 95%CI ηp
2 
Goal space 1. Hierarchical 7.55 3.40 -.06  .59 -.10 .923 [7.22, 8.00] < .01 
 2. Network 7.87 3.38 .51  .38 1.33 .185 [-.24, 1.26] .01 
 3. Sequential 7.27 3.54 -.46  .37 -1.24 .216 [-1.20, .27] < .01 
Goal importance 1. Hierarchical 8.77 1.49 .02  .23 .09 .926 [-.43, .48] < .01 
 2. Network 8.64 1.25 -.18  .15 -1.18 .239 [-.47, .12] < .01 
 3. Sequential 8.83 1.38 .16  .15 1.10 .274 [-.13, .45] < .01 
 
Facilitative ambience 1. Hierarchical 1.01 .77 .05 
 .15 .31 .755 [-.24, .33] < .01 
 2. Network .97 .91 .00  .10 .04 .972 [-.18, .19] < .01 
 3. Sequential .94 .82 -.02  .09 -.23 .816 [-.21, .16] < .01 
 
Conflict ambience 1. Hierarchical .05 .12 -.04 
 .03 -1.35 .180 [.01, .20] .01 
 2. Network .11 .18 .03  .02 1.80 .073 [.00, .07] .01 
 3. Sequential .08 .16 -.02  .02 -.89 .372 [-.05, .02] < .01 
Centralization 1. Hierarchical .45 .32 .10 * .05 2.09 .037 [.01, .20] .01 
 2. Network .41 .30 .08 * .03 2.46 .014 [.02, .14] .02 
 3. Sequential .30 .24 -.12 *** .03 -3.80 < .001 [-.17, -.06] .04 
Interconnectedness 1. Hierarchical 2.05 .96 -.18  .20 -.89 .375 [-.57, .22] < .01 
 2. Network 2.50 1.27 .53 *** .13 4.15 < .001 [.28, .78] .05 
 3. Sequential 1.95 1.07 -.43 *** .13 -3.46 .001 [-.68, -.19] .04 
Disconnectivity 1. Hierarchical .39 .34 .01  .06 .25 .799 [-.10, .13] < .01 
 2. Network .30 .34 -.14 *** .04 -3.84 < .001 [-.21, -.07] .04 
  3. Sequential .44 .30 .13 
*** .04 3.58 < .001 [.06, .20] .04 
Note. N = 335. T-tests were conducted with one dummy variable (goal model) at a time (e.g., 
Hierarchical: hierarchical = 1, network = 0, sequential = 0). For each dependent variable, individual tests 
are numbered separately.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
  As expected, compared to the other two models, hierarchical models scored higher on 
goal centralization, t = 2.09, p = .037, in which goals were likely to be subsumed by a single or a 
few goals. Network models (vs. the other two models) had a marginally higher level of goal 
conflict ambiance, t = 1.80, p = .073, a higher level of goal interconnectedness, t = 4.15, p 
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< .001, and a lower level of disconnectivity, t = -3.84, p < .001. These suggested that network 
models were more likely to show more negative relations and more connections between goals. 
Sequential models (vs. the other two models) scored lower on centralization, t = -3.80, p < .001, 
lower on interconnectedness, t = -3.46, p < .001, and higher on disconnectivity, t = 3.58, p 
< .001, which indicates a more linear structure that is relatively easy to be broken apart. 
Exploratory analyses controlling for average goal importance rating and goal space did not 
change the pattern of the above results; this suggests that the observed findings were likely a 
result of the way participants structured their goals, not the properties of single goals.  
 Overall, these findings suggest that the proposed goal models varied in their structural 
properties, as illustrated in the form of goal model indices. They provide strong support for 
convergent validity of the goal model assessment method and the proposed goal model 
framework. 
 Objectivity. To test the degree of objectivity in self-categorizing goal models, I recruited 
and trained two coders (who had no knowledge of participants’ own ratings) to assess each 
participant’s goal map independently. The coders were first trained on the definitions of goal 
models, and they were then presented with participants’ goal maps one at a time in a random 
order. They rated on the same similarity scales that participants used in the survey and 
categorized each goal map with its closest fit model.  
 After the coding was completed, I conducted inter-rater reliability analyses to calculate 
scores of how consistent the ratings were among the participant and the two coders. First, kappa 
reliability scores were calculated (Cohen, 1960; Light, 1971) to assess the degree to which the 
participant and coders consistently categorized a goal map as the same goal model. The resulting 
kappa score indicated a fair-to-good level of agreement, ϰ = .49 (Fleiss, Levin, & Paik, 2003; 
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Landis & Koch, 1977). Second, Cronbach’s alphas were calculated to evaluate the degree to 
which the participant and coders’ similarity ratings of a goal map to each goal model were 
consistent. These alpha scores indicated a high level of agreement, αhierarchical = .71, αnetwork = .84, 
and αsequential = .83. In sum, the results suggested that the self-report goal model assessment 
converged on the third parties’ assessment, generating support for the objectivity in the use of 
self-categorization to identify goal models. 
 Summary and implications. Altogether, results from the diverse validation analyses 
showed that the newly developed goal model assessment task is a valid method to elicit a 
visualization of people’s goals and assess their goal model. A goal map can be categorized as 
one of the goal models as a self-report measure or by third-party evaluation. Importantly, the 
variation in the structure of goal maps participants drew fit well under the proposed three goal 
models: hierarchical, network, and sequential, with high discriminant validity among them. This 
goal model framework also seemed to cover most typical variation in lay theories of goal model, 
as suggested by the goal model assessment’s high content validity. Further, each model 
converged on critical indicator(s) of its signature properties (convergent validity), providing 
further evidence for the existence and systematic variation of the different goal models.  
 Having validated the goal model assessment method, the following studies aim to explore 
the diverse implications of goal models (i.e., predictive validity). Each goal model highlights a 
distinct organizing principle of goals, and I hypothesize that these differences have a nontrivial 
impact on self-regulation as it creates trade-offs in self-regulatory effectiveness depending on the 
situation. Specifically, goal models may differentially heighten the awareness of certain 
characteristics in a self-regulatory context (e.g., sensitivity to goal conflict and goal progress 
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information) which may confer both costs and benefits. In the following, I designed three sets of 
studies, each targeted to test some of the unique implications of goal models.  
Study 2: Network Models and Workers’ Heightened Work-Family Conflict 
The first set of studies (Studies 2 and 3) were designed to examine the implications of 
network models for self-regulation, namely increasing tensions in chronic goal conflict and 
increased creativity. Managing goal conflict is an immense challenge for most people. Goals 
often conflict with one another, presenting trade-off scenarios where achieving one goal 
frequently means sacrificing some other goal. While goal conflict is inevitable, people can vary 
in the extent to which they are aware of it. This tendency, I propose, depends in part on how 
people organize their goals.  
Notably, network models highlight multiple relations among goals, emphasizing how 
goals are related to one another with many possible pathways. Network models also highlight the 
dynamic relations among goals, as they acknowledge the possibility that relations among two 
goals can be positive or negative. This awareness of trade-offs can be a double-edged sword. I 
hypothesize that, by increasing the awareness of multiple and dynamic relations among goals, 
network models will exacerbate the tensions among goals that tend to be in chronic conflict (e.g., 
work-family goals, academic-social goals; Carlson, Kacmar, & Williams, 2000; Fishbach & 
Dhar, 2005; Study 2). However, in some situations, the awareness of trade-offs is beneficial. For 
instance, the awareness of trade-offs may help people realize the connections between seemingly 
unrelated ideas, which could result in enhanced creativity (Study 3).   
 Study 2 aims to explore whether adopting a network model is associated with the 
heightened experience of tensions between chronic goals. Given that most workers (male and 
female) report experiencing at least some enduring conflict between work and family goals 
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(Shockley, Shen, DeNunzio, Arvan, & Knudsen, 2017), this study recruited full-time and 
married workers as participants. The study assessed workers’ model of their life goals and tested 
whether those who reported using a network model would also report experiencing more work-
family conflict.  
Method 
 Power, participants, and design. Participants were recruited on Prolific Academic, an 
online platform for an international sample of adult participants (Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & 
Acquisti, 2017), to complete an online survey for £3.25. To be eligible for the survey, a 
participant needed to be a full-time employee, married or common-law married, living with the 
spouse, fluent in English, and currently residing in an English-speaking country. This procedure 
aimed to ensure that participants have experience of work-family conflict (and external validity 
of its measure) and can understand the English survey materials. Three-hundred and four 
individuals participated in the survey. Among them, 59 either did not complete the survey or had 
missing data in the focal tasks (e.g., did not complete the goal model assessment task), resulting 
in a final sample of 245 for analysis. In the survey, participants first reported their demographics, 
completed an online version of the goal model assessment task, and then completed a battery of 
work-related questions, including a measure of perceived work-family conflict. Study details are 
reported in Table 2. The sampling plan, procedure, and materials of the current study were pre-
registered (available at https://osf.io/p6h24). 
 Goal model assessment (online version). Given that participants would complete the 
study on the internet, I created an online version of the goal model assessment task (adapted 
from Study 1; see instructions in Appendix D). To begin the survey, participants were instructed 
to prepare a piece of White paper and a device that could take and upload images online (e.g., 
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smartphone, tablet). Similar to the standard goal model assessment, participants thought about 
their life goals and freely visualized them in a concept map on the paper. Afterward, participants 
made indications on their goal map to label their goals and to indicate any goal relation(s). Then 
they completed the standard measure of goal importance (from 1 = Not at all important to 11 = 
Very important). At the end of the survey, participants took a picture of their goal map and had 
an option to either upload the image onto the survey or email the image to the researcher (using 
an anonymous email provided by Prolific).  
 In this study, participants did not self-code their goal models. Two coders, blind to the 
hypothesis, were trained and presented with participants’ goal map in random order. The coders 
independently categorized each participants’ goal map into the best fitting goal model, achieving 
a good-to-substantial level of agreement, ϰ = .67 (Fleiss et al., 2003; Landis & Koch, 1977). The 
final goal model categorization after the coders discussed to resolve the discrepancy was used as 
the predictor variable in the current study.  
 Work-family conflict. Next, the participants responded to a standard work-family 
conflict scale. This scale is commonly used in the organizational health literature and measured 
participants’ subjective experience of conflict between work and family (Netemeyer et al., 1996). 
The scale consisted of 10 items, capturing both the interference of work demands with family life 
(e.g., ‘My job produces strain that makes it difficult to fulfill family duties.’) and the demands 
from family life with work (e.g., ‘Family-related strain interferes with my ability to perform job-
related duties.’). Participants responded to the scale from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly 
agree. The higher the score means the more intense experience of work-family conflict. The 
average of all items formed the work-family conflict index, used as the dependent measure (α 
= .93). 
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Results and Discussion 
 In this sample, I hypothesized that workers who had a network model (vs. hierarchical 
and sequential model) would be more likely to experience higher work-family conflict. To test 
the hypothesis, I used a dummy variable to contrast network model (= 1) versus hierarchical and 
sequential models (= 0) to predict work-family conflict index in a t-test. This planned contrast 
allows the direct test of the target network model effect, in comparison to the two other models. 
As shown in Figure 3, results suggested that workers who had a network model (vs. the other 
two models) reported experiencing significantly more work-family conflict, t = 2.22, p = .027. 
Statistics of this focal analysis and other exploratory analyses are presented in Table 7. 
 
 
Figure 3. The Level of Work-Family Conflict as a Function of Goal Models (Study 2; scale from 
1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree). 
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Table 7 
Independent t-tests and GLMs: Network Models (vs. Other Models) Predicting Work-Family 
Conflict, and Exploratory Analyses (Study 2) 
DV Predictor M SD B SE    t    p 95%CI ηp2 
Focal t-test    
       
Work-family conflict 1. Network 3.69 1.18 .45 * .20 2.22 .027 [.05, .85] .02 
Exploratory t-tests          
Work-family conflict 2. Hierarchical 3.18 1.41 -.34 * .17 -1.98 .049 [.67, -.002] .02 
 3. Sequential 3.36 1.30 .03  .20 .15 .881 [-.36, .42] < .01 
Goal space 1. Hierarchical 8.80 5.37 1.4  * .63 2.23 .026 [.16, 2.64] .02 
 2. Network 7.82 4.37 -.41  .76 -.54 .591 [-1.90, 1.09] < .01 
 3. Sequential 7.02 4.95 -1.49 * .73 -2.05 .041 [-2.92, -.06] .02 
Goal importance 1. Hierarchical 8.64 1.43 .18  .19 .95 .345 [-.19, .54] < .01 
 2. Network 8.35 1.35 -.28  .22 -1.25 .213 [-.71, .16] .01 
 3. Sequential 8.58 1.44 .02  .22 .11 .911 [-.40, .45] < .01 
Exploratory GLMs including controlsa 
Work-family conflict 1. Hierarchical 3.16 1.42 -.35 * .17 -1.99 .048 [-.69, .00] .02 
     Goal space   -.01  .02 -.64 .523 [-.05, .02] < .01 
     Goal Importance   .05  .06 .83 .406 [-.07, .17] < .01 
 2. Network 3.70 1.34 .45 * .21 2.21 .028 [.05, .86] .02 
     Goal space   -.01 
 
.02 -.83 .408 [-.05, .02] < .01 
     Goal Importance   .05 
 
.06 .86 .392 [-.07, .17] < .01 
 3. Sequential 3.37 1.36 .03 
 
.20 .14 .886 [-.37, .43] < .01 
     Goal space 
  
-.02 
 
.02 -.91 .362 [-.05, .02] < .01 
      Goal Importance     .04   .06 .66 .509 [-.08, .16] < .01 
Note. N = 245: 129 hierarchical (53%), 55 network (22%), and 61 sequential (25%). aAdjusted means 
(with control variables) of each goal model are reported. Goal model predictors are dummy-coded 
variables (e.g., Hierarchical: hierarchical = 1, network = 0, sequential = 0). For each dependent variable, 
individual tests are numbered separately. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
 Interestingly, results uncovered a non-hypothesized pattern. Workers who had a 
hierarchical model (vs. the other two models) reported experiencing significantly less work-
family conflict, t = -1.98, p = .049, an avenue for future studies that I will return to in the general 
discussion. Exploratory analyses controlling for the number of goals in participants’ goal map 
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(goal space) and the average level of importance of their goals did not change the pattern of the 
above results. This generated additional support to the assumption that the ways participants 
structured their goals, namely goal models, and not the properties of single goals were likely 
driving the observed findings. 
 These findings provided initial evidence that workers who had a network model of life 
goals were also more likely to report more work-family conflict. This supported the proposition 
that, by increasing conflict awareness, network models may exacerbate the tensions among goals 
that are not easily abandoned, such as work and family goals. However, given the study design 
was correlational, there is no evidence to support the direction of the effect. Just as it is possible 
that a network model might intensify a person’s work-family conflict, the work-family conflict 
might increase the use of a network model to represent the person’s goals, an alternative 
hypothesis that is interesting to test on its own. In short, further experimental work is needed to 
address the causal relation between network models and conflict experience.  
Study 3: Network Models Predict Integrative Creative Thinking 
Study 3 had two aims. First, extending the results of the previous study, this study tested 
an upside of network models. Whereas heightened awareness of goal interconnections could be 
harmful to goals bound in chronic tensions, it could be beneficial for tasks that require insights 
into interconnections of ideas, namely creativity (Mellers et al., 2014; Tadmor, Galinsky, & 
Maddux, 2012).  
There are two major categories of creativity: integrative creativity (a.k.a. convergent 
creativity) and divergent creativity (see Eysenck, 2003). Integrative creativity is the ability to 
converge seemingly unrelated ideas onto a meaningful idea, whereas divergent creativity is the 
ability to generate multiple distinct ideas from a mundane idea. Theoretically, the acuteness of 
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interconnections among diverse ideas should be more closely related to integrative thinking than 
divergent thinking. Thus, network models are likely to have a stronger positive impact on 
integrative (vs. divergent) creative performance. 
Second, Study 3 also served the aim of developing a goal model manipulation task. 
Having the ability to manipulate goal model experimentally is critical because it allows the direct 
test of the causal impact of goal models. This enhances internal validity of goal model research 
and strength of the causal argument being tested. Based on the goal model assessment method, a 
goal model manipulation was developed and its effectiveness was evaluated in the current study. 
Using the goal model manipulation, this study induced participants’ goal models and measured 
their creativity in subsequent unrelated creativity tasks.  
Method 
Power, participants, and design. This experiment had a between-subjects design 
(Condition: network, hierarchical, sequential models). The participants were recruited via the 
University of Waterloo Psychology Participant Pool and they completed a lab study for one 
course credit. In two semesters, two hundred and thirty-nine participated in the study. Among 
them, thirty-six had completed the divergent creativity task before and were ineligible for 
analysis (Steffens, Gocłowska, Cruwys, & Galinsky, 2016), and an additional twelve had 
missing data on the key measures. Excluding these participants resulted in a final sample of 191 
for analysis. Participants came to the lab and were randomly assigned to complete one of the 
three conditions of the goal model manipulation task (66 hierarchical, 62 network, and 63 
sequential). Afterward, they did an integrative and a divergent creativity task on the computer 
that was unrelated to the goal model task. The order of the two creativity tasks was randomized 
by the computer and did not affect the pattern of the results. Finally, participants completed a 
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battery of exploratory measures, which included manipulation check questions about the goal 
model manipulation task.  
 Goal model manipulation.  This manipulation task was developed based on the goal 
model assessment method validated in the prior studies. There were three conditions, each meant 
to induce one type of goal model. Participants came to the lab and received a paper-and-pencil 
booklet that asked them to create a goal map of what they did at school to achieve their goal of 
university success. Participants’ goal model was manipulated by the prototype model presented 
in the booklet. As illustrated in Figure 4, each participant received a figure of one of three goal 
models (with a brief explanation of the structure) and was told to follow the structure of the 
figure to create their goal map (see full materials in Appendix E).  
 
Figure 4. Sample Description of A (Network) Goal Model in the Goal Model Manipulation 
Task. 
 To make it more intuitive for participants to follow the instructions, the task provided an 
unfinished diagram—as seen in Figure 5—where the focal goal was already drawn according to 
the prototype. Participants completed the diagram and drew as many goals as they wanted. In 
essence, this manipulation kept the focal goal across conditions constant, while altering the 
structure participants used to organize their focal goal in relation to other idiosyncratic goals (see 
Appendix F for sample diagrams from participants). Following the goal model manipulation, 
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participants completed the standard measure of the importance of each goal (same as prior 
studies).  
 
Your representation of achieving university success: 
 
 
 
 
 
Network Condition 
 
Hierarchical Condition 
 
Sequential Condition 
   
 
   
Figure 5. The Unfinished Diagrams for Participants to Complete in the Goal Model 
Manipulation Task. 
 As a manipulation check, I included items at the end of the experiment to measure the 
degree to which participants followed certain goal organizing principles when creating their goal 
map. Participants responded to each item on a scale from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly 
agree. The items measured the use of the principle of goal importance (4 items, α = .91; e.g., “I 
classified my goals by order of importance.”), the principle of goal interconnections (4 items, α 
= .74; e.g., “I paid a lot of attention to the ways that goals were related to each other.”), and the 
principle of time (4 items, α = .91; e.g., “I organized my goals in chronological orders.”; see full 
scale in Appendix G).5  
                                                          
5 Prior to the study, I conducted scale validation analyses. In short, using a separate sample (n = 495), I conducted an 
exploratory factor analysis and observed that the three goal model subscales emerged to be three unique factors 
(average eigenvalues = 2.98). Further, in another sample (n = 515), confirmatory factor analysis results 
demonstrated that the subscales are related to but distinct from each other, and the current configuration produced 
the greatest model fit (CFI = .989, PCLOSE = .947, RMSEA = .037). 
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 Integrative creative thinking.  Integrative creativity was measured in a creative story-
rewriting task (adapted from Leung & Chiu, 2010). Participants were given a short summary of 
the story of Snow White. They were told to use their wildest imagination to rewrite the story, but 
the story needed to be based on the original fairy tale (see the task in Appendix H). In doing so, 
this task challenged participants’ ability to connect seemingly unrelated ideas, however wild they 
are, to form a new and coherent story in their own version. Hence, the outcome of the task can be 
operationalized as integrative creative thinking.  
 To evaluate participants’ performance on the task, I recruited and trained four coders who 
were blind to the hypothesis to evaluate each participant’s story independently and in random 
order. For each story, the coders rated creative performance on a 7-point scale, from 1= Not at all 
to 7 = Extremely creative (Leung & Chiu, 2010). The reliability among the coders was high 
(α= .85), so I averaged their ratings to form an integrative creativity index for each participant as 
a dependent measure. 
 Divergent creative thinking. Divergent creativity was measured with the standard 
unusual uses task (Guilford, 1950; Torrance, 1974). In this task, participants were given two 
minutes to generate as many creative uses of a brick as possible (see Appendix I). This task 
challenged participants’ ability to expand the one central idea (i.e., the brick) to as many and as 
diverse ideas as possible, without any constraint on the interconnections and coherence between 
these ideas. Therefore, the outcome of the task can be operationalized as divergent creative 
thinking. To evaluate participants’ performance on the task, I recruited and trained three coders 
(not the same coders for coding integrative creative thinking) who were blind to the hypothesis 
to evaluate each use independently and in random order. 
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 A participant’s performance in the unusual uses task was the combination of three sub-
scores: fluency, flexibility, and originality (Kurtzberg, 1998; Tadmor, Tetlock, & Peng, 2009; 
Torrance, 1974). The fluency sub-score was the number of ideas each participant generated. The 
flexibility sub-score was the number of semantic categories a participant used out of a list of 27 
categories (e.g., using a brick as a weapon, as a doorstep). The list was adopted from a pre-
existing list of 19 categories (Markman, Lindberg, Kray, & Galinsky, 2007), with an addition of 
8 categories generated in consensus by the coders to fit all participants’ uses (e.g., smoothing 
tool, extinguishing tool). The interrater reliability, ϰ = .82, was substantial (Fleiss et al., 2003; 
Landis & Koch, 1977). The coders discussed the discrepancy and agreed on the final category of 
each use participants generated. Finally, the originality sub-score was measured by coders’ 
subjective evaluation of how novel the use was on a scale from 1 = Not at all to 7 = Extremely 
creative (α = .79). The originality score of a participant was the average score across all the 
coders and the uses participants generated. These three creativity scores were highly consistent 
(α = .85). Hence, the average of the three standardized sub-scores for each participant formed the 
index of divergent creative thinking, used as a dependent variable. 
Results and Discussion 
 Manipulation check. To test the effectiveness of the goal model manipulation, I 
examined ratings of goal organizing principles (within-subjects: importance, interconnection, 
time) as a function of the goal model condition (between-subjects: hierarchical, network, 
sequential). Because of the mixed design, I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA. Results showed 
a significant interaction, F(2, 668) = 88.80, p = < .001, ηp2 = .21, suggesting that participants’ 
goal organizing principle differed depending on their goal model condition. 
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 To unpack the result, I created dummy variables to contrast each goal model with the 
other two (e.g., Hierarchical Model: hierarchical = 1, network = 0, sequential = 0). These 
variables allow the significant test of the difference between the target goal model and the two 
other models. Results of the t-tests are reported in Table 8.  
 
Table 8 
Independent t-tests: Manipulation Check Analyses, Goal Model Condition Predicting Goal 
Organizing Principles (Study 3) 
DV Predictor M SD B SE t   p 95%CI ηp2 
Importance 1. Hierarchical 4.67 1.37 .82 *** .24 3.42 .001 [.35, 1.29] .06 
 2. Network 3.74 1.72 -.58 * .25 -2.36 .019 [-1.07, -.10] .03 
 3. Sequential 3.96 1.62 -.26 
 
.25 -1.05 .296 [-.75, .23] .01 
Interconnection 1. Hierarchical 4.62 1.21 -.18 
 
.18 -1.03 .307 [-.53, .17] .01 
 2. Network 4.92 1.13 .26 
 
.18 1.43 .154 [-.10, .61] .01 
 3. Sequential 4.69 1.17 -.07 
 
.18 -.38 .702 [-.43, .29] < .01 
Time 1. Hierarchical 3.57 1.47 -.71 ** .26 -2.72 .007 [-1.23, -.20] .04 
 2. Network 3.42 1.41 -.90 *** .26 -3.44 .001 [-1.42, -.39] .06 
  3. Sequential 5.12 1.82 1.62 *** .24 6.71 < .001 [1.15, 2.10] .19 
Note. N = 191: 66 hierarchical (35%), 62 network (32%), and 63 sequential (33%). Goal model predictors 
are dummy-coded variables (e.g., Hierarchical: hierarchical = 1, network = 0, sequential = 0). For each 
dependent variable, individual tests are numbered separately. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
 When creating their goal map, participants in the hierarchical condition focused more on 
importance, p = .001; participants in the sequential condition focused more on time, p < .001. 
Unfortunately, participants in the network condition did not report focusing more on 
interconnection relative to the other two conditions, p = .154. This null difference was likely an 
artifact due to the interconnection items being relevant to not just the network condition. 
Specifically, those in the hierarchical and sequential condition seem to also endorse strongly on 
the interconnection items (e.g., “I paid a lot of attention to the ways that goals were related to 
each other.”). Importantly, results also showed that those in the network condition reported 
focusing significantly less on both importance, p = .019, and time, p = .001. Overall, results 
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suggested that the goal model manipulation successfully induced different focal organizing 
principles in participants’ goal model. 
 Creativity. Next, I investigated the creativity outcomes. The zero-order correlation 
between integrative and divergent creativity scores was r = .19, p = .009. This relatively small 
correlation supported the notion that the two creativity processes are related but unique from 
each other. I hypothesized that a network model might induce greater creative thinking, and 
particularly so for an integrative creativity task. To test this hypothesis, I conducted t-tests using 
a dummy variable (contrasting network vs. the other two models) to predict the creativity 
outcomes. Results are illustrated in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. A Panel of Integrative and Divergent Creative Performance as a Function of Goal 
Model Condition (Study 3; Integrative creativity: scale from 1= Not at all to 7 = Extremely 
creative). 
 Participants in the network condition (vs. the other two) showed a greater performance in 
the integrative creativity task, p = .025—supporting the hypothesis that a network model can 
induce integrative creative thinking. In contrast, the network condition did not affect divergent 
creative performance, p = .889. This null finding echoed the speculation that there could be a 
boundary condition for when network models can increase creativity. The full results (including 
other model comparisons and exploratory analyses) are presented in Table 9. 
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Table 9 
Independent t-tests and GLMs: Network Model Condition (vs. Other Two Conditions) Predicting 
Creativity Measures, and Exploratory Analyses (Study 3) 
DV Predictor M SD B SE t p 95%CI ηp2 
Focal t-tests     
 
     
Integrative creativity 1. Network 4.27 1.41 .52 * .23 2.26 .025 [.07, .97] .03 
Divergent creativity 1. Network -.003 .82 -.02 
 
.14 -.14 .889 [-.29, .25] < .01 
Exploratory t-tests 
Integrative creativity 1. Hierarchical 3.72 1.54 -.32 
 
.23 -1.39 .166 [-.77, .13] .01 
 2. Sequential 3.80 1.50 -.19 
 
.23 -.82 .413 [-.64, .27] < .01 
Divergent creativity 1. Hierarchical -.003 .93 -.02 
 
.14 -.15 .882 [-.29, .25] < .01 
 2. Sequential .036 .92 .04 
 
.14 .29 .772 [-.23, .31] < .01 
Goal space 1. Hierarchical 12.71 5.51 1.66 * .80 2.08 .039 [.08, 3.23] .02 
 2. Network 13.45 4.71 2.70 *** .80 3.39 .001 [1.13, 4.27] .06 
 3. Sequential 8.70 4.33 -4.37 *** .75 -5.82 < .001 [-5.85, -2.89] .15 
Goal importance 1. Hierarchical 8.50 1.28 -.20 
 
.19 -1.05 .293 [-.58, .17] .01 
 2. Network 8.58 1.01 -.08 
 
.19 -.39 .695 [-.46, .31] < .01 
 3. Sequential 8.82 1.42 .28 
 
.19 1.46 .146 [-.10, .66] .01 
Exploratory GLMs including controlsa 
Integrative creativity 1. Hierarchical 3.66 1.48 -.41 
 
.23 -1.82 .070 [-.86, .03] .02 
     Goal space   .04 
 
.02 1.72 .087 [-.01, .08] .02 
     Goal Importance   -.18 * .09 -2.02 .045 [-.35, .00] .02 
 2. Network 4.22 1.50 .45 
 
.23 1.92 .057 [-.01, .91] .02 
     Goal space   .02 
 
.02 .98 .326 [-.02, .06] .01 
     Goal Importance   -.18 * .09 -2.00 .047 [-.35, .00] .02 
 3. Sequential 3.91 1.55 -.01 
 
.25 -.03 .974 [-.50, .48] < .01 
     Goal space   .03 
 
.02 1.35 .178 [-.01, .08] .01 
     Goal Importance   -.17 
 
.09 -1.93 .055 [-.35, .00] .02 
Divergent creativity 1. Hierarchical -.05 .88 -.08 
 
.13 -.61 .544 [-.35, .18] < .01 
     Goal space   .03 * .01 2.31 .022 [.00, .05] .03 
     Goal Importance   -.07 
 
.05 -1.34 .181 [-.17, .03] .01 
 2. Network -.07 .89 -.11 
 
.14 -.76 .450 [-.38, .17] < .01 
     Goal space   .03 * .01 2.36 .019 [.00, .06] .03 
     Goal Importance   -.07 
 
.05 -1.30 .196 [-.17, .04] .01 
 3. Sequential .15 .92 .21 
 
.15 1.46 .146 [-.07, .50] .01 
     Goal space   .03 ** .01 2.64 .009 [.01, .06] .04 
      Goal Importance     -.07   .05 -1.35 .179 [-.17, .03] .01 
Note. N = 191: 66 hierarchical (35%), 62 network (32%), and 63 sequential (33%). aAdjusted means (with 
control variables) of each goal model are reported. Goal model predictors are dummy-coded variables. 
For each dependent variable, individual tests are numbered separately. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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 Exploratory analyses controlling for goal space and goal importance reduced the 
significant level of the focal result on integrative creativity (p = .057) but not the overall pattern 
of the findings. This added partial support to the argument that participants’ goal structure (rather 
than properties of single goals) led to the observed results. In addition, two interesting effects 
emerged from the exploratory analyses that future research may examine further. First, goal 
importance appeared to have an independent negative effect on integrative creativity—the more 
a person’s goals were important (on average), the worse the integrative creativity performance. 
Second, goal space seemed to affect divergent creativity positively—the more goals a person 
has, the higher the divergent creativity performance. This association might be a result of people 
who were generative thinking of both more goals and ideas spontaneously.  
 Overall, Study 3 made several contributions. It directly adds evidence for predictive 
validity of (network) goal models, supporting the proposition that a goal model framework has 
critical implication for self-regulation. A network model showed an upside that it could induce 
creative thinking. Specifically, a network model increased creativity in a task that required 
meaningfully connecting unrelated ideas. The finding fits well with the postulation about the 
implication of network models. A network model emphasizes the interconnections among goals. 
Through increasing awareness of these multiple and dynamic goal relations, a network model 
unlocks an integrative mindset, resulting in a spill-over effect on a subsequent unrelated task 
measuring integrative creative performance.  
 Further, the outcomes predicted by network models are nontrivial, such as creative 
performance. Creativity is a highly desirable ability and it predicts extensive benefits across life 
domains (e.g., good problem-solving, high job performance; Anderson et al., 2014). Study 3 not 
only uncovered a novel antecedent of creativity, but also provided a way to help individuals 
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increase creativity because a person’s goal model can be changed. This may be good news for 
the study of creativity intervention as many extant strategies may not be efficient or effective 
(e.g., Scott, Leritz, & Mumford, 2004). The goal model manipulation in the current study took 
participants 12 minutes (on average; SD = 3.92) and served as an efficient alternative method to 
boost creativity. Yet it is critical to note that the effect size was small (ηp2 = .03). Future research 
should continue exploring its effectiveness, for instance, how long the manipulation effect will 
last and its generalizability to other tasks to understand both its utility and limits. 
 Lastly, the development of a goal model manipulation method in itself brings theoretical 
and practical implications. The current research suggests that the goal model manipulation was 
effective, showing meaningful variations in manipulation check questions and creativity 
outcomes. The ability to temporarily alter people’s goal models allows future research to study 
goal models experimentally and draw causal inferences. In addition, as goal models may be 
helpful in distinct self-regulatory contexts, the manipulation also serves as the foundation of the 
future development of specific goal model interventions to help improve people’s self-regulation 
effectiveness (e.g., increasing creativity in the integrative task, dissipating perceived tensions 
among goals). 
 In the following pair of studies, I will examine the implication of sequential models. 
Specifically, the studies focus on how sequential models may amplify people’s sensitivity and 
reaction to progress (Study 4) and satisfy some people’s preference for movement (Study 5). 
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Study 4: Sequential Models Increase Sensitivity to Progress 
Sequential models, relative to other two, make time salient. I proposed that people 
organizing their goals in sequential models should be more sensitive to goal progress, amplifying 
the effects of goal progress on goal motivation (e.g., Johnson et al., 2012).  
To test this proposition, this study manipulated participants’ model of academic-related 
goals and their perceptions of academic goal progress. Afterward, participants’ academic 
motivation was measured. If sequential models heighten people’s sensitivity toward goal 
progress, we should observe that participants in the sequential model condition will be more 
affected by the goal progress manipulation. In other words, participants in the sequential model 
condition should vary more in their levels of academic motivation (compared to the two other 
models) as a function of the goal progress condition. 
Method 
 Power, participants, and design. This study had a 2(Goal progress: high vs. low) × 
3(Goal models: hierarchical, network, sequential) between-subjects design. Participants were 
recruited through the University of Waterloo Psychology Participant Pool and they participated 
in the lab study for one course credit. I tried to recruit as many participants as possible in one 
semester. In the end, 148 people participated in the study. Among them, 9 people had missing 
data and were excluded, resulting in a final sample of 139 participants. In this study, participants 
came to the lab and were randomly assigned to complete one of the three versions of the standard 
goal model manipulation task (51 hierarchical, 37 network, and 51 sequential). They were then 
randomly assigned to one of the two goal progress conditions (67 high, 72 low) using a validated 
paradigm (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005) and reported their subsequent level of academic motivation.  
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 Goal model manipulation. This study had the same goal model manipulation task used 
in Study 3, except the focal goal was an academic success (in the current study) to match the 
manipulation of academic goal progress. No goal model manipulation check and goal importance 
measure were included. 
 Goal progress manipulation. Borrowing an existing paradigm from Fishbach and Dhar 
(2005), participants were randomly assigned to be in a high or low progress condition. In the 
manipulation, participants were asked to indicate the time that they have spent on their course 
work in the past day. Critically, participants completed their answers on a paper-and-pencil 
survey that had been partially filled by a bogus participant. The experimenter told the participant 
that, in order to save paper, they could use this survey again as the last participant only answered 
the first question. The answer to the first question on the survey was the amount of time spent on 
their course work in the past day. It was filled by the bogus participants to be either 30 minutes 
(low standard) or 5 hours (high standard). The response was crossed out but still apparent. This 
manipulation has been shown in prior work to lead participants with a low comparison standard 
to think that they made high progress, whereas to lead participants with a high comparison 
standard to think that they made low progress (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005).  
 Immediately after the manipulation, a manipulation check was included and asked 
participants to indicate on a 5-point scale the rate of their progress toward completing their 
academic tasks (1 = Not at all to 5 = Extremely).  
 Academic motivation. Last, participants reported their academic motivation using a 
standard scale (Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002). The scale has 10 items, each describes a 
behavior the participant can engage in for academic success (e.g., “I plan to focus more on my 
studies”, “I plan to study harder for tests and exams.”). Participants responded on a scale from 1 
 63 
= Not at all true to 7 = Very true to indicate the extent to which they wanted to engage in these 
behaviors. The scale is reliable (α = .84) and the average score across the items was used as the 
index of academic motivation, the dependent variable. 
Results and Discussion 
 Manipulation check. Unlike the original study (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005), participants’ 
response to the manipulation check did not differ across the two conditions. One possibility is 
that a decent number of participants reported having spent 5 or more hours on studying in the 
past day (43 people; 22% of the sample), reducing the impact of the high standard comparison (5 
hours) in creating a perception of low progress. Additionally, the progress manipulation itself 
seemed to affect participants’ self-report study time. Participants in the low progress condition 
that had a high comparison standard (5 hours) reported having studied significantly more (M = 
4.35, SD = 2.71) than those in the high progress condition (M = 3.04, SD = 1.86) that had a low 
comparison standard (30 minutes), t(137)= 3.30, p = .001. This might be a result of self-
presentation motive: participants exaggerated the amount of time they studied the previous day 
when they received a high comparison standard. To examine the true conditional effect, I also 
conducted supplementary analyses testing the effect of sequential model condition controlling 
for participants’ own study time. 
 Academic motivation. As a sequential model makes salient the role of time, I 
hypothesized that participants in the sequential condition (vs. hierarchical and network 
conditions) should vary more in their levels of academic motivation as a function of the goal 
progress condition. In other words, those in the sequential condition (vs. the other two 
conditions) should report higher motivation when progress was high and report lower motivation 
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when progress was low. To test this hypothesis as a whole, I created a contrast-coded variable 
(see Table 10). 
 
Table 10 
Contrast Coding of the Hypothesis (Study 4) 
  Progress Condition   Goal Model Condition     
Contrast weights   Sequential Others  M 
 High  2 1  1.5 
 Low  -2 -1  -1.5 
  M  0 0  0 
 
 This contrast analysis provides an efficient and precise way to test a theory-driven 
hypothesis when there are multiple levels of condition (see Furr & Rosenthal, 2003). The 
contrast-coded variable had four levels (2, 1, -1, -2), corresponding to the expected conditional 
effects (goal model and progress) on motivation. Results of the contrast analysis are presented in 
Table 11. 
 
Table 11 
Contrast Analysis: Sequential Model Condition Amplifying the Effect of Progress Condition on 
Motivation, and An Exploratory Analysis (Study 4) 
DV Predictor M SD B SE F p 95%CI ηp2 
Focal t-tests          
Motivation Contrast 5.42 .93 1.12* .54 4.29 .040 [.05, 2.18] .03 
Exploratory test including controlsa 
Motivation Contrast 5.42 .90 1.26* .54 5.45 .021 [.19, 2.32] .04 
  Study time     -.01 .03 .16 .694 [-.08, .05] < .01 
Note. N = 139: 51 hierarchical (37%), 37 network (27%), and 51 sequential (37%). aAdjusted means 
were reported. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
 As predicted, there was a significant contrast effect, p = .040. Participants in the 
sequential condition (vs. the other two conditions) had a significantly greater difference in 
motivation as a function of the progress condition—supporting the hypothesis that the sequential 
model increased sensitivity to progress. Supplementary analyses controlling for participants’ 
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self-report study time did not change the pattern of the result, p = .021. The distribution of 
motivation across conditions is shown in Figure 7. Means and standard errors across hierarchical 
and network conditions were presented independently for transparency. 
 
 
Figure 7. Academic Motivation as a Function of Goal Progress Condition and Goal Model 
Condition (Study 4; scale from 1 = Not at all true to 7 = Very true). 
 
 Study 4 results suggested that the way people organized the relations of their goals could 
affect their level of sensitivity toward goal progress. Because both goal models and goal progress 
were manipulated, there was causal evidence for sequential models to amplify people’s progress 
sensitivity and motivational responses. This provides yet another demonstration that goal models 
have critical implications for self-regulation and adds new evidence for the predictive validity of 
goal models. Specifically, as goal progress information is central to people’s ability to self-
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regulate (Carver & Scheier, 1982b), sequential models may have other important implications for 
self-regulation related to time and change. Going beyond state-level differences in goal progress, 
studies have shown that individuals can differ in their general preference for making constant 
movement (progress) in self-regulation (Higgins et al., 2003). The next study tested whether 
sequential models would satisfy some people’s preference for movement in regulation and create 
a more positive experience for them in goal pursuit. 
Study 5: Sequential Models and Locomotion Fit 
 People vary in their preference for change and movement in self-regulation. Based on 
regulatory mode theory, these tendencies can be classified into one of two regulatory modes: an 
assessment mode (i.e., making critical evaluation and comparisons) versus a locomotion mode 
(i.e., generating action and change; Higgins et al., 2003). Regulatory modes can vary both 
chronically as an individual difference and state-by-state driven by the situation (Avnet & 
Higgins, 2003). People often choose strategies that support or fit their regulatory mode. For 
instance, people with a locomotion (vs. assessment mode) are less likely to procrastinate (Pierro, 
Giacomantonio, Pica, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2011), are more likely to reconcile a conflict and 
move on (Webb, Coleman, Rossignac-Milon, Tomasulo, & Higgins, 2017), and prefer leadership 
styles that advocate forceful actions (Kruglanski, Pierro, & Tory Higgins, 2007).  
 As reviewed in the introduction, when people’s regulatory mode matches with the 
manner they pursue their goals in a given situation, it helps sustain their regulatory orientation 
and creates a fit experience (Higgins, 2005)—people “feel right” and more engaged in the goal 
pursuit. The value from fit can transfer into engagement in the goal-pursuit experience, 
increasing their motivation and satisfaction in goal striving (Avnet & Higgins, 2006). For 
example, people in a locomotion (vs. assessment) mode perceive more value in their final choice 
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when they use a strategy of progressive elimination (i.e., removing worst alternatives until the 
final decision) versus full evaluation (i.e., comparing attributes of all alternatives simultaneously; 
Avnet & Higgins, 2003). They are also more satisfied with their job if they work under a leader 
who gives a clear sense of direction (Benjamin & Flynn, 2006).  
 Because sequential models highlight the passage of time and a sense of movement from 
one goal stage to another, I hypothesized that sequential models could match a locomotion (vs. 
assessment) mode and create fit. This hypothesis of fit could result in two predictions. First, if a 
sequential model (compared to the other two models) is a better fit to the locomotion mode, it is 
possible that being in a locomotion mode would lead people to represent their goals in a 
sequential model. Second, if the fit is true, locomotors should be more satisfied with their goal 
striving when they represent their goals sequentially. These two predictions are compatible with 
each other, so it is possible that both can be observed simultaneously.  
 To test these two predictions, this study manipulated participants’ regulatory mode, and 
assessed goal models and indicators of positive subjective experience of striving life goals, 
namely life satisfaction and self-esteem. If the first prediction is supported, we will observe that 
people in the locomotion (vs. assessment) condition will be more likely to organize their goals in 
a sequence (vs. network or hierarchy). If the second prediction is supported, we will observe an 
interactive effect between regulatory mode condition and goal model—people in the locomotion 
(vs. assessment) condition who adopt a sequential model would report perceiving more positive 
life goal striving experiences, captured as higher life satisfaction and self-esteem.  
Method 
 Power, participants, and design. Participants were recruited through the University of 
Waterloo Psychology Participant Pool to complete the study for one course credit. In three 
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semesters, 233 participated in the study. Among them, 16 did not complete the study, resulting in 
the final sample of 217 participants (see Table 2 for sample demographics and further details). 
Participants’ demographic information was collected via a mass survey conducted online through 
the participant pool prior to the actual study. In the study, participants came to the lab, and they 
were first randomly assigned to either complete a locomotion (n = 103) or assessment mode (n = 
114) induction task and then completed the standard goal model assessment (same as Study 1). 
Finally, they responded to a battery of scale items, including our focal measure of self-esteem 
and life satisfaction. The sampling plan, procedure, and materials of the current study are pre-
registered, and the full details are available at osf.io/tn7jy. 
 Regulatory mode induction.  This study used the standard regulatory mode induction 
technique (Avnet & Higgins, 2003). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
conditions (locomotion vs. assessment), where they recalled examples from their experience that 
would activate the regulatory mode. In the locomotion condition, participants recalled several 
experiences where they acted like a “doer,” finished one project and did not wait long to start a 
new one, and decided to do something and could not wait to get started. In the assessment 
condition participants recalled examples of when they compared themselves with other people, 
thought about their positive and negative characteristics, and critiqued work done by others or 
themselves.  
 Goal model assessment. After the regulatory mode induction, participants completed the 
standard goal model assessment task in a booklet and responded to the measure of the 
importance of each goal. Same as Study 1, participants self-categorized their goal models into 
hierarchical, network, or sequential, which was used as either the dependent measure or the 
predictor variable depending on the prediction being tested.  
 69 
 Self-esteem. I used the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale to measure participants’ 
satisfaction with the self (Rosenberg, 1965). A sample item includes “On the whole, I am 
satisfied with myself” from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree (α= .93).  
 Life satisfaction. I measured participants’ global life satisfaction with the standard 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). A sample item includes 
“I am satisfied with my life” from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree (α= .87).  
 Self-esteem and life satisfaction were strongly correlated, r = .63, p < .001, as expected 
(e.g., E. Diener & Diener, 1995); however, given that they are theoretically distinct constructs 
and might show divergent effects, they were analyzed as two separate dependent measures.  
Results and Discussion 
 Does regulatory mode condition predict goal model? First, I tested the hypothesis of 
whether regulatory mode predicts the way participants model their life goals. Because the goal 
model variable was categorical and had three groups, a multinomial logistic regression was 
performed to model the relationship between Regulatory Mode Condition (locomotion vs. 
assessment) as the predictor and participants’ goal model (sequential, network, and hierarchical) 
as the outcome. The results showed that the fit between the statistical model and data was not 
satisfactory, χ2 (2, 217) = 3.00, p = .223. Compared to participants in the assessment condition, 
participants in the locomotion condition were not more likely to use a sequential model than a 
hierarchical model, B = .43, SE = .39, Wald(1) = 1.23, p = .268, nor more like to use a sequential 
model than a network model, B = .23, SE = .30, Wald(1) = 5.68, p = .451. In sum, the first 
hypothesis was not supported, and the study found no evidence that locomotion mode predicts 
people’s use of a sequential model to structure their goals. 
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 Sequential × locomotion fit. Next, I examined the second hypothesis: the fit between the 
sequential models and a locomotion mode leading to greater positivity in goal striving. To test 
the target interaction, I conducted a general linear model analysis. In the analysis, I examined the 
interaction effect between the sequential model (dummy variable contrasting with the other two 
models) and regulatory model condition (effect-coded: locomotion = 1; assessment = -1) on self-
esteem and life satisfaction.6  
 As illustrated in Figure 8, results revealed a nonsignificant but trending interaction effect 
between sequential model and regulatory mode condition on self-esteem, p = .099 (see detailed 
statistics in Table 12). This suggested that the use of a sequential model might affect 
participants’ self-esteem depending on their regulatory mode. Simple effect analyses were 
conducted to unpack the interaction. Among those in the locomotion condition, participants who 
had a sequential model reported marginally higher self-esteem, B = .42, SE = .24, t = 1.72, p 
= .088, 95%CI[-.06, .89], ηp2 = .03—providing some support, albeit weak, for the fit hypothesis. 
There was no effect of sequential models for people in the assessment condition, p = .490.  
 Since participants were recruited from the psychology participation pool, there was 
secondary data available that happened to include the same measure of participants’ self-esteem 
prior to the study in the same academic term. As exploratory analyses, I used this pre-study self-
esteem as a potential control to enhance the sensitivity to detect the conditional effects on self-
esteem. Controlling for participants’ pre-study self-esteem revealed a more robust pattern of 
results: self-esteem measured during the study varied significantly as a function of the sequential 
model and regulatory mode condition, p = .030. Simple effect analyses showed no effect of 
sequential model for people in the locomotion condition, p = .328; in contrast, participants who 
                                                          
6 Different from Study 4, the effect of regulatory mode condition on the dependent variables was unclear; therefore, 
Study 5 did not employ contrast coding. Effect-coding goal models produced the same patterns of results. 
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had a sequential model reported significantly lower self-esteem in the assessment condition, B = 
-.31, SE = .15, t = -2.12, p = .037, 95%CI[-.60, -.02], ηp2 = .04. This pattern of simple effects was 
not what I initially predicted—I expected that the positivity in goal-striving would be driven 
primarily by a fit (not a nonfit) experience. However, this nonfit effect is consistent with the 
overall fit hypothesis: the match between people’s regulatory mode and sequential models 
matters, affecting the quality of goal-striving experience.  
 
Figure 8. Self-esteem as a Function of Regulatory Mode Condition and Goal Models (Study 5; 
scale from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree). 
  
 As shown in Figure 9, there was no significant interaction between sequential model and 
regulatory mode condition on life satisfaction, p = .519 (see also Table 12). No simple effects 
were significant. There was no secondary data of pre-study life satisfaction available as a control 
variable. Exploratory analyses controlling for the number of goals and average goal importance 
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in the goal map did not change the pattern of the above results. The full results (including other 
model comparisons and exploratory analyses) are presented in Table 12.  
 
 
Figure 9. Life Satisfaction as a Function of Regulatory Mode Condition and Goal Models (Study 
5; scale from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree). 
 
 
 
Table 12 
GLMs and Independent t-tests: Sequential Model × Regulatory Mode Condition Interaction 
Predicting Self-esteem and Life Satisfaction, and Other Exploratory Analyses (Study 5) 
DV Predictor M SD B SE t p 95%CI ηp2 
Focal GLMs     
 
     
Self-esteem 1. Sequential 4.30 1.24 .11  .18 .60 .549 [-.25, .47] < .01 
     Reg. mode condition   -.12  .11 -1.09 .278 [-.35, .10] .01 
     Sequential × Reg. mode condition   .30  .18 1.66 .099 [-.06, .67] .01 
Life satisfaction 1. Sequential 4.49 1.14 .09  .18 .49 .624 [-.27, .45] < .01 
     Reg. mode condition   .00  .11 -.01 .992 [-.23, .23] < .01 
     Sequential × Reg. mode condition   .12  .18 .65 .519 [-.24, .48] < .01 
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An Exploratory GLM controlling for pre-study self-esteema        
Self-esteem 1. Sequential 4.19 .81 -.094  .10 -.95 .341 [-.29, .10] < .01 
     Pre-study self-esteem   .85  .04 23.17 <.001 [.78, .92] .72 
     Reg. mode condition   -.08  .06 -1.25 .212 [-.20, .05] < .01 
     Sequential × Reg. mode condition   .21  .10 2.189 .030 [.02, .41] .02 
Exploratory GLMs    
 
     
Self-esteem 1. Hierarchical 4.16 1.43 -.02  .24 -.10 .919 [-.49, .44] < .01 
     Reg. mode condition   .04  .10 .44 .658 [-.15, .24] < .01 
     Hierarchical × Reg. mode condition   -.26  .24 -1.10 .272 [-.73, .21] .01 
 2. Network 4.18 1.35 -.07  .18 -.39 .700 [-.43, .29] < .01 
     Reg. mode condition   .05  .12 .41 .679 [-.19, .28] < .01 
     Network × Reg. mode condition   -.14  .18 -.75 .455 [-.50, .22] < .01 
Life satisfaction 1. Hierarchical 4.31 1.34 -.11  .24 -.48 .631 [-.58, .35] < .01 
     Reg. mode condition   .09  .10 .91 .367 [-.11, .29] < .01 
     Hierarchical × Reg. mode condition   -.21  .24 -.90 .370 [-.68, .25] < .01 
 2. Network 4.43 1.45 .01  .18 .03 .980 [-.36, .36] < .01 
     Reg. mode condition   .04  .12 .29 .771 [-.20, .27] < .01 
     Network × Reg. mode condition   .03  .18 .15 .885 [-.33, .39] < .01 
Exploratory t-tests    
 
     
Goal space 1. Hierarchical 11.02 5.39 .66  .90 .73 .468 [-1.12, 2.43] < .01 
 2. Network 11.96 5.29 2.52 *** .70 3.62 <.001 [1.15, 3.89] .06 
 3. Sequential 8.67 4.44 -3.00 *** .70 -4.31 <.001 [-4.37, -1.63] .08 
Goal importance 1. Hierarchical 8.71 1.11 .28  .25 1.11 .269 [-.22, .78] .01 
 2. Network 8.20 1.43 -.49 * .20 -2.46 .015 [-.88, -.10] .03 
 3. Sequential 8.67 1.58 .32  .20 1.57 .118 [-.08, .71] .01 
Exploratory GLMs including controlsa    
 
     
Self-esteem 1. Sequential 4.22 1.35 .07  .19 .36 .717 [-.31, .45] < .01 
     Reg. mode condition   -.14  .12 -1.21 .229 [-.37, .09] .01 
     Sequential × Reg. mode condition   .33  .18 1.77 .078 [-.04, .69] .01 
     Goal space   .00  .02 -.17 .861 [-.04, .03] < .01 
     Goal importance   .10  .06 1.52 .131 [-.03, .22] .01 
Life satisfaction 1. Sequential 4.43 1.39 .13  .19 .70 .487 [-.24, .51] < .01 
     Reg. mode condition 
  -.01  .12 -.10 .918 [-.24, .21] < .01 
     Sequential × Reg. mode condition 
  .13  .18 .72 .473 [-.23, .49] < .01 
     Goal space 
  .02  .02 1.24 .215 [-.01, .06] .01 
      Goal importance     .07 
  .06 1.19 .237 [-.05, .20] .01 
Note. N = 217: 41 hierarchical (19%), 91 network (42%), and 85 sequential (39%); 114 locomotion 
(53%), 103 assessment (47%). aAdjusted means reported. Goal model predictors are dummy-coded. For 
each dependent variable, each individual test is numbered. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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 In contrast to my prediction, regulatory mode condition did not predict use of goal 
models. The simple explanation is that there is no relation between regulatory mode and the way 
people organize their goals. Alternatively, if we entertain the possibility that it is true that 
regulatory mode can affect the way people organize their goals, the null finding might be the 
result of sampling error or a weak regulatory mode manipulation (e.g., the change in 
participants’ regulatory mode was insufficient or required more time for it to internalize and 
affect goal models). These possibilities require future research with a larger sample size and/or 
varied regulatory mode manipulation paradigms to explore. 
  The results lent partial support to the fit hypothesis that by highlighting time and 
sensitivity to goal progress, sequential models could help satisfy the preference of locomotion, 
predicting more positive goal striving experiences. The results were relatively weak; no effects 
were found for life satisfaction and the effects on self-esteem were not robust. However, to the 
extent that there is a possible relation between regulatory mode and goal structure on self-
esteem, this suggests new possibilities for considering how goal structure can aid or inhibit 
engagement. Goal pursuit might not always feel enjoyable, for example, especially when 
laborious craftsmanship and endurance is needed for the course of long-term goals (Duckworth, 
Shulman, et al., 2015; Duckworth, Eichstaedt, & Ungar, 2015). This study suggests that the 
extent to which people enjoy and finish the course of goal pursuit may depend in part on how 
they structure their goals (and how that structure fits with their more general motivational 
orientation; c.f. Duckworth, 2016). 
 The benefits of a goal model are likely contingent on the person and the situation. For 
some people, a goal model may help (e.g., locomotors with a sequential model), for others, a 
specific goal model may hurt. Continuing this perspective, the upcoming sets of studies examine 
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how hierarchical models may interact with people’s beliefs about the nature of the self to predict 
their satisfaction and motivation in goal pursuit. 
Study 6: Hierarchical Models Moderate the Effects of Implicit Person Theory  
on Self-Esteem and Life Satisfaction 
As reviewed in the introduction, individuals differ in the extent to which they view the 
person to be fixed (entity theory) or malleable (incremental theory) on a continuum, called 
implicit person theory (Dweck et al., 1995b). Holding the belief that a person cannot be changed, 
entity theorists have the need to prove themselves and tend to exhibit helplessness when facing 
failure or challenge (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). In contrast, incremental 
theorists, who see person characteristics as malleable, experience challenges and failures as 
learning opportunities and focus on achieving mastery (Robins & Pals, 2002).  
 I proposed that the way in which people organize their goals can potentially exacerbate 
the rigid view of the self and helpless reactions among entity theorists, particularly so when the 
goal model highlights how the ultimate goal is highly important, self-relevant, and stable. 
Following this logic, I theorized that hierarchical models would likely intensify the helpless 
reactions of entity theorists. To test the hypothesis, this study assessed individuals’ goal models, 
implicit person theory, and positive life goal striving experience which was captured as higher 
life satisfaction and self-esteem (same as Study 5). 
Method 
 Power, participants, and design. Participants were recruited at multiple campus 
locations (e.g., library) at the University of Waterloo. After two months, we collected a sample 
of 100 participants and stopped the recruitment. Six participants had missing data and were 
excluded, resulting in 94 in the final sample (same sample used in Study 1; sample C). In this 
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study, participants completed two separate paper-and-pencil survey booklets to receive a snack 
bar and enter into a draw for cash prizes. One booklet comprised a goal model assessment, in 
which participants drew a model to represent the relations among their goals. In the other 
booklet, participants responded to a battery of scale items, including our focal measures—
implicit person theory, self-esteem, and life satisfaction. To avoid order effects, the order of 
completion of the booklets and the order of scale inside the personality booklet were 
counterbalanced. These orders did not affect the patterns of our results. 
 Goal model assessment. Same as Study 1, participants completed the standard goal 
model assessment task in a booklet and reported the level of importance of each goal in their 
goal map. They self-categorized their goal models into a hierarchical, network, or sequential 
model, which will be used as the predictor variable.    
  Implicit person theory. In a separate survey booklet, participants responded to the 
below measures on a scale ranging from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree. We 
employed the full 8-item version of the implicit person theory scale (Levy et al., 1998). 
Participants responded to each item, such as “Everyone is a certain kind of person, and there is 
not much that they can do to really change that,” and “People can substantially change the kind 
of person they are” (reverse-coded). Item scores were averaged to obtain the overall person 
theory score, so that higher scores indicated a stronger endorsement of an entity (vs. incremental) 
theory about the self (α= .92). Participants’ person theory scores were normally distributed. Its 
mean equals to 3.57 (SD = 1.39) sitting close to the mid-point of the scale (i.e. 4.00), suggesting 
that the points of +/- 1SD of the mean score can meaningfully represent entity versus incremental 
theorists respectively. Person theory scores were centered and used as a predictor in the analysis. 
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 Self-esteem. I used the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale to measure participants’ 
satisfaction with the self (Rosenberg, 1965; same as Study 5; α= .89).  
 Life satisfaction. I measured participants’ global life satisfaction with the standard 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985; same as Study 5; α= .86). As in Study 5, self-
esteem and life satisfaction (r = .59, p <.001) were analyzed as two separate dependent measures.  
Results and Discussion 
 Consistent with past research (e.g., Burnette, O’Boyle, VanEpps, Pollack, & Finkel, 
2013; Robins & Pals, 2002), there were negative but nonsignificant correlations between 
people’s entity (vs. incremental) person theory and self-esteem, r= - .17, p = .107, and life 
satisfaction, r = -.12, p = .245. I hypothesized that self-esteem and life satisfaction would vary as 
a function of people’s goal model and person theory: hierarchical models may trigger negativity 
in goal-striving experience among those who held a strong entity person theory. To test this 
interaction, I conducted general linear model analysis (same as Study 5). I created a dummy 
variable contrasting hierarchical (= 1) versus the other two models (= 0) and tested its interaction 
effect with person theory on self-esteem and life satisfaction.7  
 As seen in Figure 10, there was a significant interaction between hierarchical model and 
person theory on self-esteem, p = .027 (see detailed statistics in Table 13). This suggested that 
hierarchical models moderated the relation between person theory and self-esteem. Specifically, 
among people who had a hierarchical model, a stronger entity theory was associated with lower 
self-esteem, B = -.44, SE = .14, t = 3.19, p = .006, 95%CI[-.73, -.15], ηp2 = .39. Moreover, simple 
                                                          
7 Alternatively, one could use two dummy or effect-coded goal model variables simultaneously in the analysis (e.g., 
use sequential as the baseline: hierarchical = 1, network = 0, sequential = 0, and hierarchical = 0, network = 1, 
sequential = 0). These varied categorical coding methods produced the same pattern of results and drew the same 
conclusion. Given the focal interest in hierarchical models and consistency in coding with previous studies, I 
retained the use of contrast coding to highlight the effect of the target goal model, the hierarchical model, versus the 
other models. 
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effect analyses showed that among those who had a strong entity person theory (+1SD), the use 
of a hierarchical model was associated with significantly lower self-esteem, p = .004. Among 
those who had a strong incremental person theory (-1SD), however, the hierarchical model 
showed no effect, p = .947. The finding supported the hypothesis that the hierarchical model 
exacerbated the negative goal-striving experience of entity theorists. 
 
Figure 10. Self-esteem as a Function of Implicit Person Theory and Goal Models (Study 6; scale 
from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree). 
 
 Analyses of life satisfaction showed parallel results (see Figure 11). There was a 
significant interaction between hierarchical model and person theory on life satisfaction, p 
= .029, suggesting that hierarchical models also moderated the relation between person theory 
and life satisfaction. Among people who had a hierarchical model, a stronger endorsement of the 
entity theory was associated with lower life satisfaction, B = -.49, SE = .16, t = -3.10, p = .007, 
95%CI[-.82, -.16], ηp2 = .38. In addition, among those who had a strong entity theory (+1SD), 
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the use of a hierarchical model was associated with significantly lower life satisfaction, p = .018. 
Among those who had a strong incremental theory (-1SD), however, hierarchical models had no 
impact, p = .566. Results again supported the hypothesis. 
 
 
Figure 11. Life Satisfaction as a Function of Implicit Person Theory and Goal Models (Study 6; 
scale from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree). 
 
 Other model comparisons and exploratory analyses are presented in Table 13. 
Exploratory analyses controlling for the number of goals and average goal importance in the goal 
map did not change the pattern of the above results. It is noteworthy that, though not 
hypothesized, results showed that network models moderated the relations between person 
theory and life satisfaction, p = .005. There was a nonsignificant yet similar trend for self-
esteem, p = .107. Specifically, network models seemed to buffer against the negative impact of 
an entity theory on self-esteem and life satisfaction—an observation that suggests implications 
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for future studies and will be addressed later in the general discussion. Sequential models, on the 
other hand, showed no moderating effects. 
 
 
 
Table 13 
GLMs and Independent t-tests: Hierarchical Model × Implicit Person Theory Interaction 
Predicting Self-esteem and Life Satisfaction, and Other Exploratory Analyses (Study 6) 
DV Predictor M SD B SE t p 95%CI ηp2 
Focal GLMs           
Self-esteem 1. Hierarchical 4.40 1.11 -.53 
 
.27 -1.97 .052 [-1.05, .00] .04 
     Person theory   -.04 
 
.09 -.43 .672 [-.21, .14] < .01 
     Hierarchical × 
Person theory 
  -.40 * .18 -2.25 .027 [-.76, -.05] .05 
 Simple effects    
      
 
Hierarchical at 
+1SD person theory 
(entity)  
3.19 1.11 1.07 ** .36 -2.95 .004 [-1.79, -.35] .09 
 
Hierarchical at  
-1SD person theory 
(incremental) 
4.53 1.11 .02 
 
.36 .07 .947 [-.69, .74] < .01 
Life satisfaction 1. Hierarchical 3.98 1.25 -.41 
 
.33 -1.25 .214 [-1.06, .24] .02 
     Person theory   < .001 
 
.11 < .001 > .999 [-.21, .21] < .01 
     Hierarchical × 
Person theory 
  -.49 * .22 -2.21 .029 [-.93, -.05] .05 
 Simple effects    
      
 
Hierarchical at 
+1SD person theory 
(entity)  
3.78 1.25 -1.08 * .45 -2.40 .018 [-1.97, -.19] .06 
 
Hierarchical at -1SD 
person theory 
(incremental) 
4.99 1.25 .25 
 
.44 .58 .566 [-.62, 1.13] < .01 
Exploratory GLMs     
      
Self-esteem 1. Network 4.91 .87 .17 
 
.22 .75 .455 [-.27, .61] .01 
     Person Theory   .21 * .09 -2.28 .025 [-.40, -.03] .06 
     Network × Person 
theory 
  .28 
 
.17 1.63 .107 [-.06, .62] .03 
 Simple effects:    
      
 
Network at +1SD 
person theory 
(entity) 
5.07 .87 .55 
 
.32 1.73 .087 [-.08, 1.17] .03 
 
Network at -1SD 
person theory 
(incremental) 
4.23 .87 -.21 
 
.33 -.65 .517 [-.87, .44] < .01 
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 2. Sequential 4.90 1.17 .15 
 
.22 .69 .494 [-.29, .59] .01 
     Person theory   -.15 
 
.11 -1.38 .171 [-.37, .07] .02 
     Sequential × 
Person theory 
  .05 
 
.16 .31 .761 [-.27, .36] < .01 
Life satisfaction 1 Network 4.27 1.18 -.06 
 
.26 -.22 .824 [-.58, .46] < .01 
     Person theory   -.29 * .11 -2.59 .011 [-.51, -.07] .07 
     Network × Person 
theory 
  .59 ** .20 2.91 .005 [.19, 1.00] .09 
 Simple effects:    
      
 
Network at +1SD 
person theory 
(entity) 
5.00 1.18 .75 * .37 2.00 .049 [.00, 1.49] .04 
 
Network at -1SD 
person theory 
(incremental) 
4.82 1.18 -.87 * .39 -2.22 .029 [-1.64, -.09] .05 
 2. Sequential 4.46 1.39 .29 
 
.27 1.07 .290 [-.25, .82] .01 
     Person theory   -.04 
 
.13 -.32 .749 [-.31, .22] < .01 
     Sequential × 
Person theory 
  -.15 
 
.19 -.76 .452 [-.53, .24] .01 
Exploratory t-tests     
      
Goal space 1. Hierarchical 7.33 3.51 -.07 
 
.92 -.08 .940 [-1.89, 1.75] < .01 
 2. Network 7.92 3.77 1.21 
 
.73 1.65 .101 [-.24, 2.66] .03 
 3. Sequential 6.60 3.46 -1.11 
 
.72 -1.56 .123 [-2.54, .31] .03 
Goal importance 1. Hierarchical 8.80 1.12 .17 
 
.33 .51 .614 [-.49, .82] < .01 
 2. Network 8.56 1.32 -.18 
 
.27 -.66 .514 [-.70, .35] .01 
 3. Sequential 8.70 1.28 .06 
 
.26 .24 .810 [-.46, .58] < .01 
Exploratory GLMs including controlsa 
Self-esteem 1. Hierarchical 4.38 1.01 -.51 
 
.27 -1.94 .056 [-1.04, .01] .04 
     Person theory   -.06 
 
.09 -.73 .468 [-.24, .11] .01 
     Hierarchical × 
Person theory 
  -.33 
 
.18 -1.82 .072 [-.70, .03] .04 
     Goal space   .02 
 
.03 .69 .495 [-.04, .08] .01 
     Goal importance   .11 
 
.09 1.32 .191 [-.06, .29] .02 
Life satisfaction 1. Hierarchical 3.95 1.26 -.44 
 
.33 -1.31 .193 [-1.09, .22] .02 
     Person theory   -.01 
 
.11 -.07 .946 [-.22, .21] < .01 
     Hierarchical × 
Person theory 
  -.46 * .23 -2.03 .045 [-.92, -.01] .05 
     Goal space   .01 
 
.04 .14 .888 [-.07, .08] .00 
      Goal importance     .07   .11 .63 .531 [-.15, .28] .01 
Note. N = 94: 18 hierarchical (19%), 36 network (38%), and 40 sequential (43%). aAdjusted means 
reported. Goal model predictors are dummy-coded variables (e.g., Hierarchical: hierarchical = 1, network 
= 0, sequential = 0). For each dependent variable, each individual test is numbered. * p < .05; ** p < .01; 
*** p < .001. 
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 Overall, results supported the hypothesis that goal model interacted with person theory to 
predict the quality of goal striving experience. Representing goals on a hierarchy seemed to 
exacerbate the entity theorists’ negativity in the striving of life goals, showing lower self-esteem 
and life satisfaction. The next and final study followed up on this proposition in the lab, 
manipulating goal model to test the causality of this proposition. 
Study 7: Hierarchical Models Moderate the Effects of Implicit Person Theory on 
Motivation 
 Study 6 provided initial evidence that hierarchical models interact with person theory to 
influence people’s goal-pursuit experience. However, because it was a correlational study, one 
cannot be certain about the direction of the effects. Therefore, the current study experimentally 
manipulated people’s goal models and measured their level of motivation to pursue the focal 
goal in the manipulation. Building on past research that entity theorists tended to be less 
motivated at school (e.g., giving up early, less excited about challenging goals; Blackwell et al., 
2007; Robins & Pals, 2002), this study manipulated undergraduates’ model of academic goals 
and extended Study 6 to examine whether goal models would interact with person theory to 
predict their academic motivation.  
Method 
 Power, participants, and design. The experiment had a between-subject design 
(Condition: hierarchical, network, and sequential models). Two hundred participants were 
recruited through the University of Waterloo Psychology Participant Pool and participated in the 
lab study for one course credit. In the lab, participants were randomly assigned to complete one 
of the three versions of standard goal model manipulation task (59 hierarchical, 73 network, and 
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68 sequential). Afterward, they responded to the measure of person theory and academic 
motivation among a battery of filler measures. 
 Goal model manipulation. This study used the same goal model manipulation task as in 
Study 4, where participants were instructed to think about academic success as their focal goal 
and organize idiosyncratic goals related to the goal. Following the goal model manipulation, 
participants completed the standard measure of importance of each goal. 
  Person Theory. Same as Study 6, I used the standard implicit person theory scale (Levy 
et al., 1998) and the higher the score reflected the stronger the entity (vs. incremental) theory 
about personal character traits (8 items; α= .92). Participants’ scores were normally distributed. 
Its mean equals to 3.41 (SD = 1.32) sitting close to the mid-point of the scale (i.e. 4.00), 
suggesting that the points of +/- 1SD of the mean score can meaningfully represent entity versus 
incremental theorists respectively. Person Theory scores were centered and used as a predictor in 
the analysis. 
 Academic motivation. I included two scales to measure academic motivation. The first 
scale was the same scale used in Study 4 to measure participants’ academic motivation to do well 
in their coursework (10 items; α = .76; Lockwood et al., 2002). The second scale was a 2-item 
scale that measured motivation in a more idiosyncratic manner (Kay, Laurin, Fitzsimons, & 
Landau, 2014): “Think about the work you will have to do in order to achieve academic success. 
How interested are you in doing this work?”, and “Think about the temptations you will have to 
resist in order to achieve academic success. How interested are you in resisting these 
temptations?” Participants responded to these items on a scale from 1 = Not at all and 7 = 
Extremely (r = .56). The two scales converged and together formed one common factor 
(eigenvalue = 3.31) in a principle component analysis. For parsimony’s sake, all motivation item 
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scores were averaged to form a latent academic motivation score as the outcome variable (α 
= .80).8  
Results and Discussion 
 I hypothesized that participants’ academic motivation would vary as a function of their 
goal model condition and person theory. Specifically, the hierarchical condition would reduce 
academic motivation among those had strong entity (vs. incremental) theory. To test this 
interaction effect, same as Study 6 I conducted general linear model analysis. I created a dummy 
variable contrasting hierarchical (= 1) versus the other two models (= 0) and tested its interaction 
effect with person theory on motivation. 
 As illustrated in Figure 12, there were no main effects of person theory or conditions on 
academic motivation, ps > .246. As predicted, however, there was a marginally significant 
hierarchical condition × person theory interaction, p = .053 (see detailed statistics in Table 14). 
This suggested that the relation between participants’ person theory and academic motivation 
might depend on the goal model condition. Among people in the hierarchical condition, there 
was no significant trend that a stronger entity theory was associated with lower motivation, t = -
1.15, p = .256. However, simple effect analyses showed that the hierarchical condition tended to 
harm motivation of those who had a strong entity theory (+1SD), p = .087; whereas among those 
who had a strong incremental theory (-1SD) the hierarchical condition had no impact, p = .267. 
These findings provide mixed support for the hypothesis that hierarchical model may aggravate 
the negative goal-striving reactions of entity theorists, reducing their motivation. 
 
                                                          
8 Analyzing the motivation scores separately yielded the same patterns of results. 
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Figure 12. Academic Motivation as a Function of Implicit Person Theory and Goal Model 
Condition (Study 7; scale from 1 = Not at all/Not at all true and 7 = Extremely/Very true). 
 
 Other model comparisons and exploratory analyses are presented in Table 14. 
Exploratory analyses controlling for the number of goals and average goal importance in the goal 
map did not change the pattern of the results. Interestingly, consistent with Study 6 there was an 
emerging interaction between the network condition and person theory, p = .096. Contrasting the 
effect of the hierarchical condition, among people in the network condition, a stronger entity 
theory tended to be associated with higher motivation, B = .18, SE = .10, t = 1.88, p = .064, 
95%CI[-.82, -.16], ηp2 = .38. Network model seemed to be beneficial for people who endorsed a 
strong entity person theory (+1SD), but the effect was not significant, p = .290. Also consistent 
with Study 6, the sequential condition showed no moderating impact, p = .824. 
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Table 14 
GLMs and Independent t-tests: Hierarchical Model × Implicit Person Theory Interaction 
Predicting Academic Motivation, and Other Exploratory Analyses (Study 7) 
DV Predictor M SD B SE t p 95%CI ηp2 
Focal GLMs           
Motivation 1. Hierarchical 5.30 .84 -.04  .15 -.27 .791 [-.34, .26] < .01 
     Person theory   .13 
* .06 2.08 .038 [.01, .25] .02 
     Hierarchical × 
Person theory   -.23  .12 -1.95 .053 [-.46, .00] .02 
 Simple effects          
 
Hierarchical at 
+1SD person theory 
(entity)    -.34  .20 -1.72 .087 [-.73, .05] .01 
 
Hierarchical at  
-1SD person theory 
(incremental)   .26  .23 1.11 .267 [-.20, .72] .01 
Exploratory GLMs     
      
Motivation 1. Network 5.31 1.05 -.02  .14 -.14 .892 [-.30, .26] < .01 
     Person Theory   .00  .06 -.06 .951 [-.13, .12] < .01 
     Network × Person 
theory   .18  .11 1.67 .096 [-.03, .40] .01 
 Simple effects:          
 
Network at +1SD 
person theory 
(entity)   .22  .21 1.06 .290 [-.19, .63] .01 
 
Network at -1SD 
person theory 
(incremental)   -.26  .20 -1.33 .185 [-.64, .13] .01 
 2. Sequential 5.41 .97 .12  .14 .81 .417 [-.17, .40] < .01 
     Person theory   .05  .07 .82 .414 [-.08, .18] < .01 
     Sequential × 
Person theory   .02  .11 .22 .824 [-.19, .24] < .01 
Life satisfaction 1 Network 4.27 1.18 -.06 
 
.26 -.22 .824 [-.58, .46] < .01 
     Person theory   -.29 * .11 -2.59 .011 [-.51, -.07] .07 
     Network × Person 
theory 
  .59 ** .20 2.91 .005 [.19, 1.00] .09 
 Simple effects:    
      
 
Network at +1SD 
person theory 
(entity) 
5.00 1.18 .75 * .37 2.00 .049 [.00, 1.49] .04 
 
Network at -1SD 
person theory 
(incremental) 
4.82 1.18 -.87 * .39 -2.22 .029 [-1.64, -.09] .05 
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 2. Sequential 4.46 1.39 .29 
 
.27 1.07 .290 [-.25, .82] .01 
     Person theory   -.04 
 
.13 -.32 .749 [-.31, .22] < .01 
     Sequential × 
Person theory 
  -.15 
 
.19 -.76 .452 [-.53, .24] .01 
Exploratory t-tests     
      
Goal space 1. Hierarchical 9.15 3.67 .84  .63 1.34 .180 [-.39, 2.07] .01 
 2. Network 10.62 4.31 3.24 *** .55 5.90 < .001 [2.16, 4.32] .15 
 3. Sequential 5.84 2.11 4.12 *** .53 -7.80 < .001 [-5.17, -3.08] .23 
Goal importance 1. Hierarchical 8.99 1.28 -.05  .18 -.28 .778 [-.41, .31] < .01 
 2. Network 8.83 1.18 -.31  .17 -1.82 .071 [-.65, .03] .02 
 3. Sequential 9.27 1.05 .37 * .17 2.13 .035 [.03, .71] .02 
Exploratory GLMs including controlsa 
Motivation 1. Hierarchical 5.36 .94 -.02  .14 -.13 .897 [-.30, .27] < .01 
     Person theory   .14 
* .06 2.33 .021 [.02, .25] .03 
     Hierarchical × 
Person theory   -.30 
** .11 -2.67 .008 [-.52, -.08] .04 
     Goal space   .02  .02 .94 .346 [-.02, .05] < .01 
     Goal importance     .30 *** .06 5.18 < .001 [.18, .41] .12 
Note. N = 200: 59 hierarchical (30%), 73 network (37%), and 68 sequential (34%). aAdjusted means 
reported. Goal model predictors are dummy-coded variables (e.g., Hierarchical: hierarchical = 1, network 
= 0, sequential = 0). For each dependent variable, each individual test is numbered. * p < .05; ** p < .01; 
*** p < .001. 
  
 Overall, results partially supported my hypothesis that the combination of an entity 
person theory and hierarchical models may trigger negativity in goal-pursuit, lowering goal-
pursuit motivation. This finding provided a conceptual replication of the results from Study 6 
and a new example for goal models’ predictive validity.  
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General Discussion 
 The current work offers a novel framework to examine people’s lay theories of goal 
structure. It introduces validated methods to assess (Study 1) and manipulate people’s goal 
models (Study 3), which can be categorized by self-report (e.g., Study 1) or by independent 
raters (e.g., Studies 1 and 2). Classes of scientific theories seem to translate well into meaningful 
differences in the ways lay people subjectively construct the relations among their goals: 
hierarchical, network, and sequential. These models have distinct qualities, and my research 
presents evidence that they can have both positive and negative implications for self-regulatory 
outcomes depending on the situation, task, and individual. Network models were associated with 
heightened (work-family) goal conflict experiences (Study 2), yet boosted creativity in situations 
where idea integration was needed (Study 3). Sequential models increased goal motivation when 
goal progress was high but reduced goal motivation when goal progress was low (Study 4), and 
they tended to result in a more satisfying goal-striving experience only among people who 
preferred change and movement (i.e., locomotion; Study 5). Hierarchical models exacerbated 
negativity (e.g., lower self-esteem) in goal striving, but only among those who believed more 
strongly that the self is fixed versus malleable (Studies 6-7). Together, these findings bring new 
insights into the dynamics of multiple goals. 
Contributing to the Broad Literature on Goals 
 This work sheds new light on the significance of goal structure in understanding 
multiple-goal dynamics. Many goal theories have assumed that both adjacent and nonadjacent 
goals co-exist and influence each other in an organized system (e.g., control theories, spreading 
activation theory, goal system theory; Carver & Scheier, 1982a; A. M. Collins & Loftus, 1975; 
Kruglanski et al., 2002). However, despite extensive research on goal-related constructs, 
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traditionally the literature has focused on understanding single goals and the relations between 
two goals. Scarce evidence directly speaks to whether and how a person’s goal structure as a 
whole can affect his or her self-regulation. The current work addresses this gap by demonstrating 
that the impact of people’s lay theory of goal structure is nontrivial. Goal models predicted 
various vital self-regulatory outcomes such as creativity (Study 3) and life satisfaction (Studies 5 
and 6).  
Moreover, goal structure has a unique influence on goal-regulation over and beyond goal 
content. The studies consistently showed that the effects of goal models held (and often became 
stronger) when controlling for the number of goals and the average importance of goals. This 
reveals a critical insight into goal regulation: the impact of people’s goal structure is more than 
just the sum of its parts, and future research needs to take the impact of goal structure as a whole 
seriously. The present research on lay theories of goal structure begins to understand these goal 
structure influences, enriching our understanding of multiple-goal dynamics and paving the way 
for future goal research to explore other goal structural implications systematically. 
 Furthermore, this goal model framework integrates traditionally isolated literatures 
related to the study of multiple goals or goal structure. Different scientific theories of goal 
structures are popular in distinct literatures (Unsworth et al., 2014). For instance, control theory 
is popular in the study of goal prioritization in industrial/organizational psychology (e.g., 
Ballard, Yeo, Loft, et al., 2016; Schmidt & DeShon, 2007); goal system theory is often used to 
understand the relation of adjacent goals in social psychology (e.g., Köpetz, Faber, Fishbach, & 
Kruglanski, 2011); motivational theory of lifespan development is frequently discussed in 
understanding goal content in development psychology (e.g., Heckhausen et al., 2010). Because 
these literatures often operate in parallel, insights across disciplines are often not synthesized. By 
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actively integrating these theories, however, the goal model framework provides a platform for 
idea exchanges among these literatures. It builds the groundwork for comparing the organizing 
principles of the goal theories and for future research to advance the literature by synergizing 
these principles.  
Advancing the Understanding of and Assessment of Lay Theories 
 The understanding of laypeople’s subjective beliefs is the foundation of many social 
science disciplines, and the current research contributes to this literature in several ways. It 
uncovers a new set of lay theories that has critical psychological implications. The lay theories 
literature has documented a wide range of lay theories that map onto the ways people make sense 
of the nature of things and how the world works, such as the personality (Levy et al., 1998), 
intelligence (Blackwell et al., 2007), social relations (Chen, Chiu, & Chan, 2009; Kung et al., 
2016), and race/ethnicity (Chao & Kung, 2015; Hong et al., 2009; Plaks et al., 2012). However, 
even though people manage multiple goals daily, there is limited knowledge of how laypeople 
understand their goals. The goal model framework is the first to propose and test that there are 
meaningful differences in the way people understand and think about the structure of relations 
among their goals. 
 In addition, the findings provide support to several fundamental assumptions in the lay 
theories literature. First, lay theory contents are diverse and flexible. They are not confined by 
the well-known distinction between fixed-versus-malleable beliefs (Gelman, 2003; Zedelius et 
al., 2017). Goal models posit distinct organizing principles that reflect the varying ways a goal 
structure can be meaningfully constructed. Second, lay theories are impactful regardless of 
whether they are true in reality (Furnham, 1988; Heider, 1958). People’s goal models may not 
necessarily reflect the actual relations among goals in the brain. Yet the current studies showed 
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that these subjective beliefs about goal structure, either assessed or manipulated, have a 
systematic influence on self-regulatory outcomes.  
 Third, the goal model framework illustrates a fundamental, yet often neglected, property 
of lay theories as conceptual structures. Lay theories are at their core “knowledge structures” 
(e.g., Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995a; Hong, Levy, & Chiu, 2001), which creates a meaning 
system or conceptual framework for people to understand the relations among ideas (Dweck, 
1996). Essentially, a lay theory itself is a cognitive structure of ideas. Nevertheless, past research 
on lay theory has focused on understanding people’s lay theories of the nature or the content of 
ideas (e.g., personality, wisdom), and there is no research to support the core assumption that lay 
theories are conceptual structures themselves. This research puts the “structure” back to the study 
of lay theories as knowledge structures, and the goal model framework offers both a theoretical 
and an empirical illustration of the different ways people can do so in the domain of goals. 
 Additionally, highlighting lay theories as conceptual structures provides not only 
theoretical but also methodological advances—this work provides a way to study lay theories as 
knowledge structures empirically. In Study 1, based on graph theory methods (Borgatti et al., 
2009), I developed a structural analysis in the form of goal model indices to unpack the structure 
of goal models. This method is not confined to the study of goals; on the contrary, it is versatile 
and meaningful in the broad study of lay theories. The same structural analysis can be modified 
and applied to the study of other conceptual frameworks. For instance, beyond the study of the 
lay theory of (the nature of) personality—whether personality is fixed or malleable (Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988)—this structural analytical method allows the evaluation of people’s lay theory of 
the structure of their personality. Using extant indices, one may assess people’s beliefs about the 
degree of interconnection among their personality traits (i.e., interconnection index) and the 
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extent to which a small number of personality traits dominate the structure (i.e., centralization 
index). As seen in these examples, the use of the structural analysis has the potential to unlock 
diverse novel lay theory phenomena. In sum, this research paves the way to a more nuanced and 
sophisticated understanding of lay theories, providing both theoretical and methodological 
advances to the literature.  
What is New and What is Next for Goal Models in the Study of Self-Regulation 
 By showing that the way people construe the relations among their goals matter for self-
regulation, the current work adds a new perspective to the understanding of why and when 
people succeed and fail at self-regulatory challenges. To increase one’s ability to self-regulate, 
most scholars and educators traditionally advise people to practice self-control (e.g., Duckworth 
& Seligman, 2017), avoid temptation or focus on long-term goals (e.g., Fujita, 2011), set specific 
difficult goals (e.g., Locke & Latham, 1990), or devise contingency plans (i.e., if-then plan, e.g., 
Gollwitzer, Gawrilow, & Oettingen, 2010). Most strategies focus heavily on the qualities of 
either the self or a goal; less research has looked at how structuring and re-structuring relations 
among goals play a role in self-regulation (e.g., Milkman, Minson, & Volpp, 2014; Scholer, 
2014). To this end, the current studies show that people’s beliefs about goal structure matter for 
self-regulation. Goal models influence effectiveness in self-regulation across different contexts, 
and they bring new and more nuanced insights into a number of subfields in self-regulation. 
 Conflict management. The literature on conflict management suggests that managing 
goal conflict is a challenging experience for many. To improve one’s ability to resolve conflict 
effectively is key to not only personal but also social prosperity (Emmons & King, 1988; Gray et 
al., 2017). The current research contributes to the literature by showing that self-regulation in 
conflict situations is related to people’s beliefs about the relations among their goals. 
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Particularly, network models seem to be especially relevant to conflict management. Network 
models increased integration of conflicting ideas (Study 3), yet were associated with heightened 
personal conflict experience (Study 2). This presents mixed blessings, and future research should 
continue to explore contexts in which network models help or hurt.  
 One common high-stakes conflict situation is negotiation. Effective negotiation happens 
when negotiators can trade off on the crucial issues to create a win-win—mutually beneficial 
outcome for both parties (Pruitt, 1981). Negotiators can vary in what they want to achieve for 
each of the issues, which are their goals in the negotiation. Negotiators can also vary in how they 
understand the relations among their goals in general (i.e., general goal model) and their goals in 
the negotiation in particular (i.e., negotiation-specific goal model; Liu, Friedman, Barry, 
Gelfand, & Zhang, 2012). As lay theories have been shown to be powerful in negotiation 
contexts (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007), it is possible that negotiators’ goal models may influence 
how they approach resolving issues in the negotiation, which could matter for the negotiation 
outcomes. For example, through highlighting interconnections among negotiation issues, 
network models may increase negotiators’ likelihood to realize trade-offs. This insight may in 
turn facilitate a higher level of win-win (Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993). Yet this positive 
effect may also depend on the length of the negotiation process—how long the negotiators need 
to work on the issues together.  
 In many one-shot negotiations, negotiators do not have a continuous working relationship 
after the deal is made; but in multi-round negotiations, negotiations tend to have a longer-term 
working relationship where they negotiate similar issues over and over again. The present 
research suggests that network models are associated with heightened conflict experience in 
more chronic goal pursuits. In long-term conflict situations like multi-round negotiations, the 
 94 
effect of network models might play out differently. Network models can potentially create 
excessive tensions in the negotiation that hinder effectiveness and undermine the outcome. These 
are exciting research directions to explore. 
 Temporal dynamics. Another self-regulation subfield concerns temporal dynamics in 
motivation and decision-making. One critical topic in this area is progress. Varying progress 
toward a goal can produce diverse effects on people’s motivation to pursue or abandon a goal 
(Carver, 2003; Huang et al., 2012; Schmidt & Dolis, 2009). The literature on cybernetic models 
and control theories has a long tradition in understanding the complexity of how progress—as a 
critical input to a feedback loop—predicts goal affect and motivation (Carver & Scheier, 1982b; 
G. A. Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Powers, Clark, & McFarland, 1960). Whereas past 
research emphasizes that the effect of progress depends on a person’s personality and goal 
framing (e.g., gain vs. loss goal, to-go vs. to-date goals; Huang et al., 2017; Koo & Fishbach, 
2008; Schmidt & DeShon, 2007), the current findings enrich the literature by showing that 
people’s beliefs about the relations among the goals also matter for people’s reaction to progress. 
Sequential models in particular have the ability to increase people’s sensitivity to progress 
(Study 4). Moreover, sequential models also interact with personality to predict people’s goal 
experience (Study 5). Despite these promising initial results, these studies only scratched the 
surface of the effects of goal models on temporal dynamics. It is possible that goal models may 
not just influence people’s experience but also their choices in temporal decision making. 
 People’s decisions now about the future can have critical life implications. For example, 
what makes people save for the future? What drives people to continue education for a better 
job? Research suggests that typically (not always) choosing the higher-value long-term goal over 
the lower-value short-term goal indicates success in self-regulation (Fujita, 2011; Trope & 
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Fishbach, 2000). Yet often people give up prematurely on beneficial long-term goals (e.g., 
saving goals, exercise goals). This is likely because they fail to see the goal progress they are 
making (e.g., Chang, Johnson, & Lord, 2009; Koo & Fishbach, 2010), and it happens especially 
during the middle (vs. the beginning and end) of the course of goal pursuit (Touré-Tillery & 
Fishbach, 2011, 2012). The current research suggests that sequential models may increase 
people’s sensitivity to time. Therefore, it is possible that sequential models may amplify the 
sense of progress, reminding people that every step along the way to a long-term goal means an 
incremental success (Huang et al., 2017). If this is the case, sequential models may be 
particularly useful in the middle of a goal pursuit where goal progress feels stagnant (Touré-
Tillery & Fishbach, 2011). By increasing the sense of progress, sequential models may break the 
stagnation and motivate people to move forward on the course of a long-term goal pursuit, 
adding new implications for temporal decision-making. 
 Achievement motivation. Last, a major subfield of self-regulation studies the mechanics 
of what drive people to success (Duckworth, Eichstaedt, et al., 2015; Elliot & Thrash, 2001). The 
measure of success depends on the context—it can be defined as job performance in the 
workplace and students’ grade at school (Kuncel, Hezlett, & Ones, 2004). It is well known that a 
critical ingredient of high achievement is the amount of effort a person is willing to exert 
(Duckworth, Eichstaedt, et al., 2015; Wu, Kung, Chen, & Kim, 2016). Achievement motivation 
drives success; however, people often experience difficulty staying motivated, feeling fatalistic 
or threatened by the goal-pursuit process, especially when they see the person as a fixed entity 
(Robins & Pals, 2002). Most studies of implicit person theory on achievement motivation focus 
on this main effect. The current research adds nuance to this observation. It suggests that not all 
entity theorists suffer from negative goal-pursuit experience. In fact, it may be especially those 
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who also have a hierarchical model of their goals that tend to experience lower goal satisfaction 
(Study 6) and motivation (Study 7).  
 Moreover, goal models seem to be an antidote for entity theorists’ lower achievement 
motivation without changing their beliefs about malleability of person characteristics. 
Specifically, an unexpected pattern emerged that the use of a network model was associated with 
more positive goal-striving experience (Study 6). This is possibly because compared to 
hierarchical models, network models encourage a less rigid perspective on goal relations and free 
entity theorists’ from having fatalistic assumptions and self-threat about goal-pursuit (e.g., less 
anticipatory anxiety; Plaks & Stecher, 2007). This is largely in line with research on self-
complexity that the more diverse self-concepts a person has, the more resilient the person is 
especially in the face of criticism or failure (Linville, 1987; Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). 
Further, given that ample research has shown persistent negative effects of entity (vs. 
incremental) theories (Burnette et al., 2013; c.f. Sisk, Burgoyne, Sun, Butler, & Macnamara, 
2018), this finding is particularly important. It adds to the literature that in some situations (e.g., 
when using a network model), entity theorists could enjoy goal-pursuit to the same extent, or 
more, than incremental theorists.  
 Yet it is also noteworthy that network models might have a downside for incremental 
theorists. Incremental theorists see goal pursuit as a possible opportunity for learning and 
growth. Having a clear expectation of what successful goal pursuit leads to can be indicative of 
the progress in learning. By relating goals with associations, network models strip away 
information about possible stages or levels of learning that makes learning progress salient. The 
diffused sense of learning may explain why network models reduced incremental theorists’ 
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positivity in goal-striving (Study 6). Future research should put these speculations to test and 
verify the underlying mechanisms of the phenomenon. 
Practical implications 
 Insights into effective self-regulation generated by this line of research are not only 
theoretical but also actionable. As the studies together make clear, no one goal model is 
universally optimal. It will be practical to consider diagnostic questions one might ask to 
determine what model might help a person most effectively pursue a specific goal. Goal model 
assessment and goal model indices serve precisely this purpose. Understanding the beliefs about 
the relations of people’s goals may provide both the researcher and the people themselves 
insights into how these models might guide or limit their approaches to specific self-regulatory 
challenges. 
 Critically, like other lay theories, people’s goal models are changeable. The goal model 
manipulation task developed in this work is the first step to an effective goal model intervention. 
This goal model manipulation method can be applied to any goal domains (e.g., academic, work, 
and health). As different goal models are helpful in distinct contexts, the goal model 
manipulation can help people devise a suitable goal model in response to their specific 
motivational orientation (e.g., locomotion) and multiple-goal challenges (e.g., negotiation) for 
optimal self-regulation effectiveness. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The current research by no means can provide a full picture into understanding goal 
models. There are several limitations and open questions to be addressed in future research. 
 Conceptualizing goal models. In this initial stage of building the goal model framework, 
it was essential to consider whether people’s lay theories of goal structure belonged to distinct 
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models. Theoretically, the three lay goal models examined here reflect the diversity of scientific 
theories in the goal structure literature. Empirically, there is supportive evidence that most 
people consider the proposed goal models as distinct constructs (discriminant validity; Study 1) 
and that their models relate to specific structural properties in the goal map as expected 
(convergent validity; Study 1). Thus, while the current approach of considering goal models as 
distinct constructs appears warranted, it is interesting to consider how these goal models may 
also overlap in meaningful ways (i.e., multiplicative models). For example, it is possible that 
some people may represent their goals on a hierarchy and a sequence simultaneously. One 
popular folk time management strategy is to organize goals by both urgency and importance 
(e.g., doing urgent and important things first). Future research should consider these complexities 
and explore whether the combinations of goal models have unique implications. 
 The current framework posits that goal models are lay theories, and thus like other lay 
theories, goal models can be conceptualized at both the chronic and state levels (Chiu et al., 
1997). However, more evidence is needed to support this claim in the study of goal models. Thus 
far, my studies have shown that goal models can both be assessed and manipulated, indicating 
that goal models can change across states. Yet, there is no direct evidence to address the 
proportion of the between-subjects and within-subjects variance: how stable a person’s goal 
model naturally can be and what situations should spontaneously induce a specific goal model. 
Future work using a longitudinal design is needed to answer these queries. 
 Method and measurement. One limitation at the methodological level is that the current 
studies rely heavily on the concept-mapping method to assess and manipulate goal models. There 
are advantages of this particular method (e.g., suitable for the study of lay concepts, easy to 
represent structural properties) and the consistency in the use of method across studies. However, 
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the use of the same method across studies can also pose a common-method bias threat to the 
findings (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Fortunately, my research has already 
developed some alternative goal model methods, including self-report goal model scale 
(Appendix G), third-party coding (Studies 1 and 2), and goal model indices (Study 1).  
 Goal model indices in particular have much potential to uncover new goal structure 
phenomena. Beyond the three indices used in Study 1, the social network literature has 
documented a wide range of indices to represent social structure (e.g., diameter, transitivity; 
Hanneman & Riddle, 2005) that can be directly applied to the study of goal structure. For 
simplicity in my initial application of goal model indices (Study 1), I only considered undirected 
ties, i.e., mutual relations. But it is meaningful to for future work to consider other variations in 
ties, such as directed ties, i.e., relations that travel in one direction, and the strength of ties, i.e., 
the strength of the relation between nodes (Borgatti et al., 2013; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). 
These more nuanced properties can build indices that allow more complex understanding of goal 
structures (e.g., reciprocity, maximum flow; see Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). In addition, besides 
goal model indices that characterize structural properties as a whole (e.g., centralization), new 
indices can be developed to represent properties of the location a goal holds—goal-centric 
indices (Borgatti et al., 2013). For example, a node can vary in the number of shortest paths from 
all nodes to all others that pass through it, a concept called betweenness centrality. The higher 
betweenness centrality a person has in a group, the more likely the person can broker different 
relationships and control the flow of information (White & Borgatti, 1994). The same may apply 
to goals within a goal structure. A goal with high betweenness centrality may have high 
instrumentality independent of its content. My ongoing work is developing these goal model and 
goal-centric indices as well as testing their implications. 
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 Notably, future research should consider using diverse methods in the research and 
unpack the suitability of the use of each method—whether a specific method is better used in 
some contexts and not others. For instance, goal model indices can be limited for between-
subjects comparisons of people’s natural goal models because people spontaneously generate a 
different number of goals (e.g., Study 1: M = 7.54, SD = 3.46). The varying number of goals 
across structures causes goal model (and goal-centric) indices to fluctuate, undermining the 
statistical power to detect a significant difference across goal structures and the reliability of the 
difference (see Forbes, Wright, Markon, & Krueger, 2017; Fried & Cramer, 2017). One 
straightforward solution is to standardize the number of goals, and better yet the content of goals 
as well, across individuals. There are both pros and cons in doing so. 
 In some case, there are theoretical benefits to standardizing the number and content of 
nodes across individuals. Take the study of mental disorders as symptom networks for example. 
A mental disorder is a predefined set of symptoms. Based on DSM-IV, major depression has 9 
key symptoms, and it is meaningful to examine the structural relations among these 9 specific 
symptoms in order to advance the theory of the particular disorder (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013). 
In the goal literature, there are collections of goals that are theoretically meaningful to be 
examined together (e.g., Chulef, Read, & Walsh, 2001; Grouzet et al., 2005; Rokeach, 1973). 
One of my ongoing studies looks at people’s beliefs about the relations among 7 (shortened from 
10) value goals that are universal in principle (e.g., achievement, power, security; Schwartz & 
Bilsky, 1987). Because of this top-down approach, I borrow the technique called “paired-
judgment” (Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000) to assess people’s goal 
structure. In this task, I present participants with pairs of values in random order and ask them to 
rate on the degree of the (positive and negative) relations between the two values. Each person’s 
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ratings together form a matrix and can be transformed into goal model indices. The paired-
judgment method is flexible and easy to implement with a standardized set of goals, but it has 
limitations. This method removes the visualization process (unlike the standard goal model 
assessment) which could provide critical information for people to self-categorize goal models. 
Moreover, the use of standardized goals per se may reduce external validity compared to when 
people can freely report their goals. It may also reduce content validity as the given list of goals 
might not include all the goals that are important to an individual. None of the methods is 
perfect, and thus researchers should be mindful of the tradeoffs and choose the method(s) that are 
most suitable for their research question. 
 Exploration of antecedents. To demonstrate the significance of goal models, the current 
series of studies were designed to target their diverse consequences but not their antecedents. 
Nevertheless, examining the origins of goal models is also critical as they can inform what types 
of factors are most likely to shape people’s models (e.g., developmental trajectories, self-
regulatory variables, goal domains, life stage etc.). 
 First, goal models, like other lay theories, can be developed based on people’s past 
experience and social learning (Haslam, 2017). Developmental research argues that specific lay 
theories are unlikely to be something people are born with and they emerge to provide 
explanations of a person’s observations about the world. Take as an example lay theories of race 
and ethnicity—beliefs that racial/ethnic characteristics are fixed versus malleable. Young 
children do not possess strong lay theories of race until older and children living in places with 
high (vs. low) racial/ethnic segregation learned to adopt  fixed beliefs about race sooner (e.g., 
Birnbaum, Deeb, Segall, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2010; Deeb, Segall, Birnbaum, Ben-
Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2011). The same may apply to goal models, where individuals may be 
 102 
more likely to endorse a specific goal model based on their prior goal management experience. 
In other words, people may acquire differential focus on importance, associations, or time based 
on different types of goal experiences.  
 What kinds of goal experiences produce divergent goal models is still a question to 
explore. But some observations support the possibility that goal models can be something that is 
socially learned. Through the process of sharing the visions behind observable tasks, 
organizational leaders may influence subordinates in the way they believe their goals should be 
arranged and prioritized (e.g., Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990). Warren Buffet, 
for instance, shared that he would rank goals from the most to the least important ones 
(Schroeder, 2008), resembling a hierarchical model. Goal organizing principles can also be more 
explicitly taught. Greg McKeown, CEO of a strategy firm for tech companies and author of the 
self-help book called “essentialism” taught employees to focus on doing things that are essential, 
another example of teaching an importance principle to organize goals (McKeown, 2014). David 
Allen, a management consultant famous for his productivity method known as “getting things 
done”, argued that time is essential in consideration of multiple goals. In his book, he teaches 
that recognizing how long a task takes and deciding when to do it are the fundamental organizing 
rules for productivity (Allen, 2015). All these examples together suggest that it is possible for 
people to learn goal organizing principles in social contexts that they may apply to their own 
goals. 
 Theoretically, goal models may also stem from individuals’ own motivational 
orientations and needs, but these are not supported by the current data. In Study 5, I hypothesized 
that a locomotion mode might predict the use of a sequential model. This hypothesis was not 
supported. It could be due to a weak manipulation of locomotion mode. However, I included the 
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measure of people’s chronic regulatory mode in all studies, and there was no consistent pattern 
that either a chronic locomotion or assessment mode was associated with a tendency to use any 
of the goal models. Other exploratory work I have done to examine the relations between 
individual differences and goal models has also suggested that I am not likely to find simple 
relations between personality differences and goal models. For instance, unfulfilled needs are 
powerful in guiding the way people perceive the world (Pittman & Zeigler, 2007) and may 
temporarily alter people’s goal models. Hypothetically, a high need for cognition (Cacioppo, 
Petty, Feinstein, Blair, & Jarvis, 1996) may stimulate individuals to think deeply about subtle 
interconnections among ideas, which may likely induce a network model. A high need for 
structure or order (Friesen, Kay, Eibach, & Galinsky, 2014; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) may 
encourage individuals to look for a clear way to put goals into meaningful categories, and a 
hierarchical model that segregates goals by ranking might provide a way to do so. Last, a high 
need for closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) may lead individuals to fix their attention on a 
clear end-goal, and a sequential model (and in some way a hierarchical model as well) may be 
more likely to be used and satisfy this need. In some of the studies, these needs were measured. 
Exploratory analyses showed, however, that they did not consistently predict people’s use of 
goal models. Follow-up studies are needed to examine whether there are conditions in which 
stronger deprivation or activation of the needs would produce the effect. 
 Exploration of potential mechanisms and moderators. Building on past research, the 
current work argued for why goal models would affect specific self-regulatory outcomes, but the 
underlying mechanisms are not directly tested. To provide empirical evidence, future research 
should include measures of mediators of the goal model effects. This may include measuring 
self-threat and rigidity in the study of hierarchical models, conflict awareness in the study of 
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network models, and time sensitivity in the study of sequential models. Alternatively, researchers 
may operationalize these mechanisms in the form of goal model indices. For instance, conflict 
awareness can be broadly operationalized as “goal conflict ambiance” in the goal map (see Table 
4) or more narrowly operationalized as the number of negative relations reported between the 
target goals. 
 The effects of goal models can also be influenced by moderating factors. The findings 
have already demonstrated how goal models interact with goal progress (Study 4), regulatory 
mode (Study 5), and implicit person theory (Studies 6-7) in influencing self-regulatory outcomes. 
There could be other important factors that future work should continue to explore. For instance, 
we do not know in what situations the effects of goal models would be amplified versus 
diminished. Time pressure and cognitive load may play a vital role. When in a rush or 
cognitively distracted, people may be less likely to pay attention to their goal models, producing 
weaker goal model effects. Another question that is interesting to ask is what determines the 
likelihood of people modifying their goal model. Individuals differ in their metamotivational 
awareness to choose an optimal motivational state that maximizes performance in a task (Scholer 
& Miele, 2016). This awareness may also predict the likelihood of individuals flexibly devising 
different goal models to suit the self-regulatory challenge at hand (e.g., switching from a network 
model to a sequential model when in stress about goal conflict).  
 Generalizability.  Last, it should also be acknowledged that there are constraints to the 
generalizability of the current findings. Despite the attempt to diversify samples, most samples 
were recruited from North America, with many of the participants as undergraduate students. 
Although the use of goal models did not statistically differ by most demographic variables (e.g., 
gender, race, major; Study 1), this limitation draws caution to the extent to which the results 
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apply to other samples, such as older less-educated adults. For instance, in most studies with 
young undergraduate samples, hierarchical models were reported to be the least common model; 
however, in Study 2 with an older working sample, hierarchical models were the most common. 
This is in line with research on adult development suggesting that aging is related to forming 
more converging goals, perceiving less goal conflict, and having higher self-concept clarity 
(Diehl & Hay, 2011; Riediger, Freund, & Baltes, 2005). Future work will benefit from 
unpacking how aging affects goal models in relation to adaptiveness. Further, all study samples 
were from English-speaking populations, and we do not know if language or (national/ethnic) 
culture plays a role in influencing the goal model effects. In short, demographic differences in 
the use of goal models and goal model effects should be investigated further in future research 
with larger and more diverse samples.  
Conclusion 
 To conclude, the development of the goal model framework marks a new journey for the 
literature on goals and self-regulation to understand multiple-goal dynamics using a lay theory 
perspective. This research provides initial evidence that the framework captures the diversity in 
participants’ goal models, develops multiple strategies to measure and manipulate people’s goal 
models, and demonstrates that these goal models have nontrivial effects on several different self-
regulatory outcomes. While this line of work continues to grow, there are many questions yet to 
be addressed. Through a deeper understanding of the nature and implications of goal models, we 
will be able to develop well-informed self-regulation strategies to help people to juggle multiple 
goals with greater success. 
 
 
  
 106 
References 
Allen, D. (2015). Getting things done: The art of stress-free productivity. New York, NY, US: 
Penguin Group. 
Anderson, N., Potočnik, K., & Zhou, J. (2014). Innovation and creativity in organizations. 
Journal of Management, 40(5), 1297–1333. http://doi.org/10.1177/0149206314527128 
Austin, J. T., & Vancouver, J. B. (1996). Goal constructs in psychology: Structure, process, and 
content. Psychological Bulletin, 120(3), 338–375. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.120.3.338 
Avnet, T., & Higgins, E. T. (2003). Locomotion, assessment, and regulatory fit: Value transfer 
from “how” to “what.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39(5), 525–530. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00027-1 
Avnet, T., & Higgins, E. T. (2006). How regulatory fit affects value in consumer choices and 
opinions. Journal of Marketing Research, 43(1), 1–10. http://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.43.1.1 
Ballard, T., Yeo, G., Loft, S., Vancouver, J. B., & Neal, A. (2016). An integrative formal model 
of motivation and decision making: The MGPM*. Journal of Applied Psychology, 101(9), 
1240–1265. http://doi.org/10.1037/apl0000121 
Ballard, T., Yeo, G., Neal, A., & Farrell, S. (2016). Departures from optimality when pursuing 
multiple approach or avoidance goals. Journal of Applied Psychology, 101(7), 1056–1066. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/apl0000082 
Bastian, B., & Haslam, N. (2006). Psychological essentialism and stereotype endorsement. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42(2), 228–235. 
 107 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2005.03.003 
Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T., & Tice, D. (1994). Losing control: How and why people fail at 
self-regulation. San Diego, CA, US: Academic Press. 
Benjamin, L., & Flynn, F. J. (2006). Leadership style and regulatory mode: Value from fit? 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 100(2), 216–230. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.01.008 
Berg, J. M. (2014). The primal mark: How the beginning shapes the end in the development of 
creative ideas. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 125, 1–17. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.06.001 
Bettman, J. R., Luce, M. F., & Payne, J. W. (1998). Constructive consumer choice processes. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 25(3), 187–217. http://doi.org/10.1086/209535 
Birnbaum, D., Deeb, I., Segall, G., Ben-Eliyahu, A., & Diesendruck, G. (2010). The 
development of social essentialism: The case of Israeli children’s inferences about Jews and 
Arabs. Child Development, 81(3), 757–777. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2010.01432.x 
Blackwell, L. S., Trzesniewski, K. H., & Dweck, C. S. (2007). Implicit theories of intelligence 
predict achievement across an adolescent transition: A longitudinal study and an 
intervention. Child Development, 78(1), 246–263. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2007.00995.x 
Borgatti, S. P., Everett, M. G., & Freeman, L. C. (2002). Ucinet for Windows: Software for 
social network analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies. 
 108 
Borgatti, S. P., Everett, M. G., & Johnson, J. C. (2013). Analyzing social networks. Los Angeles, 
CA, US: SAGE Publications. 
Borgatti, S. P., Mehra, A., Brass, D. J., & Labianca, G. (2009). Network analysis in the social 
sciences. Science, 323(5916), 892–895. http://doi.org/10.1126/science.1165821 
Borsboom, D., & Cramer, A. O. J. (2013). Network analysis: An integrative approach to the 
structure of psychopathology. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 9(1), 91–121. 
http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-050212-185608 
Boudreaux, M. J., & Ozer, D. J. (2013). Goal conflict, goal striving, and psychological well-
being. Motivation and Emotion, 37(3), 433–443. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-012-9333-2 
Brienza, J. P., Kung, F. Y. H., Santos, H. C., Bobocel, D. R., & Grossmann, I. (2017). Wisdom, 
bias, and balance: Toward a process-sensitive measurement of wisdom-related cognition. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 
http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000171 
Burnette, J. L., O’Boyle, E. H., VanEpps, E. M., Pollack, J. M., & Finkel, E. J. (2013). Mind-sets 
matter: A meta-analytic review of implicit theories and self-regulation. Psychological 
Bulletin, 139(3), 655–701. 
http://doi.org/10.1080.00131880802704764\rhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0029531 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Feinstein, J. A., Blair, W., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (1996). Dispositional 
differences in cognitive motivation: The life and times of individuals varying in need for 
cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 119(2), 197–253. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.119.2.197 
 109 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Feng Kao, C. (1984). The efficient assessment of need for 
cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306–307. 
http://doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13 
Cammann, C., Fichman, M., Jenkins, G. D., & Klesh, J. (1983). Michigan organizational 
assessment questionnaire. In S. E. Seashore, E. E. Lawler, P. H. Mirvis, & C. Camman 
(Eds.), Assessing organizational change: A guide to methods, measures, and practices (pp. 
71–138). New York, NY, US: Wiley-Interscience. 
Campbell, D. T., & Fiske, D. W. (1959). Convergent and discriminant validation by the 
multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 56(2), 81–105. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/h0046016 
Campbell, J. D., Trapnell, P. D., Heine, S. J., Katz, I. M., Lavallee, L. F., & Lehman, D. R. 
(1996). Self-concept clarity: Measurement, personality correlates, and cultural boundaries. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(1), 141–156. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.70.6.1114 
Carlson, D. S., Kacmar, K. M., & Williams, L. J. (2000). Construction and initial validation of a 
multidimensional measure of work–family conflict. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 56(2), 
249–276. http://doi.org/10.1006/jvbe.1999.1713 
Carver, C. S. (2003). Pleasure as a sign you can attend to something else: Placing positive 
feelings within a general model of affect. Cognition & Emotion, 17(2), 241–261. 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1982a). Attention and self-regulation: A control-theory 
approach to human behavior. New York, NY, US: Springer-Verlag. 
 110 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1982b). Control theory: A useful conceptual framwork for 
personality-social, clinical, and health psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 92(1), 111–135. 
Cesario, J., Corker, K. S., & Jelinek, S. (2013). A Self-regulatory framework for message 
framing. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49, 238–249. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.10.014 
Chang, C.-H. D., Johnson, R. E., & Lord, R. G. (2009). Moving beyond discrepancies: The 
importance of velocity as a predictor of satisfaction and motivation. Human Performance, 
23(1), 58–80. http://doi.org/10.1080/08959280903400226 
Chao, M. M., Chen, J., Roisman, G. I., & Hong, Y. (2007). Essentializing race: Implications for 
bicultural individuals’ cognition and physiological reactivity. Psychological Science, 18(4), 
341–348. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01901.x 
Chao, M. M., Hong, Y., & Chiu, C. (2013). Essentializing race: Its implications on racial 
categorization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104(4), 619–634. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0031332 
Chao, M. M., & Kung, F. Y. H. (2015). An essentialism perspective on intercultural processes. 
Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 18(2), 91–100. http://doi.org/10.1111/ajsp.12089 
Chen, J., Chiu, C., & Chan, F. S. (2009). The cultural effects of job mobility and the belief in a 
fixed world: Evidence from performance forecast. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 97(5), 851–865. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0015950 
Chiu, C., Hong, Y., & Dweck, C. S. (1997). Lay dispositionism and implicit theories of 
personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73(1), 19–30. 
 111 
Chua, R. Y. J. (2013). The costs of ambient cultural disharmony: Indirect intercultural conflicts 
in social environment undermine creativity. Academy of Management Journal, 56(6), 1545–
1577. http://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2011.0971 
Chulef, A. S., Read, S. J., & Walsh, D. A. (2001). A hierarchical taxonomy of human goals. 
Motivation and Emotion, 25(3), 191–232. http://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012225223418 
Cohen, J. (1960). A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 20(1), 37–46. 
Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. F. (1975). A spreading-activation theory of semantic processing. 
Psychological Review, 82(6), 407–428. 
Collins, N. L., & Read, S. J. (1990). Adult attachment, working models, and relationship quality 
in dating couples. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58(4), 644–663. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.58.4.644 
Curhan, J. R., Elfenbein, H. A., & Xu, H. (2006). What do people value when they negotiate? 
Mapping the domain of subjective value in negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 91(3), 493–512. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.91.3.493 
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human needs and 
the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11(4), 227–268. 
http://doi.org/10.1207/S15327965PLI1104_01 
Deeb, I., Segall, G., Birnbaum, D., Ben-Eliyahu, A., & Diesendruck, G. (2011). Seeing isn’t 
believing: The effect of intergroup exposure on children’s essentialist beliefs about ethnic 
categories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(6), 1139–1156. 
 112 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0026107 
Diehl, M., & Hay, E. L. (2011). Self-concept differentiation and self-concept clarity across 
adulthood: Associations with age and psychological well-being. The International Journal 
of Aging and Human Development, 73(2), 125–152. http://doi.org/10.2190/AG.73.2.b 
Diener, E., & Diener, M. (1995). Cross-cultural correlates of life satisfaction and self-esteem. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68(4), 653–663. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.68.4.653 
Diener, E., Emmons, R. A., Larsen, R. J., & Griffin, S. (1985). The satisfaction with life scale. 
Journal of Personality Assessment, 49(1), 71–75. 
Duckworth, A. L. (2016). Grit: The power of passion and perseverance. New York, NY, US: 
Scribner. 
Duckworth, A. L., Eichstaedt, J. C., & Ungar, L. H. (2015). The mechanics of human 
achievement. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 9(7), 359–369. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12178 
Duckworth, A. L., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2017). The science and practice of self-control. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12(5), 715–718. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617690880 
Duckworth, A. L., Shulman, E. P., Mastronarde, A. J., Patrick, S. D., Zhang, J., & Druckman, J. 
(2015). Will not want: Self-control rather than motivation explains the female advantage in 
report card grades. Learning and Individual Differences, 39, 13–23. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.lindif.2015.02.006 
 113 
Dunning, D., Heath, C., & Suls, J. M. (2004). Flawed self-assessment: implications for health, 
education, and the workplace. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 5(3), 69–106. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1529-1006.2004.00018.x 
Dweck, C. S. (1996). Implicit theories as organizers of goals and behavior. In P. M. Gollwitzer 
& J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The psychology of action: Linking cognition and motivation to 
behavior (pp. 69–90). New York, NY, US: Guilford Press. 
Dweck, C. S. (1999). Self-theories: Their role in motivation, personality, and development. 
Philadelphia, PA, US: Taylor & Francis. 
Dweck, C. S., Chiu, C., & Hong, Y. (1995a). Implicit theories: Elaboration and extension of the 
model. Psychological Inquiry, 6(4), 322–333. http://doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli0604_12 
Dweck, C. S., Chiu, C., & Hong, Y. (1995b). Theories and their role in judgments implicit and 
reactions : A world from two perspectives. Psychological Inquiry, 6(4), 267–285. 
http://doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli0604_1 
Dweck, C. S., & Leggett, E. L. (1988). A social-cognitive approach to motivation and 
personality. Psychological Review, 95(2), 256–273. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
295X.95.2.256 
Earley, P. C., Northcraft, G. B., Lee, C., & Lituchy, T. R. (1990). Impact of process and outcome 
feedback on the relation of goal setting to task performance. Academy of Management 
Journal, 33(1), 87–105. http://doi.org/10.2307/256353 
Elliot, A. J., & McGregor, H. A. (2001). A 2 X 2 achievement goal framework. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 80(3), 501–519. 
 114 
Elliot, A. J., & Thrash, T. M. (2001). Achievement goals and the hierarchical model of 
achievement motivation. Educational Psychology Review, 13(2), 139–156. 
http://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009057102306 
Emmons, R. A. (1986). Personal strivings: An approach to personality and subjective well-being. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(5), 1058–1068. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.51.5.1058 
Emmons, R. A. (1996). Striving and feeling: Personal goals and subjective well-being. In P. M. 
Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The psychology of action: Linking motivation and 
cognition to behavior (pp. 313–337). New York, NY, US: Guilford Press. 
Emmons, R. A., & King, L. A. (1988). Conflict among personal strivings: Immediate and long-
term implications for psychological and physical well-being. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 54(6), 1040–1048. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1040 
Eysenck, H. J. (2003). Creativity, personality and the convergent-divergent continuum. In M. A. 
Runco (Ed.), Perspectives on creativity research. Critical creative processes (pp. 95–114). 
Cresskill, NJ, US: Hampton Press. 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A.-G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using 
G*Power 3.1: tests for correlation and regression analyses. Behavior Research Methods, 
41(4), 1149–1160. http://doi.org/10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149 
Fishbach, A., & Dhar, R. (2005). Goals as excuses or guides: The liberating effect of perceived 
goal progress on choice. Journal of Consumer Research, 32(3), 370–377. 
Fitzsimons, G. M., Friesen, J., Orehek, E., & Kruglanski, A. (2009). Progress-induced goal 
 115 
shifting as a self-regulatory strategy. In J. P. Forgas, R. F. Baumeister, & D. M. Tice (Eds.), 
Psychology of self-regulation: Cognitive, affective, and motivational processes (pp. 181–
194). New York, NY, US: Psychology Press. 
Fleiss, J. L., Levin, B., & Paik, M. C. (2003). The measurement of interrater agreement. In J. L. 
Fleiss, B. Levin, & M. C. Paik (Eds.), Statistical methods for rates and proportions (3rd ed., 
pp. 598–626). J. Wiley. 
Forbes, M. K., Wright, A. G. C., Markon, K. E., & Krueger, R. F. (2017). Evidence that 
psychopathology symptom networks have limited replicability. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 126(7), 969–988. http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/abn0000276 
Forster, J., Liberman, N., & Friedman, R. S. (2007). Seven principles of goal activation: A 
systematic approach to distinguishing goal priming from priming of non-goal constructs. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11(3), 211–233. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1088868307303029 
Frederick, S., Novemsky, N., Wang, J., Dhar, R., & Nowlis, S. (2009). Opportunity cost neglect. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 36(4), 553–561. http://doi.org/10.1086/599764 
Freeman, L. C. (1978). Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification. Social Networks, 
1(3), 215–239. http://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(78)90021-7 
Fried, E. I., & Cramer, A. O. J. (2017). Moving forward: Challenges and directions for 
psychopathological network theory and methodology. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 12(6), 999–1020. http://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617705892 
Friesen, J. P., Kay, A. C., Eibach, R. P., & Galinsky, A. D. (2014). Seeking structure in social 
 116 
organization: Compensatory control and the psychological advantages of hierarchy. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 106(4), 590–609. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0035620 
Fujita, K. (2011). On conceptualizing self-control as more than the effortful inhibition of 
impulses. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15(4), 352–366. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1088868311411165 
Fujita, K., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Levin-Sagi, M. (2006). Construal levels and self-control. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90(3), 351–367. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.90.3.351 
Furnham, A. (1988). Lay theories: Everyday understanding of problems in the social sciences 
(Vol. Xiii). Elmsford, NY, US: Pergamon Press. 
Furr, R. M., & Rosenthal, R. (2003). Evaluating theories efficiently: The nuts and bolts of 
contrast analysis. Understanding Statistics, 2(1), 33–67. 
http://doi.org/10.1207/S15328031US0201_03 
Gelfand, M. J., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L., Leslie, L. M., Lun, J., Lim, B. C., … Yamaguchi, S. 
(2011). Differences between tight and loose cultures: A 33-nation study. Science, 
332(6033), 1100–1104. http://doi.org/10.1126/science.1197754 
Gelman, S. A. (2003). The essential child: Origins of essentialism in everyday thought. New 
York, NY, US: Oxford University Press. 
Gelman, S. A. (2004). Psychological essentialism in children. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(9), 
404–409. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.07.001 
Gelman, S. A., Coley, J. D., & Gottfried, G. M. (1994). Essentialist beliefs in children: The 
 117 
acquisition of concepts and theories. In L. A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping 
the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture (pp. 341–366). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1990). Action phases and mind-sets. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino 
(Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (Vol. 2, pp. 
53–92). New York, NY, US: Guilford Press. 
Gollwitzer, P. M., Gawrilow, C., & Oettingen, G. (2010). The power of planning: Self-control by 
effective goal-striving. In R. R. Hassin, K. N. Ochsner, & Y. Trope (Eds.), Self Control in 
Society, Mind, and Brain (pp. 279–296). Cambridge, UK: Oxford University Press. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391381.003.0015 
Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., Swann, W. B., & Swann Jr., W. B. (2003). A very brief measure 
of the Big-Five personality domains. Journal of Research in Personality, 37(6), 504–528. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0092-6566(03)00046-1 
Gray, J. S., Ozer, D. J., & Rosenthal, R. (2017). Goal conflict and psychological well-being: A 
meta-analysis. Journal of Research in Personality, 66, 27–37. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2016.12.003 
Grossmann, I., & Kung, F. Y. H. (2018). Wisdom across cultures. In S. Kitayama & D. Cohen 
(Eds.), Handbook of Cultural Psychology (vol. 2). New York, NY, US: Guilford Press. 
Grouzet, F. M. E., Kasser, T., Ahuvia, A., Dols, J. M. F., Kim, Y., Lau, S., … Sheldon, K. M. 
(2005). The structure of goal contents across 15 cultures. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 89(5), 800–816. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.89.5.800 
 118 
Guilford, J. P. (1950). Creativity. American Psychologist, 5(9), 444–454. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/h0063487 
Hamilton, D. L., Sherman, S. J., & Rodgers, J. S. (2004). Perceiving the groupness of groups: 
Entitativity, homogeneity, essentialism, and stereotypes. In V. Yzerbyt, C. M. Judd, & O. 
Corneille (Eds.), The psychology of group perception: Perceived variability, entitativity, 
and essentialism (pp. 39–60). New York, NY, US: Psychology Press. 
Hanneman, R. A., & Riddle, M. (2005). Introduction to social network methods. Riverside, CA, 
US. 
Haslam, N. (2017). The origins of lay Theories: The case of essentialist beliefs. In C. M. 
Zedelius, B. C. N. Müller, & J. W. Schooler (Eds.), The science of lay theories (pp. 3–16). 
Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-
57306-9_1 
Haynes, S. N., Richard, D. C. S., & Kubany, E. S. (1995). Content validity in psychological 
assessment: A functional approach to concepts and methods. Psychological Assessment, 
7(3), 238–247. http://doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.7.3.238 
Hebb, D. O. (1955). Drives and the C. N. S. (conceptual nervous system). Psychological Review, 
62(4), 243–254. http://doi.org/10.1037/h0041823 
Heckhausen, J., Wrosch, C., & Schulz, R. (2010). A motivational theory of life-span 
development. Psychological Review, 117(1), 32–60. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0017668 
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York, NY, US: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
 119 
Higgins, E. T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. American Psychologist, 52(12), 1280–1300. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.52.12.1280 
Higgins, E. T. (2000). Making a good decision: Value from fit. American Psychologist, 55(11), 
1217–1230. http://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.11.1217 
Higgins, E. T. (2005). Value from regulatory fit. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 
14(4), 209–213. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00366.x 
Higgins, E. T., Bargh, J. A., & Lombardi, W. J. (1985). Nature of priming effects on 
categorization. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
11(1), 59–69. 
Higgins, E. T., Friedman, R. S., Harlow, R. E., Idson, L. C., Ayduk, O. N., & Taylor, A. (2001). 
Achievement orientations from subjective histories of success: Promotion pride versus 
prevention pride. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31(1), 3–23. 
http://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.27 
Higgins, E. T., Horwitz, E. K., Horwitz, M. B., Cope, J., Horwitz, E. K., Horwitz, M. B., & 
Cope, J. (1987). Self-discrepancy: a theory relating self and affect. Psychological Review, 
94(3), 319–340. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.94.3.319 
Higgins, E. T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Pierro, A. (2003). Regulatory mode: Locomotion and 
assessment as distinct orientations. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology (Vol. 35, pp. 293–344). New York: Academic Press. 
Hirsch, J. E. (2005). An index to quantify an individual’s scientific research output. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 102(46), 16569–
 120 
16572. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0507655102 
Hirschfeld, L. A. (2001). On a folk theory of society: Children, evolution, and mental 
representations of social groups. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5(2), 107–117. 
http://doi.org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0502_2 
Hong, Y., Chao, M. M., & No, S. (2009). Dynamic interracial/intercultural processes: The role of 
lay theories of race. Journal of Personality, 77, 1283–309. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
6494.2009.00582.x 
Hong, Y., Levy, S. R., & Chiu, C. (2001). The contribution of the lay theories approach to the 
study of groups. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5(2), 98–106. 
http://doi.org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0502_1 
Huang, S., Jin, L., & Zhang, Y. (2017). Step by step: Sub-goals as a source of motivation. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 141, 1–15. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2017.05.001 
Huang, S., Zhang, Y., & Broniarczyk, S. M. (2012). So near and yet so far: The mental 
representation of goal progress. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103(2), 225–
241. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0028443 
Ilies, R., & Judge, T. A. (2005). Goal regulation across time: The effects of feedback and affect. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 90(3), 453–467. http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.90.3.453 
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology (Vol. I & II). New York, NY: Holt. 
Jayaratne, T. E., Ybarra, O., Sheldon, J. P., Brown, T. N., Feldbaum, M., Pfeffer, C. A., & Petty, 
E. M. (2006). White Americans’ genetic lay theories of race differences and sexual 
 121 
orientation: Their relationship with prejudice toward Blacks, and gay men and lesbians. 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 9(1), 77–94. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1368430206059863 
Jehn, K. A. (1997). A qualitative analysis of conflict types and dimensions in organizational 
groups. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(3), 530–557. http://doi.org/10.2307/2393737 
Johnson, R. E., Chang, C.-H. (Daisy), & Yang, L.-Q. (2010). Commitment and motivation at 
work: The relevance of employee identity and regulatory focus. Academy of Management 
Review, 35(2), 226–245. 
Johnson, R. E., Howe, M., & Chang, C.-H. (2012). The importance of velocity, or why speed 
may matter more than distance. Organizational Psychology Review, 3(1), 62–85. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/2041386612463836 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 47(2), 263–291. 
Kay, A. C., Laurin, K., Fitzsimons, G. M., & Landau, M. J. (2014). A functional basis for 
structure-seeking: Exposure to structure promotes willingness to engage in motivated 
action. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(2), 486–491. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0034462 
Kelly, G. A. (1955). The psychology of personal constructs. Volume 1: A theory of personality. 
New York, NY, US: WW Norton and Company. 
Kelly, R. E., Mansell, W., & Wood, A. M. (2015). Goal conflict and well-being: A review and 
hierarchical model of goal conflict, ambivalence, self-discrepancy and self-concordance. 
 122 
Personality and Individual Differences, 85, 212–229. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2015.05.011 
Kleiman, T., & Hassin, R. R. (2013). When conflicts are good: Nonconscious goal conflicts 
reduce confirmatory thinking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 105(3), 374–
387. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0033608 
Kluger, A. N., & DeNisi, A. (1998). Feedback interventions: Toward the understanding of a 
double-edged sword. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 7(3), 67–72. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/20182507 
Koo, M., & Fishbach, A. (2008). Dynamics of self-regulation: How (un)accomplished goal 
actions affect motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94(2), 183–195. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.94.2.183 
Koo, M., & Fishbach, A. (2010). Climbing the goal ladder: How upcoming actions increase level 
of aspiration. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99(1), 1–13. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0019443 
Köpetz, C., Faber, T., Fishbach, A., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2011). The multifinality constraints 
effect: How goal multiplicity narrows the means set to a focal end. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 100(5), 810–826. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0022980 
Kray, L. J., & Haselhuhn, M. P. (2007). Implicit negotiation beliefs and performance: 
experimental and longitudinal evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
93(1), 49–64. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.1.49 
Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., & Tory Higgins, E. (2007). Regulatory mode and preferred 
 123 
leadership styles: How fit increases job satisfaction. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 
29(2), 137–149. http://doi.org/10.1080/01973530701331700 
Kruglanski, A. W., Shah, J. Y., Fishbach, A., Friedman, R., Chun, W. Y., & Sleeth-Keppler, D. 
(2002). A theory of goal systems. In Mark P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology (Vol. 34, pp. 331–378). San Diego, CA, US: Academic Press. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(02)80008-9 
Kruglanski, A. W., Thompson, E. P., Higgins, E. T., Pierro, A., & Spiegel, S. (2000). To "do the 
right thing " or to "just do it ": Locomotion and assessment as distinct self-regulatory 
imperatives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(5), 793–815. 
http://doi.org/10.10371A1022-3514.79.5.79 
Kuncel, N. R., Hezlett, S. A., & Ones, D. S. (2004). Academic performance, career potential, 
creativity, and job performance: Can one construct predict them all? Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 86(1), 148–161. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.86.1.148 
Kung, F. Y. H., Chao, M. M., Yao, D. J., Adair, W. L., Fu, J. H., & Tasa, K. (2018). Bridging 
racial divides: Social constructionist (vs. essentialist) beliefs facilitate trust in intergroup 
contexts. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 74, 121–134. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.09.008 
Kung, F. Y. H., Eibach, R. P., & Grossmann, I. (2016). Culture, fixed-world beliefs, 
relationships, and perceptions of identity change. Social Psychological and Personality 
Science, 7(7), 631–639. http://doi.org/10.1177/1948550616652208 
Kurtzberg, T. R. (1998). Creative thinking, a cognitive aptitude, and integrative joint gain: A 
study of negotiator creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 11(4), 283–293. 
 124 
http://doi.org/10.1207/s15326934crj1104_2 
Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical 
data. Biometrics, 33(1), 159–174. http://doi.org/10.2307/2529310 
Laran, J. (2010). Goal management in sequential choices: Consumer choices for others are more 
indulgent than personal choices. Journal of Consumer Research, 37(2), 304–314. 
http://doi.org/10.1086/652193 
Laran, J., & Janiszewski, C. (2009). Behavioral consistency and inconsistency in the resolution 
of goal conflict. Journal of Consumer Research, 35(6), 967–984. 
http://doi.org/10.1086/593293 
Latham, G. P., & Locke, E. A. (1991). Self-regulation through goal setting. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50(2), 212–247. http://doi.org/10.1016/0749-
5978(91)90021-K 
Laurin, K., Fitzsimons, G. M., & Kay, A. C. (2011). Social disadvantage and the self-regulatory 
function of justice beliefs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(1), 149–171. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0021343 
Lauterbach, W., & Newman, C. F. (1999). Computerized intrapersonal conflict assessment in 
cognitive therapy. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 6(5), 357–374. 
http://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0879(199911)6:5<357::AID-CPP208>3.0.CO;2-3 
Leith, S. A., Ward, C. L. P., Giacomin, M., Landau, E. S., Ehrlinger, J., & Wilson, A. E. (2014). 
Changing theories of change: Strategic shifting in implicit theory endorsement. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 107(4), 597–620. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0037699 
 125 
Leung, A. K. -y., & Chiu, C. (2010). Multicultural experience, idea receptiveness, and creativity. 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 41(5–6), 723–741. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0022022110361707 
Levy, S. R., Stroessner, S. J., & Dweck, C. S. (1998). Stereotype formation and endorsement: 
The role of implicit theories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(6), 1421–
1436. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1421 
Lewin, K. (1943). Defining the “field at a given time.” Psychological Review, 50(3), 292–310. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/h0062738 
Lewin, K. (1951). Intention, will, and need. In D. Rapaport (Ed.), Organization and pathology of 
thought: Selected sources. (pp. 95–153). New York: Columbia University Press. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/10584-005 
Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (2008). The psychology of transcending the here and now. Science, 
322(5905), 1201–1205. http://doi.org/10.1126/science.1161958 
Light, R. J. (1971). Measures of response agreement for qualitative data: Some generalizations 
and alternatives. Psychological Bulletin, 76(5), 365–377. http://doi.org/10.1037/h0031643 
Linville, P. W. (1987). Self-complexity as a cognitive buffer against stress-related illness and 
depression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(4), 663–676. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.52.4.663 
Liu, L. A., Friedman, R., Barry, B., Gelfand, M. J., & Zhang, Z.-X. (2012). The Dynamics of 
Consensus Building in Intracultural and Intercultural Negotiations. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 57, 269–304. http://doi.org/10.1177/0001839212453456 
 126 
Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (1990). A theory of goal setting & task performance. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ, US: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Lockwood, P., Jordan, C. H., & Kunda, Z. (2002). Motivation by positive or negative role 
models: Regulatory focus determines who will best inspire us. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 83(4), 854–864. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.4.854 
Lord, R. G., & Levy, P. E. (1994). Moving from cognition to action: A control theory 
perspective. Applied Psychology, 43(3), 335–367. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-
0597.1994.tb00828.x 
Louro, M. J., Pieters, R., & Zeelenberg, M. (2007). Dynamics of multiple-goal pursuit. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 93(2), 174. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.93.2.174 
Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Social hierarchy: The self‐reinforcing nature of power 
and status. The Academy of Management Annals, 2(1), 351–398. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/19416520802211628 
Major, V. S., Klein, K. J., & Ehrhart, M. G. (2002). Work time, work interference with family, 
and psychological distress. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(3), 427–436. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.87.3.427 
Malaviya, P., Brendl, C. M., & Miguel, C. (2014). Do hedonic motives moderate regulatory 
focus motives? Evidence from the framing of persuasive messages. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 106(1), 1–19. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0034666 
Mannetti, L., Leder, S., Insalata, L., Pierro, A., Higgins, T., & Kruglanski, A. (2009). Priming 
 127 
the ant or the grasshopper in people’s mind: How regulatory mode affects inter-temporal 
choices. European Journal of Social Psychology, 39(6), 1120–1125. 
http://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.601 
Markman, K. D., Lindberg, M. J., Kray, L. J., & Galinsky, A. D. (2007). Implications of 
counterfactual structure for creative generation and analytical problem solving. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(3), 312–324. http://doi.org/10.1177/0146167206296106 
Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review, 50(4), 370–396. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/h0054346 
Mathieu, J. E., Heffner, T. S., Goodwin, G. F., Salas, E., & Cannon-Bowers, J. A. (2000). The 
influence of shared mental models on team process and performance. The Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 85(2), 273–83. http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.85.2.273 
McClelland, D. C. (1987). Human motivation. New York, NY, US: Cambridge Univerisity Press. 
McGregor, I., & Little, B. R. (1998). Personal projects, happiness, and meaning: on doing well 
and being yourself. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(2), 494–512. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.2.494 
McKeown, G. (2014). Essentialism: The disciplined pursuit of less. New York, NY, US: Crown 
Business. 
Medin, D. L., & Ortony, A. (1989). Psychological essentialism. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony 
(Eds.), Similarity and analogical reasoning (pp. 179–195). New York, NY, US: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mellers, B., Ungar, L., Baron, J., Ramos, J., Gurcay, B., Fincher, K., … Tetlock, P. E. (2014). 
 128 
Psychological strategies for winning a geopolitical forecasting tournament. Psychological 
Science, 25(5), 1106–1115. http://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614524255 
Milkman, K. L., Minson, J. A., & Volpp, K. G. M. (2014). Holding the hunger games hostage at 
the gym: An evaluation of temptation bundling. Management Science, 60(2), 283–299. 
http://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1784 
Miller, G. A., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. H. (1960). Plans and the structure of behavior. New 
York: Holt. http://doi.org/10.1037/10039-000 
Miller, N. E. (1944). Experimental studies of conflict. In J. M. Hunt (Ed.), Personality and the 
behavior disorders (pp. 431–465). Oxford, England: Ronald Press. 
Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: 
reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure. 
Psychological Review, 102(2), 246–268. 
Netemeyer, R. G., Boles, J. S., & McMurrian, R. (1996). Development and validation of work-
family conflict and family-work conflict scales. Journal of Applied Psychology, 81(4), 400–
410. http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.81.4.400 
Neuberg, S. L., & Newsom, J. T. (1993). Personal need for structure: Individual differences in 
the desire for simpler structure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(1), 113–
131. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.65.1.113 
No, S., Hong, Y., Liao, H.-Y., Lee, K., Wood, D., & Chao, M. M. (2008). Lay theory of race 
affects and moderates asian americans’ responses toward american culture. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 95(4), 991–1004. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0012978 
 129 
Orehek, E., Bessarabova, E., Chen, X., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2011). Positive affect as 
informational feedback in goal pursuit. Motivation and Emotion, 35(1), 44–51. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-010-9197-2 
Orehek, E., Mauro, R., Kruglanski, A. W., & van der Bles, A. M. (2012). Prioritizing association 
strength versus value: The influence of self-regulatory modes on means evaluation in single 
goal and multigoal contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(1), 22–31. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0025881 
Orehek, E., & Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, A. (2013). Sequential and concurrent strategies of multiple 
goal pursuit. Review of General Psychology2, 175(3), 339–349. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0032584 
Oyserman, D. (2007). Social identity and self-regulation. In A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins 
(Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 432–453). New York, NY: 
Guilford Press. 
Peer, E., Brandimarte, L., Samat, S., & Acquisti, A. (2017). Beyond the Turk: Alternative 
platforms for crowdsourcing behavioral research. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 70, 153–163. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.01.006 
Pierro, A., Giacomantonio, M., Pica, G., Kruglanski, A. W., & Higgins, E. T. (2011). On the 
psychology of time in action: Regulatory mode orientations and procrastination. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 101(6), 1317–1331. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0025943 
Pittman, T. S., & Zeigler, K. R. (2007). Basic human needs. In A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. 
Higgins (Eds.), Social Psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 473–489). New York, 
NY, US: Guilford Press. 
 130 
Plaks, J. E. (2017). Implicit theories: Assumptions that shape social and moral cognition. In 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. http://doi.org/10.1016/bs.aesp.2017.02.003 
Plaks, J. E., Malahy, L. W., Sedlins, M., & Shoda, Y. (2012). Folk beliefs about human genetic 
variation predict discrete versus continuous racial categorization and evaluative bias. Social 
Psychological and Personality Science, 3(1), 31–39. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1948550611408118 
Plaks, J. E., & Stecher, K. (2007). Unexpected improvement, decline, and stasis: A prediction 
confidence perspective on achievement success and failure. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 93(4), 667–684. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.4.667 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method 
biases in behavioral research: a critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879–903. http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.88.5.879 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Moorman, R. H., & Fetter, R. (1990). Transformational 
leader behaviors and their effects on followers’ trust in leader, satisfaction, and 
organizational citizenship behaviors. The Leadership Quarterly, 1(2), 107–142. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/1048-9843(90)90009-7 
Powers, W. T. (1973). Behavior: The control of perception. Chicago, IL, US: Aldine. 
Powers, W. T., Clark, R. K., & McFarland, R. L. (1960). A general feedback theory of human 
behavior: Part I. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 11(Mono Suppl I-VII), 11, 71–88. 
Prentice, D. A., & Miller, D. T. (2007). Psychological essentialism of human categories. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 16(4), 202–206. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
 131 
8721.2007.00504.x 
Presseau, J., Tait, R. I., Johnston, D. W., Francis, J. J., & Sniehotta, F. F. (2013). Goal conflict 
and goal facilitation as predictors of daily accelerometer-assessed physical activity. Health 
Psychology, 32(12), 1179–1187. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0029430 
Pruitt, D. G. (1981). Negotiation Behavior. San Diego, CA, US: Academic Press. 
Quinn, R., & Staines, G. L. (1979). The 1977 quality of employment survey. Ann Arbor, MI, US: 
University of Michigan Survey Research Center. 
Rafaeli-Mor, E., & Steinberg, J. (2002). Self-complexity and well-being: A review and research 
synthesis. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6(1), 31–58. 
http://doi.org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0601_2 
Rattan, A., Good, C., & Dweck, C. S. (2012). “It’s ok — Not everyone can be good at math”: 
Instructors with an entity theory comfort (and demotivate) students. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 48(3), 731–737. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.12.012 
Riediger, M., & Freund, A. M. (2004). Interference and facilitation among personal goals: 
Differential associations with subjective well-Being and persistent goal pursuit. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(12), 1511–1523. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0146167204271184 
Riediger, M., Freund, A. M., & Baltes, P. B. (2005). Managing life through personal goals: 
Intergoal facilitation and intensity of goal pursuit in younger and older adulthood. The 
Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 60(2), 84–
91. http://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/60.2.P84 
 132 
Robins, R. W., & Pals, J. L. (2002). Implicit self-theories in the academic domain: Implications 
for goal orientation, attributions, affect, and self-esteem change. Self and Identity, 1(4), 
313–336. http://doi.org/10.1080/15298860290106805 
Roets, A., & Van Hiel, A. (2011). Item selection and validation of a brief, 15-item version of the 
Need for Closure Scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 50(1), 90–94. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.09.004 
Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York, NY, US: Free press. 
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ, US: Princeton 
University Press. 
Rothbart, M., & Taylor, M. (1992). Category labels and social reality: Do we view social 
categories as natural kinds? In S. G. R. & K. Fiedler (Eds.), Language, interaction and 
social cognition (pp. 11–36). Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic 
motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55(1), 68–78. 
http://doi.org/10.1037//0003-066X.55.1.68 
Sattath, S., & Tversky, A. (1977). Additive similarity trees. Psychometrika, 42(3), 319–345. 
Savary, J., Kleiman, T., Hassin, R. R., & Dhar, R. (2015). Positive consequences of conflict on 
decision making: When a conflict mindset facilitates choice. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 144(1), 1–6. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0038551 
Schaufeli, W. B., Bakker, A. B., & Salanova, M. (2006). The measurement of work engagement 
with a short questionnaire. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 66(4), 701–716. 
 133 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0013164405282471 
Schmidt, A. M., & DeShon, R. P. (2007). What to do? The effects of discrepancies, incentives, 
and time on dynamic goal prioritization. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92(4), 928–941. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.4.928 
Schmidt, A. M., & Dolis, C. M. (2009). Something’s got to give: The effects of dual-goal 
difficulty, goal progress, and expectancies on resource allocation. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 94(3), 678–691. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0014945 
Schmuck, P., & Sheldon, K. M. (2001). Life goals and well-being: Towards a positive 
psychology of human striving (Vol. X). Ashland, OH, US: Hogrefe & Huber Publishers. 
Scholer, A. A. (2014). When saying yes to the doughnut is not saying no to self-control: A 
hierarchical approach to flexibility in conflict representation. In J. P. Forgas & E. Harmon-
Jones (Eds.), Motivation and its regulation: The control within (pp. 247–262). New York, 
NY: Psychology Press. 
Scholer, A. A., Eitam, B., Stadler, G., & Higgins, E. T. (2017). How locomotion concerns 
influence perceptual judgments. Social Cognition, 35(3), 227–244. 
http://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2017.35.3.227 
Scholer, A. A., & Miele, D. B. (2016). The role of metamotivation in creating task-motivation 
fit. Motivation Science, 2(3), 171–197. http://doi.org/10.1037/mot0000043 
Schroeder, A. (2008). The snowball : Warren Buffett and the business of life. New York, NY, 
US: Bantam Books. 
Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human 
 134 
values? Journal of Social Issues, 50(4), 19–45. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
4560.1994.tb01196.x 
Schwartz, S. H., & Bilsky, W. (1987). Toward a theory of the universal content and structure of 
values: Extensions and cross-cultural replications. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 53(3), 550–562. http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.58.5.878 
Scott, G., Leritz, L. E., & Mumford, M. D. (2004). The effectiveness of creativity training: A 
quantitative review. Creativity Research Journal, 16(4), 361–388. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/10400410409534549 
Shah, A. K., Shafir, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2015). Scarcity frames value. Psychological Science, 
26(4), 402–412. Retrieved from 
http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/02/12/0956797614563958.abstract 
Shah, J. Y., Friedman, R., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2002). Forgetting all else: On the antecedents 
and consequences of goal shielding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(6), 
1261–1280. http://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.83.6.1261 
Shah, J. Y., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2000). Aspects of goal networks: Implications for self-
regulation. In M. Boekaerts, P. R. Pintrich, & M. Zeidner (Eds.), Handbook of Self-
Regulation (pp. 85–110). London, England: Academic Press. http://doi.org/10.1016/B978-
012109890-2/50033-0 
Sharma, S., & Bottom, W. P. (2013). Personality, intelligence and negotiation outcomes: A 
meta-analysis of the evidence. Academy of Management Proceedings, 2013(1), 13148–
13148. http://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2013.134 
 135 
Sheldon, K. M., & Elliot, A. J. (1999). Goal striving, need satisfaction, and longitudinal well-
being: The self-concordance model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(3), 
482–497. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.76.3.482 
Sheldon, K. M., & Emmons, R. A. (1995). Comparing differentiation and integration within 
personal goal systems. Personality and Individual Differences, 18(1), 39–46. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(94)00131-B 
Shockley, K. M., Shen, W., DeNunzio, M. M., Arvan, M. L., & Knudsen, E. A. (2017). 
Disentangling the relationship between gender and work–family conflict: An integration of 
theoretical perspectives using meta-analytic methods. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
102(12), 1601–1635. http://doi.org/10.1037/apl0000246 
Sisk, V. F., Burgoyne, A. P., Sun, J., Butler, J. L., & Macnamara, B. N. (2018). To what extent 
and under which circumstances are growthmindsets important to academic achievement? 
Two meta-analyses. Psychological Science, 29(4), 549–571. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617739704 
Slade, P. D., & Sheehan, M. J. (1979). The measurement of ‘conflict’ in repertory grids. British 
Journal of Psychology, 70(4), 519–524. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8295.1979.tb01726.x 
Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1991). A terror management theory of social 
behavior: The psychological functions of self-esteem and cultural worldviews. In Advances 
in experimental social psychology (pp. 93–159). New York, NY, US: Academic Press. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60328-7 
Staines, G. L., & Pleck, J. H. (1983). The impact of work schedules on the family. Ann Arbor, 
MI, US: Institute for Social Research. 
 136 
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1997). Reasoning independently of prior belief and individual 
differences in actively open-minded thinking. Journal of Educational Psychology, 89(2), 
342–357. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0663.89.2.342 
Steffens, N. K., Gocłowska, M. A., Cruwys, T., & Galinsky, A. D. (2016). How multiple social 
identities are related to creativity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(2), 188–
203. http://doi.org/10.1177/0146167215619875 
Steger, M. F., Kashdan, T. B., Sullivan, B. A., & Lorentz, D. (2008). Understanding the search 
for meaning in life: Personality, cognitive style, and the dynamic between seeking and 
experiencing meaning. Journal of Personality, 76(2), 199–228. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2007.00484.x 
Tadmor, C. T., Galinsky, A. D., & Maddux, W. W. (2012). Getting the most out of living 
abroad: biculturalism and integrative complexity as key drivers of creative and professional 
success. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103(3), 520–42. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0029360 
Tadmor, C. T., Tetlock, P. E., & Peng, K. (2009). Acculturation strategies and integrative 
complexity: the cognitive implications of biculturalism. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, 40(1), 105–139. http://doi.org/10.1177/0022022108326279 
Talevich, J. R., Read, S. J., & Walsh, D. A. (2014). Goal Impact: A goal systems domain-general 
prediction tool, applied to voluntary job turnover. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 
36(1), 35–50. http://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2013.856784 
Tangney, J. P., Baumeister, R. F., & Boone, A. L. (2004). High self-control predicts good 
adjustment, less pathology, better grades, and interpersonal success. Journal of Personality, 
 137 
72(2), 271–324. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-3506.2004.00263.x 
Thompson, L. (1990). Negotiation behavior and outcomes: Empirical evidence and theoretical 
issues. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 515–532. http://doi.org/10.1037//0033-2909.108.3.515 
Tomasik, M. J., Knecht, M., & Freund, A. M. (2017). Some evidence for the usefulness of an 
optimal foraging theory perspective on goal conflict and goal facilitation. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology. http://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000165 
Torrance, E. P. (1974). The Torrance tests of creative thinking-Norms-Technical manual 
research edition—Verbal tests, forms A and B—Figural tests, forms A and B. Princeton, NJ, 
US: Personnel Press. 
Touré-Tillery, M., & Fishbach, A. (2011). The course of motivation. Journal of Consumer 
Psychology, 21(4), 414–423. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcps.2011.04.004 
Touré-Tillery, M., & Fishbach, A. (2012). The end justifies the means, but only in the middle. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141(3), 570–583. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0025928 
Trope, Y., & Fishbach, A. (2000). Counteractive self-control in overcoming temptation. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(4), 493–506. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.79.4.493 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2010). Construal-level theory of psychological distance. 
Psychological Review, 117(2), 440–463. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0018963 
Tullett, A. M., & Plaks, J. E. (2016). Testing the link between empathy and lay theories of 
happiness. Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(11), 1505–1521. 
 138 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0146167216665092 
Turner-McGrievy, G. M., Wright, J. A., Migneault, J. P., Quintiliani, L., & Friedman, R. H. 
(2014). The interaction between dietary and life goals: using goal systems theory to explore 
healthy diet and life goals. Health Psychology and Behavioral Medicine, 2(1), 759–769. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/21642850.2014.927737 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and 
probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5(2), 207–232. http://doi.org/10.1016/0010-
0285(73)90033-9 
Unsworth, K., Yeo, G., & Beck, J. (2014). Multiple goals: A review and derivation of general 
principles. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 35(8), 1064–1078. 
http://doi.org/10.1002/job.1963 
Vallacher, R. R., & Wegner, D. M. (1987). What do people think they’re doing? Action 
identification and human behavior. Psychological Review, 94(1), 3–15. 
http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.94.1.3 
Vallacher, R. R., & Wegner, D. M. (1989). Levels of personal agency: Individual variation in 
action identification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(4), 660–671. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.57.4.660 
Vancouver, J. B., Weinhardt, J. M., & Schmidt, A. M. (2010). A formal, computational theory of 
multiple-goal pursuit: Integrating goal-choice and goal-striving processes. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 95(6), 985–1008. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0020628 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures 
 139 
of positive and negative affect: the PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 54(6), 1063. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063 
Webb, C. E., Coleman, P. T., Rossignac-Milon, M., Tomasulo, S. J., & Higgins, E. T. (2017). 
Moving on or digging deeper: Regulatory mode and interpersonal conflict resolution. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 112(4), 621–641. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000131 
Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive 
closure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6), 1049–1062. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.6.1049 
Weingart, L. R., Bennett, R. J., & Brett, J. M. (1993). The impact of consideration of issues and 
motivational orientation on group negotiation process and outcome. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 78(3), 504–517. http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.78.3.504 
Weststrate, N. M., Ferrari, M., & Ardelt, M. (2016). The many faces of wisdom: An 
investigation of cultural-historical wisdom exemplars reveals practical, philosophical, and 
benevolent Prototypes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(5), 662–676. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0146167216638075 
White, D. R., & Borgatti, S. P. (1994). Betweenness centrality measures for directed graphs. 
Social Networks, 16(4), 335–346. http://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(94)90015-9 
White, D. R., & Harary, F. (2001). The cohesiveness of blocks In social networks: Node 
connectivity and conditional density. Sociological Methodology, 31(1), 305–359. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/0081-1750.00098 
 140 
Williams, M. J., & Eberhardt, J. L. (2008). Biological conceptions of race and the motivation to 
cross racial boundaries. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94(6), 1033–47. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.94.6.1033 
Wu, H.-Y., Kung, F. Y. H., Chen, H.-C., & Kim, Y.-H. (2016). Academic success of “tiger 
cubs”: Self-control (not IQ) predicts academic growth and explains girls’ edge in Taiwan. 
Social Psychological and Personality Science. http://doi.org/10.1177/1948550616675667 
Yeager, D. S., Trzesniewski, K. H., & Dweck, C. S. (2013). An implicit theories of personality 
intervention reduces adolescent aggression in response to victimization and exclusion. Child 
Development, 84(3), 970–88. http://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12003 
Yeager, D. S., Walton, G. M., Brady, S. T., Akcinar, E. N., Paunesku, D., Keane, L., … Dweck, 
C. S. (2016). Teaching a lay theory before college narrows achievement gaps at scale. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(24), E3341–E3348. 
http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1524360113 
Yzerbyt, V., Judd, C. M., & Corneille, O. (2004). The psychology of group perception: 
Perceived variability, entitativity, and essentialism. New York, NY, US: Psychology Press. 
Zedelius, C. M., Müller, B. C. N., & Schooler, J. W. (2017). The science of lay theories. Cham, 
Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57306-9 
Zhang, Y., Fishbach, A., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2007). The dilution model: how additional goals 
undermine the perceived instrumentality of a shared path. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 92(3), 389–401. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.3.389 
 
  
 141 
Appendix A 
Goal Model Assessment 
 
Your Goals 
Please read the instructions on each page carefully and turn over to the next page ONLY 
WHEN you have completed the task on the page. Please do not change your responses on 
earlier pages unless you are being instructed to. 
If you have any questions when you are filling out the survey, please feel free to ask the 
experimenter. 
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Your Life Goals 
[USE BLACK PEN] 
In this task, we want to understand how people understand their goals in life.  
In the space below, please think about your goals in life, and create a diagram or concept map 
to organize and present your goals visually. Please label all elements of your 
map/diagram/figure. Use only the black pen. 
There are no right or wrong, better or worse presentations. You can organize your goals in 
whatever ways you want that fit how you usually think about them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Turn to the next page only when you have finished the task on the current page.]  
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Below are three example types of different goal representations that people might use to think 
about their goals: 
 
 
How much do you think each of the examples is similar to your own view of goals? 
  Not at all                                            Extremely 
similar                                                    similar 
1. Hierarchical 1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
2. Network 1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
3. Sequential 1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
 
 
Please rank the models according to how closely they fit the way you think about or represent 
your goals:   
(1: the closest fit ---- 3: the least close fit) 
Hierarchical    ________ 
Network          ________ 
Sequential       ________ 
 
 
 
 
 
[Turn to the next page only when you have finished the task on the current page.] 
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[USE BLUE PEN] 
 
From now on, please do NOT change the drawing of your goals by erasing goals or adding new 
goals. 
 
Please go back to your visual presentation of goals… 
If you have already drawn lines in between your goals to indicate there are some sort of 
relations, use the blue pen to indicate above the line how they are related by: 
- using a “+” sign when the pursuit of a goal facilitates/helps the pursuit of the other 
- using a “-“ sign when the pursuit of a goal hinders/excludes the pursuit of the other 
 
 
If you did not draw any lines between goals, you may turn to the next page. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Turn to the next page only when you have finished the task on the current page.] 
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[USE RED PEN] 
 
Please go back to your visual presentation of goals… 
 
1. There may be links between goals that you did not indicate in your original drawing but that 
you do think are present. If this is the case, use the red pen to draw lines between goals to 
indicate the relationships.  
 
2. Use the red pen to indicate above the line how they are related by: 
- using a “+” sign when the pursuit of a goal facilitates/helps the pursuit of the other 
- using a “-“ sign when the pursuit of a goal hinders/excludes the pursuit of the other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[After you finish the task on this page, you may return the booklet to the researcher.] 
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Copy and list all the goals you have from your visual presentation below: 
After listing all the goals, please use the scale next to each goal and rate how individually 
important each goal is to you at this point in your life 
 
Goals 
Not                                                                                             Extremely 
at all                                                                                           Important 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
_____________________________________   1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10        11 
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Appendix B 
Instructions for Transforming an Undirected Goal Map into an Adjacency Matrix 
Steps 
1. On the first column in Excel, starting at cell A2, enter the name of each goal in a cell. 
a. Include subgoals 
b. Use exact wording 
c. Replace space between words with an underscore 
2. Sort goal names by alphabetical order. 
3. Copy and paste special, transposing all goal names into the first row starting at cell B1. 
4. Enter numbers in the matrix to represent goal relations 
a. -1 = negative relationship (indicated by “-” sign) 
b. 0 = no relationship 
c. 1 = relationship but no value (indicated by no or mixed sign) 
d. 2 = positive relationship (indicated by “+” sign) 
A sample goal map and its matrix 
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Appendix C 
Sample Goal Maps and the Self-Categorized Goal Model (Study 1) 
Hierarchical 
 
Network 
 
Sequential 
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Appendix D 
An Online Version of the Goal Model Assessment (Study 1) 
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Appendix E 
Goal Model Manipulation – The Network Model Condition 
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Goal Model Manipulation – The Hierarchical Model Condition 
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Goal Model Manipulation – The Sequential Model Condition 
The Sequential Model Condition 
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Appendix F 
A Sample Goal Map from Each Goal Model Condition (Study 3) 
Hierarchical 
 
Network 
 
Sequential  
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Appendix G 
Goal Model Scale 
1. My goals were categorized from the most important to least clearly. 
2. There was a clear hierarchy of goals. Some goals were just meant to be more important 
than the others. 
3. I classified my goals by order of importance. 
4. I organized my goals by significance from the most important to the least. 
5. I organized my goals based on their level of interconnectedness. 
6. I paid a lot of attention to the ways that goals were related to each other. 
7. Many of my goals were closely related to others, and therefore completing a goal could 
greatly influence the progress towards its connected goals. 
8. The more important my goal was, the more it would be interconnected with and 
influence other goals. 
9. I placed my goals on a timeline based on the chronological order to achieve them. 
10. My goals were arranged in a step-by-step process. 
11. I organized my goals in chronological orders. 
12. My drawing of the goals had a clear sequence of steps. 
 
Note. Used as manipulation check in Study 3. The hierarchical model sub-scale consists of Item 
1-4; the network model sub-scale consists of Item 5-8; the sequential model sub-scale consistent 
of Item 9-12. 
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Appendix H 
Story Rewriting Task (Integrative Creativity) 
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Appendix I 
Brick Use Task (Divergent Creativity) 
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Appendix J 
Exploratory Individual Difference Measures 
Measure Reference 
Study 
1 
Study 
2 
Study 
3 
Study 
4 
Study 
5 
Study 
6 
Study 
7 
         
Actively open-minded 
thinking  
Stanovich & West, 1997  X      
Career interest  
Laurin, Fitzsimons, & 
Kay, 2011 
    X  X 
Cultural tightness  Gelfand et al., 2011 X   X  X  
Family satisfaction  Staines & Pleck, 1983  X      
Implicit person theory Levy et al., 1998 X  X X X X X 
Job engagement 
Schaufeli, Bakker, & 
Salanova, 2006 
 X      
Job involvement  Quinn & Staines, 1979  X      
Job satisfaction 
Cammann, Fichman, 
Jenkins, & Klesh, 1983 
 X      
Life satisfaction Diener et al., 1985 X X X X X X X 
Need for closure Roets & Van Hiel, 2011 X X X X X X X 
Need for cognition 
Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng 
Kao, 1984 
X X X X X X X 
Need for structure 
Neuberg & Newsom, 
1993 
X X X X X X X 
Positive and negative 
affect schedule 
Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988 
X   X  X  
Regulatory focus Higgins et al., 2001 X   X  X  
Regulatory mode 
Kruglanski, Thompson, 
Higgins, Pierro, & 
Spiegel, 2000 
X X X X X X X 
Self-esteem Rosenberg, 1965 X X X X X X X 
Ten-item personality 
inventory 
Gosling, Rentfrow, 
Swann, & Swann Jr., 
2003 
X X X X X X X 
Trait self-control 
Tangney, Baumeister, & 
Boone, 2004 
X  X X X X X 
Universal values Schwartz, 1994 X   X  X  
 
 
 
